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THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF CIVIL SOCIETY:

ASSOCIATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

by

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Date: March 31, 2004

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science in the Graduate School
of Duke University

2004

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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Political theorists since Tocqueville and J. S. Mill have predicated citizen support for democratic government on the experience of what Mill called "democratic institutions in detail" in associational life. "Congruence theory" holds that associations must conform to the structure of government, but recent critic Nancy Rosenblum asserts the value for democracy of maintaining associations' structural pluralism. Previous empirical studies have generally sought to test for relationships between associations and democratic government simply by counting survey respondents' mentions of associational memberships. This project collected data to estimate respondents' exposure to the internal political institutions of associations, identifying large associations mentioned by at least two respondents to the 1996 American National Election Study. Association leaders responded to a questionnaire about internal political institutions, resulting in finished questionnaires for sixty-seven large U.S. associations. A confirmatory measurement model generated latent factors of organizational democracy and membership constitutionality for fifty-nine associations. These factors were employed to estimate models of organizational success at the association level and models of generalized trust, internal and external efficacy, regime support and participation at the respondent level. At the association level, organizational democracy requires strong membership standards just to achieve success levels similar to autocratic organizations. And NES respondents involved in more democratic and constitutional associations are generally not more trusting, efficacious, or supportive of democracy, nor are they more likely to vote or campaign. The study concludes that congruence theory assumes a model

of human cognition that is too simplistic, given psychological research on the advanced nature of abstract inference, and suggests that associations would have to work hard at the civic education necessary to make their mental models relevant and salient as influences on evaluations of government.

Dedication

This dissertation, along with all its positive consequences, is dedicated to my lovely wife, LaVonne, who has made eight years of graduate school a wonderful time of comfort and peace, and to my joyful son Jay, who gave me the inspiration to stop at eight years and try to grow up as fast as he is.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

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CHAPTER 1: A Little League Theory of Democratic Politics



Doonesbury *by Garry Trudeau, November 3, 2002; used under educational permissions*

"This is *not* a democracy!"—but why not?

Garry Trudeau's cartoon quarterback barks to his team: "This is *not* a democracy!" The phrase has become as much a staple of American conversation as "finders keepers" and "eat your spinach." Its popularity is both an indicator of the pervasiveness of democratic organizational norms—for democracy is a general form of *governance*, not just of government—and a reminder that any commitment to democratic practices is sensitive to context and wary of overreaching itself. People can and do stake out decisions that are legitimately not subject to collective judgment. But the quarterback's teammates could easily pose another classic question in response: "Why not?" They might even respond by saying, "In fact, this *is* a democracy, and if you want to stay team captain, you'll call a different play!"

When should "this," whatever "this" is, be a democracy, and how much so? This study is in part inspired by personal experience with stubborn, deep-seated patterns of resistance to the slightest whiff of democratization in organizations and other settings in

polite society. I have heard the quarterback's retort uttered in great earnest on numerous occasions, in response to no more than tentative proposals to cope with conflict by voting or having a group discussion. Persons in positions of power are not the sole sources of resistance; the rank and file are as wary of wasting time on "politics" as executives and trustees. I wondered why, in "the world's oldest democracy," do citizens routinely object to the use of the same patterns of political behavior that they historically have held virtually sacred at the national level?

One answer that repeatedly suggested itself was that today's citizens might have fewer opportunities than they once did to experience democratic practice firsthand and become comfortable with it. As a student representative to my hometown's school board, I observed early in life that neither I nor any of my cohort had much real experience with Roberts' Rules of Order, for example, while my grandparents' generation was relatively steeped in such "political technologies" or "organizational repertoires" for collective decision making. This declining democratic training seems to accompany the notorious decline in respect and trust for government and politicians; citizens with experience in associational democracies might be more comfortable with the noisy democratic machinery of the nation-state. But the opposite is also possible: people who belong to democratic organizations may have seen enough of democracy's characteristic foibles to become disillusioned and cautious about overusing it. Our national habit of wisecracking about the dysfunctionality of committees and boards is not a commentary on Congress, it is drawn from much more personal experience. Whichever explanation seems more

likely, the question is raised: do citizens' experiences of non-governmental democracies have effects on their attitudes toward and behaviors within the national polity?

I have since learned that this question and its many cousins have a remarkably long family history in political theory and science, but contemporary empirical investigations have done little to test hypotheses on data. In this study, I examine some of the intellectual history of government-association "congruence theory," the idea that associations must be structured democratically to support democratic government. I propose and test a set of hypotheses about congruence, using the 1996 American National Election Studies (NES) data and a supplemental data set I collected from large U.S. membership associations. As a would-be organizational design consultant, I began the data collection project with a fairly strong conviction that exposure to associational democracy should accompany attitudes and behaviors supportive of a democratic regime, a relationship I believed should swamp the effect of association counts in the national polling data. There are valid reasons to consider democratic organizations essential to democratic nations, and the argument has an intellectual pedigree at least from John Stuart Mill to Robert Putnam. But reading of contrarian liberal political theorists, particularly Nancy Rosenblum (1994; 1998), led me to complicate my conviction long before my data analysis revealed generally null findings. The crusading organizational reformer in me has been further humbled by reading Edmund Burke, who heaped withering disdain on intellectual interlopers who propose to gut hallowed institutions in the name of abstract principles of right and efficiency:

> What is the use of discussing a man's abstract right to food or medicine [or organizational voice]? The question is upon the method of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall always advise to call in the aid of the farmer and the physician rather than the professor of metaphysics [or political science]. (Burke 1790, editorial brackets mine)

Burke's undeservedly reactionary reputation notwithstanding, there is something marvelously democratic about the implication that the organizational design of 4H or the American Medical Association should be up to farmers and physicians, not political scientists. Still, Burke himself was a sort of consultant, who saw fit to advise on who should decide. Rosenblum too arrives at some firm, if measured conclusions about the "moral uses of pluralism." There is a settled wisdom that runs throughout voices as disparate as Burke and Mill, Rosenblum and von Hayek, in favor of a massively plural society in which decisions of institutional design are devolved as thoroughly as resource allocation in a market society. In other words, there should be a "free market" for nonmarket, political institutions, just much as there is a nonmarket framework of laws and norms that enables any market economy; I attempt to reinforce this wisdom. Congruence is logically defensible in principle, but it appears to operate on so high and complex a level of human cognition as to be an unlikely tool for social reform. I hope it is a sign of successful education that my conclusions are now restrained and my voice muted. I have settled for a complicated set of conclusions, briefly summarized here.

Overview of chapters

In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that our conceptual framework in political science needs maintenance. Politics should be understood in terms of *collective decision making under any circumstances*, not merely where macroscopic or coercive government

is concerned. Unless politics is understood correctly, political science is directed away from important political settings within organizations and civil society. Similarly, efforts to narrow definitions of *cultural* and *institutional*, while admirable for their pursuit of analytical precision, unnecessarily provoke communication failures between scholars from different disciplines and schools of thought. I discuss recent definitions of each term and attempt to illustrate their interrelatedness, their analytical utility and their ecumenical import. I hold that the usual culture-versus-institutions dichotomy is misleading; "formal" political institutions are as integral to political culture as are informal norms, "shared strategies" and habitual behaviors. The available "organizational repertoire" (Clemens 1993) represented by the internal institutions of organizations and governments necessarily embeds understandings of what human beings are and how they should act. Institutions are statements with a grammar (Crawford and Ostrom 1995) and are thus "meaning-makers" (Wedeen 2002), components of the analytical construct we call "culture" and causal influences on other "mental models" (North 1990) like attitudes, beliefs and perceived interests. Democratic institutions *per se* are not value-neutral, preference-independent, minimalist standards, as some critics of "merely procedural" democracy would claim. As mental models, abstractions of how things are and should be done, similar institutions might provide parallels and interpretive connections between citizens' everyday life and their perceptions of national government. Whether and how civil society's institutions have this influence is a critical question for political and social science. Turning to the problem of how to assess the degree of democracy, I argue that

institutions are necessary, if not sufficient, criteria for evaluating democracy at any scale or degree of political community, including organizations and associations.

In Chapter 2, I move to a more specific examination of the theory of government-association congruence, with a brief intellectual history. Nancy Rosenblum (1998) is very persuasive: any democratic political theory is fatally flawed if it mandates strict or coercive conformity or what I am calling "strong congruence" between the organizational forms of government and those of civil society. Drawing from Michael Walzer (1991), I suggest instead a "weak congruence" criterion that expects citizens to respond to almost any exposure to democratic practice, regardless of the overall nature of their involvements.

In Chapter 3, I briefly review empirical political science literature on associations, noting a markedly small population of direct treatments of organizational governance, especially with respect to political institutions in detail as opposed to very broad organizational structures. I propose a series of hypotheses about the influence of exposure to associational democracy on demand and support inputs to the political system, especially internal and external efficacy, regime support, voter turnout and campaign participation.

In Chapter 4, I describe the 1996 National Election Studies data and the questionnaire used to operationalize hypotheses and collect a supplemental data set to the 1996 NES.

Chapter 5 presents statistical evidence at the associational level confirming that a multitude of specific democratic institutions can be described as part of a single

"organizational democracy" latent variable. Additional latent variables are identified for membership constitutionality and organizational success. Analysis shows that organizational democracy interacts with membership constitutionality in a model of organizational success; strong membership standards appear to be necessary to prevent democratic practices from reducing perceptions of associational success.

In Chapter 6, respondent-level data bears out Rosenblum's claim that congruence has little empirical effect on democratic character, even when testing for the "weak" form of congruence effects. Mere associational involvement remains an important correlate of generalized trust, internal efficacy, voter turnout, and campaigning behavior. But citizens who belong to more democratic associations do not offer survey responses that are markedly more trusting of government, supportive of the democratic regime, more personally efficacious, or more indicative of participatory behavior. There are tentative indications that democratic associations may correlate with trust and internal efficacy, but only in the small subsample of respondents with complete associational data.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes that the broad expectations of congruence theory depend on a theory of cognition that underestimates the demands of abstraction across contexts. Given recent psychological research, associations would have to work very hard indeed to make their associational structures both relevant and salient for evaluations of government. Organizational repertoires are much more likely to matter at the rare moment of creation for a new association. Future research should look for evidence that associations can promote their organizational models as a means of creating "focal points" or "shared strategies" for the creation of new cooperative ventures.

Little League democracy and the sporting republic

Like the *Doonesbury* quarterback, one can adopt a perspective from which the Little League is hardly democratic. Children are taught baseball by adult coaches, often with autocratic authority, both by nature of their age and the way the game is played. But from an adult, organizational vantage, the Little League is a profoundly democratic voluntary association, in which local members elect league presidents, who in turn elect district administrators, who in turn elect regional representatives to the international Board of Directors. The Little League trumpets its democratic form on its web site: "This democratic process is designed to provide both enthusiastic participation and equitable representation from the local to the global level in the administration of the Little League program" (Little League 2002). Of 1,534 respondents to the post-election 1996 American National Election Study (Rosenstone et al. 1998), 42 (2.7%) mentioned involvement with Little League baseball. In comparison, just 45 (2.9%) mentioned any involvement with either major political party's many official organs.[1] The Little League's philosophy of governance has a non-negligible opportunity to influence the public's attitudes toward democratic practice.

The Little League contrasts markedly with the emerging modal form of organization among large voluntary associations in the United States, which have shifted away from a

[1]Of course, some respondents were referring to other youth sports leagues, much as one says "Xerox" when one means "photocopy" or "Kleenex" when one means "facial tissue," to the chagrin of the trademark holders. Several respondents who mentioned "Little League Soccer" or "Little League Football" are excluded from this count, since the Little League is strictly a baseball organization. This form of communication error is a challenge to the accuracy of any project that collects mentions of specific organizations; work is needed to find a time-efficient way of ensuring data identifies exactly which organization a survey respondent belongs to. But the political party measures are subject to a similar kind of error, as some "Democrat" and "Republican" organizations have no real ties to the parties.

political base in grass-roots membership and toward the professionalized model encouraged by Washington-centric advocacy dependent on mail-order donations (Skocpol 1999; Skocpol 2003) and the regulatory demands of the 501(c)(3) tax code (Hall 1992, 91). There is at least some evidence of Max Weber's "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationalization, more recently labeled "institutional isomorphism" (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), as government policy and the exigencies of influence seeking coax organizations into increasingly similar, nonparticipatory forms. Meanwhile, grass-roots participation in voluntary associations as a proportion of the population has apparently dropped precipitously (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000), particularly in the largest associations (Skocpol 1999).

The Little League's intentionally participatory design and all such exceptions to the "iron cage" rule raise two very practical questions: First, can the implementation of democratic associational institutions in fact increase "enthusiastic participation" within such associations, enhancing their ability to achieve goals of public service, policy influence or mutual benefit? Second, do citizens involved with differing forms of associational governance differ significantly in their political attitudes and behaviors in the governmental sphere? Can some associations, by their institutional form alone, acculturate members who are relatively more sophisticated in their approach to politics, more efficacious in their perception of self and government, and more supportive of democratic forms of government?

There is a powerful American tradition of answering these questions in the affirmative, adopting substantive metaphors for democratic politics from every aspect of

life: military combat, religious practices, educational institutions, literary circles and agricultural practices. Sporting organizations in particular have a history of intellectual connection with republican values in practical political theory, one of many forms of healthy institutional congruence between everyday life and government. Mark Dyreson has documented how the same political thinkers and leaders who promoted the Progressive reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were vocal advocates of the United States as a "sporting republic." Sport became "a moral equivalent for war" (Dyreson 1998, 6, quoting William James) in the sense that it provided the impetus for social solidarity and the outlet for "pugnacity" otherwise filled by military conflict. "Sport re-creates the cherished values and norms of republicanism in its fervent devotion to the spirit of the rules" (1998, 13). These beliefs fostered first calls for government encouragement of a sporting culture, then calls for government itself to conform to the rule-based, fair-play ideals of the athletic field (1998, 196-7).

Recent scholarship has echoed these traditions of society-government congruence with an athletic theme, but the Progressive's focus on forms of governance has been diluted. Most famously, Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* franchise put the impact of an apparently dying league sport on the front pages nationwide. Putnam's argument is persuasive insofar as it concerns the effects of social disconnection, and it is not my purpose here to arbitrate between Putnam and his critics who have identified alternative forms of civic engagement that Putnam did not measure. But Putnam's work is unfortunately laconic about the role of organizational institutions in non-governmental settings. The bowling illustration, for example, laments the decline of leagues, but only

because "league bowling, by requiring regular participation with a diverse set of acquaintances, did represent a form of sustained social capital that is not matched by an occasional pickup game" (Putnam 2000, 113). In this treatment, leagues are instrumental strictly for their social extensiveness, not for the object lesson in rule-based collective choice and action that was lauded by the Progressives.

Thus, while Putnam calls for a new Progressive era (Putnam 2000, 367ff), his direction diverges from some of the most important political premises of the Progressive thinkers themselves: the importance of self-governance through miniature sporting (and religious and educational and fraternal) republics. The absence of a thoughtful treatment of organizational governance has permitted readers and academic critics to misunderstand the concept of social capital, as if social capital and "networks of reciprocity" were somehow allergic to political institutionalization and threatened by rule-making and organization-building. On the contrary, as Putnam's own work reports: social capital is "fragile" with respect to institutions only insofar as one organization—perhaps a government, a corporation or a church—crushes the social-capital-rich institutions of another organization—such as a medieval guild, a modern sports league, or a layman's association. The Progressive vision would consider the Little League's influence for democratic citizenship to be a direct consequence of its organizational forms, both in the playing of the sport itself and in the governance of its logistical infrastructure; Putnam's approach at least implies that it would not matter if the Little League were run by an autocratic hierarchy, as long as it brought people together for the "horizontal" social experience of meeting strangers and making informal ties. The

problem is with the absence of analysis, not the implication; as it turns out, the data collected here suggest this unwritten implication of Putnam's may be exactly right, at least in terms of associations' effects on national politics. But it is not consistent with the Progressive thought Putnam promotes as an antidote to contemporary American woes. This study's primary finding should engage critics of Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993), who objected that the vaunted civil society of northern Italy was fertile soil for fascism as much as for democracy (such as Tarrow 1996). If, as Rosenblum shows, even fascist, paramilitary and conspiracist organizations can provide some rocky soil for democratic citizenship to grow (1998, 273ff), is it any surprise that more civic-minded organizations provided at least a temporary home for fascist government? Social capital, in the form of social networks of all kinds, may indeed make *government in general* work, serving democracy in particular merely by giving it a chance to thrive and become rooted in culture as it cannot in social-capital-poor settings. Putnam's studies do not answer this question because they do not differentiate associations in terms of their internal political practices.

Pervasive politics

One reason for Putnam's shortfall may be his implicit acceptance of an apolitical definition of civil society. Despite the recent surge of interest in intermediate organizations, the Little League and the vast legion of sporting, social, civic, religious and charitable associations that do not act as government-influencing "interest groups" *per se* will remain under the radar of political science without an appropriately broad

understanding of our subject. Why should a study of associational governance qualify as political science? Because politics encompass, simply, *any process of collective decision making*. Here, I mean decision making to be inclusive of taking collective action, since each action itself requires a decision to act, and inclusive of efforts to influence the outcome and direction of the decision-making process. The adjective form *political* thus refers to the collective decision-making aspects of any noun, insofar as it has any. An opinion is political when it addresses what any "we" should believe or do; an act is political when it targets a "we" or is described as an act of the collective.

Political theorist Mark Warren has written,

> . . . the potentials for politics are now pervasive; they exist throughout society. Wherever there is political conflict, democratic responses are possible. If it is now common to refer to the politics of the workplace, the marketplace, the church, the school, the neighborhood, and the family, so too is it appropriate to refer to *democratic* workplaces, markets, churches, schools, neighborhoods, and families—although, of course, the meanings and mechanisms of democracy will differ within these different venues. (Warren 2002, 687, emphasis original)

Politics are ubiquitous, in keeping with the word's roots and its common usage; for example, a dictionary includes this definition of politics:

> **5 a:** the total complex of relations between people living in society **b:** relations or conduct in a particular area of experience especially as seen or dealt with from a political point of view <office politics>" (Merriam-Webster 2000)

The broad definition is thus both consistent and at odds with colloquial uses of "politics." On the one hand, everyday usages like "office politics," "family politics," "church politics," and "locker-room politics" are so common that political science really must embrace them for the sake of empirical precision. The dynamics of a decision about who will be team captain are political, and no less so because the decision is made amicably with little fanfare. Because, as Aristotle said, human beings are "political animals," (Aristotle 1944 [~350 BC], 1253a, 1278b) politics may be of low salience, but

it is rarely simply absent. As Kettering Foundation president David Mathews is wont to say, "politics is not everything, but everything has a political dimension." On the other hand, the normative connotation of my definition (which derives from the definition's neutrality, not from extra wording) is *not* consistent with the usually pejorative connotation of colloquial combinations like "office politics"; the definition's neutrality insists on the possibility of *good* office politics.

The ubiquity of politics does not mean that politics are defined too broadly to distinguish them from other human interactions. Much political activity—including much of national governmental politics!—is trivial when compared with other economic and cultural factors and is therefore unworthy of investigation. But the recognition that politics happen everywhere facilitates better theoretical and practical linkages between citizens, civil society, and government. Theda Skocpol has unearthed for us a gem from history, Walter B. Hill's 1892 essay on "the great American safety-valve" found in the "enormous supply of official positions" in associations that made the U.S. "a nation of presidents" (Hill 1892; Skocpol 2003, 105). Hill's observation was astute and his analogy helpful, but the safety valve metaphor might inspire the wrong inference. Following Warren's lead, we should recognize associations are not simply outlets for frustrated or sublimated political ambitions, but are genuinely political arenas; participatory, associational offices are safety valves because they are political, not because they distract from the political.

I offer my definition of politics partly in recognition of the analytical utility of game-theoretic archetypes, which demonstrate the logical universality of certain coordination

problems of collective choice, even when people are imagined to be superhumanly rational, informed and even altruistic. Whether choosing a restaurant, choosing a volunteer director or choosing a U.S. president, people face similar "economic" dilemmas which may be solved by similar *political* rules and institutions. Some of these rules are very informal and simply "polite" or "politic", such as "let the guest decide where to eat"; others are formal and compulsory, such as "drive on the *right* side of the road!" But all are part of a common set of standards about acceptable behavior toward other human beings in political settings. Game theory is just one of many methodological tools that recognize politics as a universal practice with recognizable, common characteristics, rather than a narrowly governmental phenomenon.

My proposed definition is not unique in rejecting the reliance on coercion in many widely used definitions of politics, particularly Max Weber's (1978, 37ff). Weber defined *political* strictly in terms of nation-states, which are "authoritarian associations" with a territorial monopoly secured by force. Weber's definition is far too narrow to make sense of everyday processes that people easily recognize as political. Critiquing Weber, Fred Frohock remarks that coercion is not even necessarily the primary currency of governments themselves, let alone of the whole domain of politics:

> A society may govern by persuasion, moral argument, deceit—generally, with any means which can modify behavior. It may seem as if no other means save force guarantees effective direction. But this again is an empirical matter. In a society composed of pacifists who deeply and effectively maintain their beliefs, force may be counter to successful behavior modification. Weber denies—rightly, as I shall show—any necessary connection between the ends of action and the political society. But the same form of argument can be directed at the inclusion of force as a necessary means. (Frohock 1974, 383-4)

Weber himself undermined his own definition when he recognized that political skill is attracted to political settings, arguing that the parliament of the new Weimar Republic

would fail to attract skilled political minds if it did not offer substantive influence that could compete with other professions (Weber 1958). If a politically-motivated person (that is, who desires to join in, influence or make collective decisions as an end in itself) gravitates to non-governmental settings, should we say he or she has left politics? Better to infer that the political personality goes where the politics are.

As described earlier, game theory shows that coercion is not a defining trait of politics by demonstrating that persons who wish to cooperate in a wholly voluntary manner still face political problems of coordination. The classic example is the "Assurance" game, in which both players must convincingly communicate their commitment to a mutually beneficial outcome; "the game is a reminder of the crucial importance of perceptions and of mutual predictability in social interactions." Coordination problems can be resolved through some form of constitutional design and organized arbitration or deliberation for making decisions, if only to decide who makes the first move (Scharpf 1997, 73, 249). Coercion is not necessary, but politics is. A chief virtue of *democratic* politics is that participants implicitly declare themselves to be bound to comply with decisions made under mutually agreed rules *without* any need for direct coercion, whether implicit or explicit. Citizens "coerce themselves" to comply with the decisions reached by elections and legislation. Such decisions are "authoritative allocations of value" (David Easton's definition of politics, 1953) only in the sense that the rules make the decision itself authoritative—not necessarily because any individual or subgroup of individuals holds any specific authority. It is nonsensical to deny that

everyday processes of collective decision making are political; they are non-governmental, yes, but not apolitical.

Even "free market" decisions are politically undergirded; they are collective decisions to the extent that they involve a decision on behalf of a collective unit (family, firm, church, municipality) or reflect prior decisions about which choices are legitimately left up to the price system, itself an institution with a political foundation. The use of alternative political solutions in civil society as substitutes for coercive governmental measures are emblematic of a society's potential for self-government. It should be clear that this claim is not a neoliberal demonization of government; on the contrary, it emphasizes the virtue of distributing government itself liberally throughout society. It is a profoundly healthy sign for a society when government agents and agencies emulate the low-coercion politics of civil society, becoming in their essence and function an integral part of civil society. The successes of nominally "statist" European social democracies like Sweden and Denmark can as readily be described as the partial absorption and adoption of "governmental" functions by a robust civil society.

Weber is not entirely washed up; coercion certainly has a central role to play in any theory of politics, and beliefs about the origins of legitimate coercion are diagnostic of the extent and nature of politics. Defining politics pervasively has normative implications in that it at least allows for a public, social or "popular" monopoly of the right to exercise coercion or to delegate that right (see Coleman 1990, 162). But the Weberian definition of political society assumes, as Thomas Hobbes did before him, that a sovereign, self-governing society may delegate coercive authority to one organizational body only

(Hobbes 1968 [1651]). This assumption is partly founded in historical European Continental politics, especially anti-clerical objections to independent ecclesiastical courts and anti-feudal objections to the old patchwork of duchies and principalities with annoying local variations in law and tradition. The American and other radically distributed polities provide counterexamples to these assumptions, counterexamples that Weber's definition simply rules out of politics altogether. The sovereign people of liberal democratic theory must in principle be able to distribute various forms of coercive authority to plural, intersecting organizations and institutions. If a violence-monopolizing government is the only possible institutional design, the people are never really sovereign, only the government is.

Formal, legal and traditional limitations on access to coercion in a civil society accentuate the *political* nature of interaction between people—of necessity, decisions are based on rules and persuasion, some classes of decisions become more collective, and there are simply more collective decisions to be made and thus more politics to take place. As Warren notes, Hannah Arendt and Benjamin Barber have both characterized democracy as "the most political way of responding to politics" (Warren 1999b, 225). Self-government is self-coercion; authority is transmitted from group to group and person to person by persuasive reference to mutually-held principles of collective choice and collective action. The relationship between distributed legitimate coercion and pervasive politics is complex, for the more politics succeeds in becoming less coercive, the more freely coercive power can safely be distributed throughout society, by law, tradition and temporary contract. Ecclesiastical courts, corporate security firms, bounty hunters, "repo

men," and neighborhood vigilantes can all be frightful forces—unless they operate under the scrutiny of a broader political society in which most coercion is deprecated and all forms of government and governance are relatively benign. As Rosenblum argues (1998), the court order forcing the Junior Chamber of Commerce (the Jaycees) to accept female members was supposed to be in service of social liberalization, but instead it is an unfortunate example of coercive and illiberal government action that only further undermines the self-organizing, self-coercing capacity of civil society. The legitimate use of force in self-defense or enforcement of group norms is the precious gift of a society in which political solutions are only very rarely coercive.

Definitions have normative and practical implications as well as analytical utility; the negative connotations of "politics" may have a something to do with widespread perceptions—and some realities, of course—of social malaise. David Mathews writes, "Politics is now consumed by government, thus changing the very nature of politics. Politics has become narrowly restricted to one task, that of managing a multitude of very large governments, state and local as well as federal" (1999, 59). Warren concurs:

> Certainly part of the reason that individuals are "apathetic" about politics is that they conceive "politics" as equivalent to the state. If the state becomes less significant as a site of collective action, then individuals will judge "democracy" to be a less important part of their lives, which are likely to be organized around work, family and friends, school, clubs, recreation, and other kinds of associations. (Warren 2002, 682)

With these normative implications in mind, Warren has offered an excellent definition of politics that is very supportive of our mutual contention that politics are pervasive. However, Warren's definition contrasts with my approach with respect to the definitional necessity of the presence of power and conflict, where power is an explicitly Weberian "power over" others (1999b, 219). Warren defines politics as "the subset of

social relations characterized by conflict over goods in the face of pressure to associate for collective action, where at least one party to the conflict seeks collectively binding decisions and seeks to sanction decisions by means of power." (218) We do not disagree substantively about philosophical purposes. I admire and endorse Warren's strategy, which is to use power and conflict to define politics in a way that highlights the normative desirability of democratic politics. Under democratic conditions, "political contests are forced, by default, onto the terrain of discussion, persuasion, bargaining, negotiation, compromise and agreed decision rules such as voting" (1999b, 234).[2] But Warren maintains that the wholly voluntary relations of civil society are outside of politics (because there is no power involved), as is any decision characterized by consensus (because there is no conflict). "[C]onsensus moves the problem out of the political realm, so that a collective response to a problem may also take on a voluntary character in spite of the potential for the state to enforce binding resolutions" (1999b, 228). Because I share Warren's purpose to encourage readers not to view politics as a pathology, I would prefer to speak of consensus and voluntary relations as political phenomena, not the absence or end of politics. I agree that power and conflict are relevant categories or dimensions for evaluating politics, but their apparent absence is itself a peculiar political occurrence that may be, as Warren himself stresses, the product of past political success, present political institutions, or less visible, latent forms of political power. This is not to say that the definition is wrong because power-and-

[2]Note how Warren acknowledges all three forms of decisions discussed by Elster (1998): arguing (or "deliberative" processes), bargaining, and voting (or "aggregative"); see also Squires (2002).

conflict-free situations are empirically impossible, but rather that any such situations are not presumptively less relevant for a study of politics.[3]

Family politics offers an easily grasped example; Warren explicitly considers relationships based wholly or primarily on talk, persuasion and intimacy to be apolitical. From this perspective, the "modern" communicative family is strangely less political by than its traditional, patriarchal predecessor. My wife and I have a very apolitical relationship in Warren's definition. But our relationship's healthy qualities are predicated on a collection of manifestly political practices: frequent negotiation, dynamic agreements to rotate or divide responsibilities, well-rehearsed protocols for offering and reacting to complaints and coping with crises. Some of these protocols are more or less formalized and contractual, including those embedded in our marriage vows. If we did not practice these good politics, our lives would be much more conflictual and therefore political by Warren's narrower criteria. Just as game theorists distinguish between cooperative and noncooperative games (with a different, more technical meaning, of course), I suggest that Warren's definition overemphasizes "noncooperative" politics and thus mis-categorizes "cooperative" politics. Teaching people to think politically includes recognizing the political salience and value of the *absence* of power and conflict. Further, civil societies have long granted the family some degree of legitimate coercive capacity

[3]One of the most striking examples of this is also an example of how badly misinterpretation of *The Prince* contributes to Machiavelli's generally undeserved reputation as an advocate of autocracy. In the *Discourses*, Book I, Chapter LV, Machiavelli made much of the virtues of a rumored mountain village whose fiscal polity—and it is a polity, how else can we describe it?—was based entirely on voluntary contributions to the public treasury, given out of pride, honor, duty and public spirit. To be Machiavellian is not only to be political in the pejorative sense about resorting to hardball tactics when surrounded by people with baseball bats; it is also to be political in the virtuous sense by respecting and nurturing cooperation wherever it emerges.

when it comes to child raising. The extent of coercion permissible in polities larger than the family—churches, schools, and local governments, for example—is a matter of frequent debate, but the debate cannot deny the reality of distributed, legitimate coercive power.

Any definition so broad as mine begs a clarification of its opposite: what is, then, truly apolitical? The definition, as it should, implies the answer: decisions that are not collective are not political. Here collectivity is a matter of degree, and may be interpreted both in terms of the number of the affected parties, as when a CEO decides for a vast corporation, or the participants in a decision, as when a jury deliberates on the guilt of an individual defendant. As is necessary and right, whether a decision or decision-making process is collective or not is also a matter of the scope of inquiry in time and space. For example, Randall Nielsen at the Kettering Foundation has pointed me to the mundane issue of seatbelt use. Seatbelt use moved from apolitical, personal decision-making patterns to a high pitch of national politicization in the 1980s, then back to low political salience today. Preventable highway deaths were perceived as a public health problem, as well as a threat to the stability and profits of the insurance industry, and politicization took place not only in federal and state government, but within corporations with truck drivers, associations transporting school children, and so on. Some families politicized seat belts and some did not. In my family, seatbelt use was briefly politicized while my mother decided for the rest of us. No conflict was at issue, nor did she have to exercise any serious coercion—none of us objected to wearing seatbelts, but we often forgot. Forgetfulness is an aspect of cognition; one of the chief functions of political institutions,

whether or not there is conflict and coercion, is to remind people to think about and do things they have already decided are in their own best interests. My mother's actions to decide and coordinate for us were clearly political in a family frame of reference; without those actions, we would not have had a family polity, a collective order, with respect to travel safety. Once we developed our own unconscious habits, a later snapshot description would view seatbelts use as apolitical once again, but only because the political interlude had moved out of the frame of reference. Politics is broad and contextual, but remains identifiable.

Two key concepts: political systems and the grammar of institutions

Two conceptual approaches, among the best of the political science treasure trove, are missing in action in literature on civil society. The first is the influential concept of the "political system" championed by David Easton. Easton himself did not embrace so inclusive a definition of politics as my own, since he explicitly regarded associations as apolitical: "aspirations for power find expression in educational, labor, and similar private organizations. Only where wants require some special organized effort on the part of society to settle them authoritatively may we say that they have become inputs of the political system" (1957, 387). As with Weber, Easton offered no recognition that "private organizations" are themselves societies, and that "private" is not a word capable by itself of building a firewall between the organization's members and their neighbors and fellow citizens. We should confiscate and adapt Easton's brainchild for broader use. The systems conception of politics is superior to the common state-and-society dichotomy, as

Easton himself claimed (1981), and facilitates analysis that trespasses on the old boundary. This study is thus concerned with the extent to which associational political institutions might be constituent sources of "diffuse support" within the national political system.

The life-sciences metaphors that inspired Easton in his systems approach lend themselves well to this understanding; just as photosynthesis is carried out by a class of organisms that vary in size from a few cells to billions of cells, so democratic practices are common functions of political systems of widely varying sizes and purposes. Demands on and support for electoral functions are as comparable and interrelated, in principle, as are those of the class of photosynthesizing organisms. But the political systems approach is also reinforced by the *breakdown* of the life-sciences metaphor. Human beings store, process and communicate information in ways that have no good analog in biological nature; the way algae photosynthesize does not give oak trees ideas about how to photosynthesize, but the way unions, churches or businesses hold elections may very well give citizens ideas about how governments do so. In principle, a single person is simultaneously a member of associational and governmental political systems; one person's cognitive abstractions between systems may create a causally potent link between the functions of those systems that melds them into a single system. The "congruence theory" view of this link is a major topic of Chapter 2.

The other key concept is the underutilized "grammar of institutions" offered political science by Crawford and Ostrom (1995), a taxonomy for typing institutions in three categories, as 1) rules, 2) norms, and 3)"shared strategies," also known as equilibria in

game theory. The distinction is made based on the syntax of a verbal description of the institution in question. Institutions have five possible components:

- A, the *attributes* of people to whom the institution applies (e.g 18 years and older, or California residents).
- D, the *deontic* describing the normative aspect of the institution. There are just three possibilities: *may* (permitted), *must* (obliged) and *must not* (forbidden).
- I, the *aim* or actions to which the deontic applies; for example, "vote" or "pay dues" or "pay taxes."
- C, the adverbial *conditions* for when, where, how and to what extent the aim is permitted, obliged or forbidden.
- O, the *"or else"*, variables defining the sanctions to be imposed for not following a rule.

Referring to these five components by letter, equilibria or shared strategies have the least verbose syntax, using the components AIC; norms are written ADIC, and rules are written ADICO. Thus, "absent members vote two weeks early" is a shared strategy (or equilibrium solution to a coordination problem), "absent members *must* vote two weeks early" is a norm, and "absent members must vote two weeks early or be disfranchised" is a rule. "Meeting attendees may add items to the agenda during New Business at regular meetings" is an institutional norm that confers a right but does not itself demand compliance.

Ideologies, institutions, and political culture

The grammar of institutions illustrates the fundamental error of making arbitrarily strong distinctions between "cultural" and "institutional" explanations. Strategies, norms and laws have a fundamental syntax that calls into question drawing bright lines between them. The "political culture" in which a national government's institutions are situated itself includes a multitude of political institutions that constitute organizations, localities, religious entities and so forth. But an institutionalist perspective is too often contrasted with a stereotypical "cultural" perspective that says formal rules are relatively unimportant, while the deep currents of informal norms, beliefs and habits are the deciding factors in making for successful politics, whether organizational or governmental—as if the formal and informal were always easily separable. From that facile perspective, a civil association would be truly democratic only if its members behave and believe in an egalitarian, inclusive, or "deliberative" manner, whether or not regular elections or governing conventions exist. Such a debate resembles a futile battle over whether the physical properties of water have more to do with ice or with steam. Formal institutions and informal norms overlap and intertwine conceptually and practically; both are components of culture, and each is so often so much a part of the other as to make them almost inseparable under common circumstances. It is only when high-visibility, new formal rules explicitly attempt and fail to alter informal norms that the debate becomes relevant. By that myopic standard, we will develop a Freudian political science based only on deviant cases. Both "sides" of these debates often allow

semantics and disciplinary turf wars to obscure the remarkable extent to which they agree about the basic institutional phenomena that explain political outcomes.

Two prominent examples of this confusion are found in lead articles in a recent issue of the *American Political Science Review*. Robert C. Lieberman (2002) draws too bright a distinction between "ideational" and "institutional" explanations, attributing political change to friction between ideas (or ideologies) and institutions. It is true that institutionalist analysis needs to "find a way to treat ideas as analytically consequential" (2002, 699), but it serves no good purpose to neglect that the shared ideas Lieberman is concerned with are themselves a class of institutions, and that institutionalists are not unable to speak his language (for example, see Denzau and North 1994, whom Lieberman does not cite). Institutionalists Hinich and Munger (1994, 11) define an ideology as:

> [A]n internally consistent set of propositions that makes both proscriptive and prescriptive demands on human behavior. All ideologies have implications for (a) what is ethically good, and (therefore) what is bad; (b) how society's resources should be distributed; and (c) where power appropriately resides.

"Proscriptive and prescriptive demands" are the same "musts" and "must nots" that Crawford and Ostrom call "deontics."[4] Hinich and Munger also refer to ideologies as "norms of behavior" (1994, 225). In Lieberman's treatment of the civil rights movement, "institutions" designed for color-blindness and "ideas" in favor of race-consciousness are

[4]The deontic set also includes "may," the permissive operator, raising the question whether Hinich and Munger's definition of *ideology* might be refined as "makes proscriptive and prescriptive demands on *and sets permissive boundaries for* human behavior." Crawford and Ostrom describe how the three deontics can be reduced to two; "permitted" is simply "not forbidden," "obliged" is "forbidden not to" and so on (1995, 584). However, "permitted" may be substantively important for analysis of liberal ideologies in which affirmative statements of rights ("permitted") are emphasized over statements of duties ("obliged") and taboos ("forbidden"), especially where there is no evident "Tenth Amendment"-like institution codifying how the absence of an applicable institution is to be interpreted.

in friction. But under the grammar of institutions, both are simply norms in the ADIC form, competing for codification as rules in the sanctioned ADICO form.[5] The color-blind norm is "(A) employers (D) must (I) ignore job applicants' race (C) when hiring new employees." Substitute "(I) prefer qualified minority applicants" and you have the competing affirmative action norm. Lieberman's story is an account of the conflict—or incongruence, in the language introduced by Chapter 2—between these internally coherent "ideological" orders in their struggle to become enforced as federal policy. Lieberman would better serve academic vocabulary by characterizing the civil rights changes he describes as a clash between kinds of mental models, a competition of ideologies to become more formal organizational policy, rather than as "ideas versus institutions."

In the subsequent article in the same *APSR*, Lisa Wedeen (2002) offers a definition of culture as "semiotic practices," that is, "practices of meaning-making." The definition is a terrific contribution in many respects, particularly in its ability to embrace the pervasive politics we have discussed above, "to treat forms of evidence that, while manifestly political, most political science approaches tend to overlook" (2002, 714). Wedeen also helpfully distinguishes appropriate use of "culture" as a concept from the widely discredited "political culture" school of the 1960s, on the grounds that the old treatment has too monolithic or "essentialist" a view of culture, usually national culture. Her view of internal cultural complexity complements Lieberman's focus on friction

[5]The grammar of institutions might be usefully combined with the now-robust method of genetic algorithms to study the way in which different shared strategies, norms and rules compete, merge and evolve in social and legislative settings.

between institutions and ideas as a causal force behind political change. The weakness in Wedeen's approach is that she does not recognize that her "semiotic practices" simply *are* institutions. While she allows that semiotic practices may be "the effects of institutional arrangements" (2002, 714), she does not name these cultural effects as institutions in and of themselves.

Lieberman and Wedeen together move the conceptual football to the one-yard-line and then call for the field goal team, when we should be able to get all the way to a touchdown. Institutions are shared ideas, mental models of how things are or should be done. Lieberman even cites North (1990) in a fashion that ought to illuminate the basic categorical affinity between "institutions, policies, or sets of ideas" (Lieberman 2002, 702). Institutional mental models also serve as meaning-makers, Wedeen's "semiotic practices." I do not intend to belittle the history of disciplinary approaches; the methods adopted by economists and anthropologists are appropriate to different research goals. But we are all talking about such similar things that a common vocabulary is in order. When one speaks of "political culture," it need not be a vapid, throwaway idea; but neither is it strictly separable from "political institutions" or "ideologies." Instead of Almond and Verba's "attitudes toward political objects" (1963), we can define the political culture of a given human population as *the universe of active or available institutional statements about collective decision making*. "Available" statements may be found only in historical memory, as they were when Italians rebuilt centuries-old associations, inspired by the architecture and documents left behind (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, 149f). In the United States, the Constitution is rightly considered part

of political culture; as well as a set of legal institutions, it is a mental model of governance, part of an organizational repertoire (Clemens 1999) available for appropriation in other settings, as Skocpol has shown was commonplace in the heyday of federal associations (2003). Likewise, the practices of associations are part of political culture, available as reference points in judging the meaning and worth of national political actors and systems.

This definition does not rule out all of the polling-driven "attitude" indicators associated with political culture research since Almond and Verba. On the contrary, such attitudinal questions are a central part of this study. Consideration of institutions as mental models should promote surveys, experiments and other research methods that address the content and processing methods of relevant human minds. However, this definition of political culture clarifies how we should understand statements such as "how much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?" Survey respondents' answers to these questions are indicators (with measurement error) of the prevalence of several alternative AIC-syntax shared-strategy statements.

For example, in the grammar of institutions, the usual trust in government question is "(A) citizens (I) trust national government (C) never/rarely/sometimes/always." In the context of his widely cited dispute with Arthur Miller about the links between the trust in government items and the broader legitimacy of the constitutional regime, Jack Citrin remarked that "ritualistic cynicism" is a "well-established cultural tradition in America" (1974, 978). The Miller-Citrin debate thus illustrates the extent to which the

constitutional regime itself is intertwined and interdependent with a set of institutionalized, persistent political rituals that specify various strategies mixing trust and caution toward politicians and government.

Democratic institutions such as universal suffrage, elections and assemblies, whether national or associational in scope, are semiotic practices, political meaning-makers. Universal suffrage, with or without a strong explicit verbal tradition of citizen equality, means voters are presumptively equal, if only quantitatively. Elections mean leadership is accountable and impermanent. Assemblies mean policy is collectively made. There simply can be no purely "procedural republic" (Sandel 1984), empty of all but the thinnest moral content. Lieberman's and Wedeen's articles both rightly emphasize the complex, competitive environment in which institutions exist; these democratic meanings may be struggling not to drown in a sea of competing meanings produced by autocratic practices or apathetic ideologies. But the understanding that all institutions are sources of meaning is essential to a constructive, integrative approach both to political science and to democratic theory. The question at hand is whether and how people infer the meanings created by one set of institutions within contexts described by another set of institutions.

Democracy in the mix

Given that democracy is an institutional construct, what institutional designs make any organization democratic, and why should it be democratic at all? Organizational democracy can be promoted and critiqued on the same grounds as democratic government, both from the moral dignity of human individuals and relationships on one

hand and the practicality and efficiency of democratic politics on the other. These two fields are not necessarily aligned. Though democracy takes as a premise basic human equality before God or by nature, it can be demeaning or oppressive to people to subject them to tedious discussion and votes when the matter is trivial, urgent, or beyond their competence to decide. The *Doonesbury* quarterback's retort, "this is *not* a democracy!" is humorous because of its context: under football rules, the huddle simply isn't long enough for holding debates or voting. Just as the U.S. Constitution gives the President and the rest of the executive branch broad authority to act without deliberation or voting, so a quarterback is expected to call plays without delay. Normatively, to qualify the quarterback's discretion may be to devalue his role as quarterback in a way that robs him of personal dignity and fulfillment he can find nowhere else. A church is not undemocratic because its pastor or priest preaches his own ideas, nor is a business undemocratic when the CEO hires an employee without a committee vote. When we describe a government or an organization as democratic, we do not expect every decision to be made by all the citizens or members. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) demonstrated, a political economy can describe the contexts in which democratic decision-making institutions are time- and cost-efficient, and a constitution is the means of prescribing which decisions fall into the more democratic category.

Therefore, in practice, a democratic organization is one that employs any of a number of forms of participatory decision making with its members or constituents. Elected officers, governing conventions and local, authoritative chapters are some of the most important, as are less iconic practices such as regular public meetings and multiple

channels of member influence. Organizational democracy is a matter of degree, but even a little mass participation in decisions is probably enough to merit the label "democratic." Mark Warren says it well enough to bear extended quotation:

> What is important is that institutions and organizations are designed so they can revert to democracy as needed, on an issue-by-issue basis. Then most decisions can be made by trusted authorities, attended to by interested parties, or simply work through routine agreements, rules, habits, traditions, markets or marketlike mechanisms, without harm to democracy. Far from being less relevant today, then, the radically democratic idea that democracy should inhere in society and economy is more relevant now than ever before. Democracy cannot be encompassing, as envisaged in those older theories of democracy that build on unitary notions of popular sovereignty, but it can be pervasive, existing as one mode of decision making among others, to be called upon when decisions are political. (Warren 2002, 688)

Democratization need not become a creeping infestation of every social setting with voting, campaigning and "spin." Rather, the respect for individual dignity and basic political equality upon which democratic governance is based also implies our liberty to declare of broad spaces of our lives, "This is not a democracy!" The Greek philosopher Aristotle's preferred method of government was a mixed system that included elements of what we would democracy alongside elements of monarchy and aristocracy. The mixture was intended to balance each kind of government's weaknesses with the strengths of the others. Likewise, present-day organizations can take a mixed form and still be considered democratic. Chapter 5 presents a measurement method that describes organizational democracy in terms of the availability of these institutional channels, rather than in terms of actual participation.

The critical question is whether present-day associations have enough democracy in the mix to support a democratic government. Theda Skocpol's most recent effort continues her state-centric scholarly tradition, emphasizing the seminal force of the U.S. Constitutional model in the emergence of the great civic federations of the nineteenth

century (Skocpol 2003). The process of creating the U.S. government was the primary causal force behind the emergence of a powerful civil society. However, another dimension emerges from Skocpol's research, which is the recognition that an "institutional" analysis need not concern itself with governmental structures alone. Membership-driven, federated organizations, now demonstrably in decline, once allowed thousands of otherwise low-status citizens to hold state and national offices and to participate in political processes both within their organizations and as voices in the arena of public policymaking. While this institutional "civic transformation" has many causal roots in changes in government policy and economic structures, it is also partly a matter of voluntary decisions made by organizational leaders and members. Both Skocpol's book and Putnam's latest publication, *Better Together* (Putnam, Feldstein, and Cohen 2003), emphasize the civic and democratic utility of a specific institutional design pattern at the associational level: local chapters with active members, aggregated into larger-scope organizations. This pattern was the foundation of the once-great membership federations and is found in today's success stories. If federated organization is a critical factor for a free, prosperous and equitable civil society, perhaps elections, conventions, citizenship and other tools of democratic governance are as well. Chapter 2 traces and critiques the theory that such institutional congruence between associations and government must be thorough.

CHAPTER 2: The Logic of Government-Association Congruence

"I couldn't hack it on the outside. Been in here too long.
I'm an institutional man now. Like old Brooks Hatlen was."
—Morgan Freeman as "Red" Redding, *The Shawshank Redemption*

Institutionalization and associations

We are all institutional men, and we really cannot "hack it on the outside." Institutions define and shape our very selves, and we succeed in throwing them off only by embracing other institutions, which are not necessarily better and are often weaker in their ability to help us "hack it." The unfortunate colloquial identification of institutions with large gray buildings, prisoners and mental patients puts scholars at a presumptive disadvantage when we uphold the value of institutionalization. But the important questions for societies of all sizes involve not whether we will be defined and governed by institutions, but by what kind and how durable. The previous chapter contended that politics and political institutions are basic factors of everyday life, not only of governments; this chapter examines the relationship between the political institutions within government and those of broader civil society, particularly associations. The central idea under consideration is the "logic of congruence," the premise that institutionalization of governmental liberal democracy is conditional on institutionalization of liberal democratic practices in wider society.

Valuing institutionalization is not the same as conservatism, though they often overlap. Social change and learning are best accomplished when institutions enable, legitimize and control change. Edmund Burke, the famous "reactionary" critic of the

French Revolution, was a Whig member of parliament, a constitutionalist critic of conservative Tory administrations and an advocate of major social reforms—but only so fast as time, tradition and human nature would permit. To Burke, the Tory autocrats of his day were as reckless and foolish about abolishing time-honored institutions as were his own more radical Whig colleagues. With occasional fortuitous exceptions, institutional change is most progressive where institutions themselves facilitate their own change and most regressive where "revolutionaries" start from scratch. Of all the generalizations of political history, the association of revolutions with dictatorship and reforms with democracy is perhaps the most convincing. True revolutions from France to Russia, from China to Cuba ended with autocratic governments resembling their ancient feudal, colonial and imperial forerunners, while some of the more successful post-Communist "revolutions" of 1989 to 1991 simply converted existing legislative assemblies from rubber stamps into working governments. As is often recognized, the American Revolution was not a true revolution, since its aim was to preserve strong, independent local institutions from new encroachment by a distant British government.

These are macroscopic examples of revolution and reform, but modern societies experience small reforms, revolutions, and "wars of independence" on a daily basis in the lives of their myriad constituent organizations. Recent studies have documented the extent to which organizational networks and institutional patterns in American civil society are undergoing a powerful transformation. Theda Skocpol, herself an influential scholar of governmental revolutions, describes it under the rubric "from membership to management" (Skocpol 2003). Where associational life was once dominated by large

national federations with highly participatory and subsidiary state, district and local chapters, today it is being supplanted by mail-order envelopes developed by expert cadres of market researchers and lobbyists in Washington and New York, whose local representatives are agents of the center rather than the periphery. If political institutions are shared mental models of how to make decisions, then the institutions of democratic government may be undermined by removing their foundations in everyday political behavior. Once we were "a nation of presidents" (quoting Hill 1892; Skocpol 2003, 105); can we now expect trust and support for national Presidents from citizens who have never met one—let alone been one? When we lose the institutions of democratic membership associations, do we lose civic skills, social capital and ultimately democracy itself? Or is this another example of America's habitual apocalyptic paranoia, overestimating the impact of a benign transfer of civic activity from the Moose Lodge to "mooseworld.com,"[1] from the Parent-Teacher Association to the Children's Defense Fund?

Samuel Huntington is in many respects a cotraveler with Burke, a respecter of stability and "political order." Huntington's work is helpful in addressing the links between civil society and government because of his recognition that organizations are a common political currency of both spheres. In his 1968 book *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington used the term "organization" to refer to government and its components—especially military units—in the same breath with Harvard University, high schools and business firms. Any government is itself an organization of

[1]Mooseworld.com is not a joke–the web site is a for-profit location for pro-moose community, conservation and collectibles.

organizations, and government is a leading organization in the collection of organizations that make up a nation and a civil society; organizations are in turn defined and governed both by internal and external institutions (see North 1990, 4-5). Huntington understands society as a holistic political system of organizations.

Like Burke, Huntington drew fire for his book's emphasis on stability, since he appeared to congratulate Communism for bringing political stability to Russia, China and other historically turbulent lands. Of course, Huntington's aim was not to congratulate, but to explain why Communism presented such a formidable challenge to liberal democracy. Communists "bridged the political gap" and made stable government possible through a comprehensive, practical ideology of political order:

> Political community in a complex society thus depends upon the strength of the political organizations and procedures in the society. That strength, in turn, depends upon the *scope of support* for the organizations and procedures and their *level of institutionalization*. Scope refers simply to the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the scope is limited. ... Organizations and procedures vary in their degree of institutionalization. ... Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. (1968, 12)

Huntington proposed four criteria for judging institutionalization: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. These are opposed to rigidity, simplicity, subordination and disunity, respectively. Communism has since proved to be less successful than liberal democracy, but this challenges Huntington's analysis not because he mistook the importance of institutionalization but because he overestimated Communism's actual success at institutionalization. Soviet Communism in particular was coherent enough, but it was an ideology hostile to adaptation, worshipful of simplicity and brutally punishing of any internal autonomy; indeed, it might be said that its coherent, even monolithic ideology and organizational structure was the biggest enemy

of the other attributes. Soviet officials were dedicated to the task of destroying any and all nascent institutions that challenged the Communist party's dominance. This destructiveness is a common practice of militarist, autocratic regimes everywhere, such as the twelfth-century Norman monarchs of southern Italy made newly famous by Robert Putnam's account: "any glimmerings of communal autonomy were extinguished as soon as they appeared." (1993, 123)

In contrast, liberal democratic governments excel at adaptation, breed complexity and revel in autonomy. In the United States, this is exemplified by the proliferation of 87,525 local governments (U.S. Census Bureau 2002), over 130,000 associations (Associations Unlimited 2003), and almost 5 million employers (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). Our great challenge as a nation is that of maintaining national coherence in the face of internal diversification and the increasing external exposure of globalization. Coherence is a matter of consensus about institutions themselves: "An effective organization requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within the boundaries." (Huntington 1968, 22) Huntington's categories are usefully general: the functional boundaries of a group may be described as citizenship for nations, employment for businesses and membership for associations; procedures for resolving disputes may be autocratic, democratic or otherwise.

The question is how well a democratic umbrella organization like a national government coheres when it contains or overlaps myriad smaller organizations that "train" their members in nondemocratic dispute resolution practices. This question is at

the center of a contemporary debate over the degree to which our coherence as a society depends upon the "congruence" of civil society with the institutions of government.

Congruence theory

An enduring theme in democratic political theory is the necessity of some degree of compatibility between the organization of civil society and government institutions. As Machiavelli wrote, "as good customs have need of laws for maintaining them, so the laws, to be observed, have need of good customs" (Machiavelli 1517(?), Chap. XVIII). Machiavelli's statement may be read as a confirmation of the usual culture-institution dichotomy, but its sense is the opposite, to emphasize their interdependence.

Thinkers from Plato to Edmund Burke sought to understand government in terms of its analogy to the human family. Aristotle challenged Plato's attempt to found a unified polity on inferences from the dynamics of the family (Plato 1969 [~370 BC), 462a-c), on the grounds that unity is not the highest good of a polity (Aristotle 1944 [~350 BC], 1261a). Over two millennia later, the essayist William Hazlitt wrote of Burke,

> He took his idea of political society from the pattern of private life, wishing, as he himself expresses it, to incorporate the domestic charities with the orders of the state, and to blend them together. He strove to establish an analogy between the compact that binds together the community at large, and that [habit] which binds together the several families that compose it. (Hazlitt 1819; quoted by Landry 1999)

John Locke's battle with the absolutist Robert Filmer was fought partly on the same ancient territory of family-state congruence. Filmer held that fathers had a natural right to absolute sovereignty over their families. Kings were to nations as fathers were to families. Locke did not challenge Filmer's family-state congruence-by-analogy claim so much as he refuted Filmer's account of traditional patriarchal authority over the family

(Locke 1690, Chap. VII). For Locke, individuals are born as free with respect to the family as they are to the state—a backhanded statement of family-state congruence.

The rise of liberalism broadened focus from organic analogs like the family to include all kinds of artificial analogs for government. Perhaps the most explicit case for comprehensive institutional democratization was made by John Stuart Mill:

> A democratic constitution, not supported by democratic institutions in detail, but confined to the central government, not only is not political freedom, but often creates a spirit precisely the reverse, carrying down to the lowest grade in society the desire and ambition of political domination. In some countries the desire of the people is for not being tyrannized over, but in others it is merely for an equal chance to everybody of tyrannizing. (Mill 2003 [1848/1870], V.11.15)

"Democratic institutions in detail" includes a wide array of social groupings, including associations. Tocqueville famously described political associations as "great free schools" of the "general theory of association" (2000 [1835-40], 522). John Dewey went further: "all the agencies and influences that shape disposition . . . every place in which men habitually meet—shop, club, factory, saloon, church, political caucus—is perforce a school house even though not so labeled" (cited in Rosenblum 1994, 69-70; cited from Westbrook 1991, 534, 192).

In social science, the state-society congruence theme emerged as a major part of post-World War II thinking about democratic development. Several political sociologists were critiqued—one could say publicly spanked—by Brian Barry's classic *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (1978): Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963), Harry Eckstein (1966), and Seymour Martin Lipset (1960; 1963); Huntington was spared Barry's rod, perhaps only on account of his less obvious vocabulary for congruence. Eckstein was then the most explicit proponent of what he himself called "congruence."

His case study of Norway described the extensive similarities between everyday Norwegian cultural practice and social organization and the way the remarkably pacific Norwegian national polity worked. Barry effectively dispatched Eckstein and his cohort with an assortment of research design complaints, including the lack of experimental controls and comparative cases, lack of time-series data, poor conceptualization of "values" and "institutions," and tautological causal models—which came first, the democracy or the democratic values? But congruence theory continues to haunt social-scientific research, most recently in Robert Putnam's controversial emphasis on the differential effects on government of "vertical" *versus* "horizontal" forms of social organization (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993) and the subsequent deluge of research on associations and social capital.

Another development of the last thirty to forty years is a surge of legal and political activism aimed at using legislatures and courts to force associations to conform to liberal-democratic forms of governance, in terms of non-discriminatory membership standards and participatory authority structures. Mill's argument for "democratic institutions in detail" came in the context of a broader justification of laissez-faire policy intended to keep government from crushing non-governmental democracies. Today the paradoxical impulse is to use government mandates to impose democratic institutions on associations. For opponents of congruence, the protection of the autonomy of civil society takes priority, including the right of autonomous organizations to define their own institutional forms, democratic or not. In Huntington's terms, autonomy is at war with coherence in the arena of democratic institutionalization.

Institutional pedagogy

Though I was unfamiliar with the congruence rubric, I began this project as a vehement congruence theorist, for reasons I still find important and persuasive. Tocqueville's famous metaphor for political associations as schools implies that the rules and institutions guiding everyday decision-making practices in the non-governmental settings of civil society are influential "educators" in political values and behaviors, especially democratic values and behaviors. By learning *self-government* in civil settings, citizens learn to appreciate the value and utility of democratic government at the national level. A corollary of this thesis, beyond Tocqueville, is that associations have widely varying institutional designs, some of which must surely fail in their tutorial duties. In order for citizen-students to learn democracy, the associational "classroom" must teach it. As North has persuasively argued (1990), institutions with socially inefficient, even pathological characteristics can and do survive due to historical "path dependence" and the staying power of mental models. The obligatory reference to the Ku Klux Klan, that archetype of the "uncivil" association, suffices to illustrate this (Hefner 1998, 36; Putnam, Feldstein, and Cohen 2003, 2).

In *Political Liberalism* (1993), John Rawls proffers a historical interpretation of the origins of democratic government. He describes a progression from a pragmatic compromise on pseudo-democratic rule, a temporary "*modus vivendi*" between warring factions, to a "just and stable society" where democracy is pursued as an end in itself, as a matter of principle. For Rawls, this progression is facilitated by a constant rehearsal of democratic actions, an almost sacramental practice. Where Robert Dahl held that

consensus and stability are "social prerequisites" for a successful constitution (Dahl 1956, 83), for Rawls, the institution of rules and rituals predates and even creates consensus:

> Suppose that at a certain time, because of various historical events and contingencies, certain liberal principles of justice are accepted as a mere modus vivendi, and are incorporated into existing political institutions. This acceptance has come about, let us say, in much the same way as the acceptance of the principle of toleration came about as a modus vivendi following the Reformation: at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife. Our question, then, is this: how might it happen that over time the initial acquiescence in a constitution satisfying these liberal principles of justice develops into a constitutional consensus in which those principles themselves are affirmed? . . .
>
> Whether the third requirement of stable constitutional consensus is met by liberal principles depends on the success of the preceding two [that is, 1) fixing of the content of rights and liberties and 2) reference to generally available public rules of inquiry and evidence]. The basic political institutions incorporating these principles and the form of public reason shown in applying them–when working effectively and successfully for a sustained period of time (as I am here assuming)–tend to encourage the cooperative virtues of political life: the virtue of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway, all of which are connected with the willingness to cooperate with others on political terms that everyone can publicly accept. (Rawls 1993, 159, 163)

The story is an old one: practice makes perfect. The creation and enforcement of good institutional practices fosters virtuous political attitudes. Rawls' primeval society is large and monolithic, in which the democratic *modus vivendi* evolves at the highest order of governance, without any necessity of reference to traditions of villages, guilds, churches and so on. Both Dahl the empiricist and Rawls the moralist hypothesize about the effects of institutional designs, but they look to institutions at different levels of society for the basis of democracy.

Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999) provide some modest empirical support for Rawls' conception of institutionally driven democratic consolidation. Before and after the November 1996 elections, respondents to the American National Election Study increased their trust in abstract other people ("interpersonal trust"), in government, and in

their own political competence or efficacy. The survey results suggest that the election itself provided what Emile Durkheim called a "ritual of solidarity," increasing commitment to the political community and to democratic practice, just as Rawls suggests it should. The evidence shows that the more engaged and informed a person is in the political process, the greater the trust-promoting effects of the electoral event. Clearly, national political institutions can have a Rawlsian, pedagogical, socializing effect on members of society. But the effect of the election is a ripple on the surface of a deep pool of attitudes and perceptions. We made no comparison with the effect of elections in other societies, and Dahl's critique can still be evoked: elections may work the way they do in the U.S. only because the citizenry exhibits certain normative "social prerequisites." This research tests whether those prerequisites may be generated and maintained by democratic institutional designs in the associational sector.

The "transmission belt" problem

The expectation of institutional tutelage in democratic citizenship runs into a basic obstacle of human nature. In her tightly-reasoned, critical opus *Membership and Morals*, Nancy Rosenblum targets Rawls, Putnam, the Supreme Court, and many others, decrying

> the tendency to adopt a simplistic "transmission belt" model of civil society, which says that the beneficial formative effects of association spill over from one sphere to another. As if we can infer enduring traits from behavior in a particular setting. As if moral dispositions shaped in one context, public or private, are transferable to dissimilar ones. The "transmission belt" model is simplistic as a general dynamic. It is one thing to say that within face-to-face rotating credit associations "social networks allow trust to become transitive and spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you," (quoting from Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, 157-158) and quite another thing to show that habits of trust cultivated in one social sphere are exhibited in incongruent groups in separate spheres.

> The propensity to assume a "transmission belt" or spillover doubtless reflects the optimistic thought that if we get one set of formative associations "right," whether by promoting congruence [with the liberal-democratic institutions of government] or the proliferation of key mediating groups, the beneficial effects are multiplied. (Rosenblum 1998, 48)

Rosenblum thus implies that incongruence is a sort of cognitive insulator between social contexts, so that contextual dissimilarities are a fence rather than a channel of influence. Hefner (1998, 37) echoes Rosenblum, noting that the relationship between associational structure and cultural civility is neither simple nor direct. "Horizontal," egalitarian organizations can still tend to produce intolerant authoritarianism, while "vertical," hierarchical organizations can produce great civility and efficacy.

Rosenblum diagnoses a "permanent cycle of liberal anxiety" provoked by the tension between the hope that associations are schools of liberal virtue and the fear that illiberal associations will emerge under liberal standards freedom of association (1998, 10). *Membership and Morals* is an exhaustive catalog of the faulty legal logic and myopic view of associations held by contemporary congruence advocates and the courts that listen to them. Homeowners' associations, gender-segregated clubs and even racist and militia groups are revealed to have at least some redeeming character, faulty legal precedents to the contrary notwithstanding. Rosenblum shows there is no *prima facie* case for violating freedom of assembly by regulating associations' very structure, as opposed to specific associational acts that incur criminal or civil liability. A central focus of Rosenblum's critique is the Supreme Court's decision in *Roberts v. Jaycees* (1984), which forced the Junior Chamber of Commerce to conform to a Minnesota anti-discrimination law and admit women to membership. For Rosenblum, the decision set a precedent that threatens the ability of women, as much as men, to associate for purposes

of political voice, since compelled association with others potentially alters the association's political preferences and therefore the content of its public advocacy. The Court was "willing to substitute the state's judgment for the association's on the relation between membership and message" (1998, 201).

Rosenblum argues that the Court's reasoning in *Roberts v. Jaycees* is flawed for the same reason Putnam is in error about the influence of associational structure on democratic government. Our human endowments include a basic cognitive ability to "differentiate among contexts" and "discriminate among associations"; this "refined capacity to *resist* spillover" is a definitive element of the "discipline of culture" (Rosenblum 1998, 49). The Jaycees' exclusion of women from their association need not imply discrimination in the workplace or the political arena, any more than the exclusion of foreign nationals from U.S. citizenship necessarily implies jingoism or bigotry. Catholics do not necessarily expect government to be organized as the Roman Church is, business executives do not necessarily expect the town hall to respond to commands the way their employees do, children do not often believe all politicians are like their parents, and so on. Of course, some *do* have such expectations, but for Rosenblum, the exceptions prove the rule.

Testing the transmission belt

The chief shortcoming of Rosenblum's critique from a social-scientific point of view is that it employs a demonstrably true binary logical claim—humans do not *necessarily* allow associational practices to spill over into the polity—to answer what would better be

investigated as a question about a continuous variable: to what *degree* do people allow associational exposure to spill over into the polity? The ability to discriminate among institutional contexts and resist "spillover" is arguably representative of the very same human cognitive capacity that also enables us to abstract and infer parallels between associational governance and public government, from one level of the political system to another, and to "transmit" information, skills and habits from one sphere to another. We have ample evidence that this transfer is likely to take place at least sometimes. Rosenblum's own rehabilitative accounts of illiberal groups describe serendipitous transfers of newly found efficacy and identity from a cult or militia to a relatively "normal" career and family; her more basic argument is that transfers are not determined by structure, not that they cannot occur. We know that jury members who have deliberated to a conclusion are considerably more likely to vote in subsequent elections than those who are excused or do not return a verdict, even when prior voting rates are accounted for (Gastil, Deess, and Weiser). Church members learn civic skills that affect their political attitudes and participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and minorities "connected to institutional powers" of churches and ethnically bounded associations are more confident and outspoken politically in other contexts (Eliasoph 1998, 58-9). The explosion of associations in nineteenth-century America was arguably the result of a potent government-to-civil-society transmission belt, as the new Constitution created a "shared mental model" Americans borrowed liberally to build associations; today's shared model has become the corporate boardroom rather than the polity (on shared mental models, see Richards 2001; Skocpol 2003). Though democracy

may be learned where it is not practiced, we may yet reasonably expect to find evidence of such learning where citizens experience or witness democratic practice. The legacies of Tocqueville, Mill, Dewey and Rawls will not be silenced easily.

Michael Walzer's 1991 essay "The Idea of Civil Society" suggests a helpful amendment to government-society congruence theory. Walzer says: "Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic society can sustain a democratic state. The civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks; the roughly equal and widely dispersed capabilities that sustain the networks have to be fostered by the democratic state" (Walzer 1991, 302). This specific contention is quoted by Rosenblum (1998, 37) as an example of the usual,"strong" logic of congruence. But Walzer qualifies his stance a little later with the admission that "[associations] needn't all be democratic, for we are likely to be members of many associations, and we will want some of them to be managed in our interests, but also in our absence. Civil society is sufficiently democratic when in some, at least, of its parts we are able to recognize ourselves as authoritative and responsible participants" (1991, 302). Walzer thus portrays the influence of organizations as asymmetrical; exposure to autocratic associations need not counterbalance exposure to any democratic association. This "weak congruence" alternative is operationalized in the following analysis.

The research method pursued here assesses congruence solely in terms of the institutionalized political practices of associations, because institutions are the primary currency of congruence theory. There are valid arguments that the critical traits of

associations for democratic government are not found in their "institutional" structure, *per se*, but these arguments are generally not in the same family with congruence theory. Rosenblum reviews three "logics of congruence" in an earlier essay (1994), identifying separate logics of authority structure, empathy and identity. However, Rosenblum's discussion of the latter two logics of empathy and identity imply strongly that they are ultimately dependent on authority structure. The empathic, maternal influence of associations postulated by Jane Mansbridge (1993) is explicitly said to be generated by designed institutions. The political efficacy of identity groups is dependent on their formal institutionalization in a corporatist or "pillarized" political system that formalizes the boundaries between identity groups. Rosenblum's later argument against congruence theory is precisely to "caution against the unwarranted assumption that the effects of an association on members can be predicted on the basis of a group's formal purpose or system of internal governance" (1998, 8). Both the legal-normative and social-scientific-empirical versions of present day congruence theory are predicated on purposeful change or statistical variation in associational governance practices.

Chapter 3 documents the dearth of research on associational political institutions and presents a research design that attempts to address it.

CHAPTER 3: Past Social Science and a New Research Design

The questions about government-association congruence outlined in Chapter 2 have often been answered with inference and speculation, but have little been studied empirically. This chapter presents a brief literature review, followed by an introduction of the conceptual research design and hypotheses for this project. Chapter 4 then describes the practical details of operationalization with the 1996 National Election Studies data.

Existing literature

A number of scholars have addressed effects of associational traits from both theoretical and empirical directions, and there is wide agreement on the necessity to distinguish one association from another when evaluating their effects, rather than treating all memberships as the same. Nevertheless, a great deal of present theory and data-driven research continues simply to count memberships or at best to group associations by associational type—labor, sports, veterans, and so on. Much has been done, yet there is much to do if we are to begin to understand the linkages between the various institutions of self-government, because meaningful political institutions are found not only in the organs of the state, but in the organizations and movements that make up the whole of civil society. The central problem is finding a measurement strategy that can capture complex institutional configurations across a wide variety of associations.

A classic case study of the International Typographical Union by Lipset, Trow and Lal (1956) described the conditions that can produce formal democratic institutions within a labor union. They provided some strong evidence of the impact of national political conditions on union politics, but they had very little to say about the reciprocal impact of these institutions on the attitudes of union members toward democracy in the national polity. Lipset *et al.* were "almost as pessimistic as ... Robert Michels," the author of the famous "iron law of oligarchy" (1956, 405). They concluded that, despite internal elections and other democratic procedures, the typographical union's two-party system was at best a very rare exception to the rule, and at worst was beset by the same internally oligarchic behavior Michels critiqued in European socialist parties (Michels 1915). This basic problem of institutional and behavioral inconsistency is a challenge to any attempt to measure democracy through descriptions of institutional practices instead of directly observed behaviors. However, it is unclear that any oligarchy-free organizations exist anywhere, and it also unclear that it is humanly possible to describe any kind of democracy from a purely behavioral vantage. Perhaps in reaction to Michels' dictum that "who says organizations says oligarchy," deliberative democrats have long been engaged in a futile attempt to develop an organization- and institution-free account of democracy (Knight and Johnson 1994; Squires 2002). What patterns of behavior would assure us of real democracy, apart from formal practices such as elections and legislatures? If such patterns existed, how would we describe them except as political institutions?

Perhaps the most valuable existing work on associational governance is found in a pair of two-stage sample studies of associations: Knoke and Wood (1981), a study of Indianapolis-area associations, and Knoke (1990), based on the "National Association Study" (NAS).[1] Knoke and Wood provide a comprehensive overview of theory and literature on "social influence" associations, with special attention to Michels and Mancur Olson's formulation of the "free rider" collective action problem. They test hypotheses on interviews of 820 members (stratified to include one-third leadership) of 32 Indianapolis groups; interviews were aggregated to the association level for analysis. The book focuses on dependent variables of membership commitment, resource acquisition and external goal attainment. The independent variables represent competing forms of social control: incentive structures, decision participation (or "decentralization") and formally legitimate leadership. Decision participation was measured by the proportion of each association's respondents reporting that they participated in making a decision on their personally most salient issue. Among a myriad of valuable findings, the data show that decision participation outranks incentive structures and legitimate leadership as a predictor of aggregate membership commitment (1981, 109). However, the project did not collect constitutional details on associational structure, so we do not have any indication of whether decision participation reflects the kind of institutional congruence that could be designed intentionally by reform advocates.

Knoke (1990) presents the National Association Study (NAS), a large-scale project that retained individual-level as well as aggregate data from 8,746 randomly-sampled

[1]Unfortunately, neither data set appears to be available for re-analysis.

members of thirty-five nationwide associations, which were themselves sampled (with stratification for size) from directories of professional, recreational, and women's associations. An entire section of the book is dedicated to organizational polity, contrasting formal constitutional authority with informal patterns of influence. The NAS included five measures of democratic structures, covering annual conventions or general meetings, electoral competition, frequency of board meetings, use of referenda, and national-local consultation, resulting in a simple five-point additive scale. Knoke found that member turnout in internal elections was twice as high in associations scoring five traits than for those scoring none, and members' psychological commitment was weakly but substantively higher in associations with democratic structures (1990, 153, 182). Perhaps most importantly, democratic structures contributed to lower "detachment" toward the association, where detachment is essentially the opposite of the usual political efficacy items employed in surveys about governments, such as "I don't have much say about what the organization does" and "Since other members are active, it doesn't matter whether I participate." (1990, 172). Knoke's study lays significant groundwork for this investigation, since it provides evidence that democratic institutions play a similar role within associations to that observed by political science treatments of democratic institutions in government settings, like Rahn, Brehm and Carlson's finding that national elections stimulate efficacy (1999). What remains to be shown is the congruence question: how much is that efficacy transmitted to the governmental realm? Knoke's data does not include any capacity to estimate associational institutional effects on attitudes toward government.

Robert Putnam's focus on drawing distinctions between horizontally- and vertically-structured networks (1993, 173) and between social capital that is "bridging"—outward-looking and contextually fungible—or "bonding"—inward, exclusive and contextually non-transferable— (2000, 22ff) have inspired significant discussion, debate, and sometimes undeserved derision. But few have endeavored to operationalize them in terms of specific organizations' traits in a large-scale study.

Dietlind Stolle's work (1998; 2000; Stolle and Rochon 2001) is among the most relevant to Putnam's categories. Stolle (1998) addresses attributes of specific organizations such as internal diversity and average level of engagement, with impressive and useful results; she finds that contextual diversity, engagement and "weak ties" produce greater generalized trust in members. Her data was collected from members in attendance at meetings for selected associations. She does not evaluate political structure, because the organizations she selected differ very little in structure (1998, 502). Being concerned primarily with trust and social capital, Stolle also does not address political efficacy or regime support as outcome variables.

Indeed, much of the extant research in Putnam's wake concerns the correlates of generalized trust. Stolle and Rochon (2001) differentiate the effects of various categories of associations (sports, charity, educational, and so on) in Sweden, Germany and the U.S., but do not have data on specific organizations or movements; they also find that associational diversity produces generalized trust. Uslaner (2002) uses, among many other sources, the same 1996 American National Election Studies data I employ here, but employs only the associational count-by-category variables. Uslaner finds that no

associational type produces any measurable effects on generalized trust in a reciprocal analysis, except for church groups, which he finds *reduce* trust (Uslaner 2002, 134). His conclusion is that civic engagement has no presumptive relationship with generalized trust.[2]

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, 383) speculate about the effects of institutional differences, musing that African-American churches "have special potential for stimulating political participation" because "internal structure nurtures opportunities to exercise politically relevant skills." But there is no specific data on those internal structures in their analysis; the presence of these structures is inferred from the authors' experience and from the values of the outcome variables themselves.[3]

The research that first interested me in this topic (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1999) used confirmatory factor analysis to reveal different loadings of associational types (labor, sports, veterans, and so on) on a latent construct called "civic engagement," but left us to speculate on what institutional effects, if any, might underlie the loadings. For example, did labor unions and veterans' associations load

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[2] I have reproduced Uslaner's three-stage least squares analysis of the 1996 NES data per his description in page 132 note 4 and Table 5.4, but I am unable to replicate his result, despite taking great care in checking and rechecking the variable coding and model specification against his book. Unlike Uslaner, with his own model specification I find strong reciprocal relationships between trust and involvement in several of the associational types he isolates (business, cultural, and church, specifically). I would hazard a guess that one of us has miscoded some key variables; given the sheer number of complex data sets Uslaner covers quickly in a few pages, and my own years of meticulous data handling with this single data set, I would humbly submit that Uslaner is more likely to be in error. There are a great number of variables in the 1996 codebook that are not complete without complex recoding, combination with other variables and correct handling of missing data. Whatever the case, this is an example of the great difficulty of making findings replicable with current statistical software and research practices.

[3]Unfortunately, I have no data specifically on predominantly African-American church polities either, despite determined efforts to locate informants and persuade them to respond. But my data does permit comparison of fifteen religious denominations, some of which are ethnically diverse.

weakly on civic engagement primarily because they are relatively compulsory associations, as we suggested then? Veterans associations are voluntary, but many veterans were drafted into the status that makes them eligible for those associations. Or do labor unions and veterans groups have some other characteristic that sets them apart? We need data on specific organizations, not just classes of them, to address these issues.[4]

In a reciprocal structural-equations model of General Social Survey data, Brehm and Rahn (1997) also found, and largely passed over, an aberrant coefficient in an otherwise virtuous cycle between civic engagement (associational memberships in the sixteen GSS categories), interpersonal trust, and confidence in institutions (the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the federal government). The three endogenous variables were found to be mutually reinforcing to various degrees, except where civic engagement had a *negative* relationship with confidence in institutions. The finding raises questions about the logic of congruence; if the coefficient is not an artifact of the complexity of the model, associations may be "teaching" something other than democracy and thus undermining confidence, or associational involvement may alert members to failings of federal institutions. Unfortunately, the 1996 NES examined here does not include the specific questions about Congress, the Presidency and the Supreme Court found in the GSS, so any comparisons must be indirect.

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[4]The usual associational categories are somewhat arbitrary, as was revealed by the degree to which multiple NES 1996 respondents mentioned the same organization in several different categories. Some of the categories may be more useful as memory prompts for respondents than as analytical tools. The categories are not consistently of the same class; for example, religious affiliation, member age and charitable purposes are orthogonal dimensions; a single organization might suit all three categories. Is the Salvation Army a charitable service to the needy, a church, or a church-affiliated organization? Is the National Education Association a professional society, a labor union or an educational group?

When it comes to measurement, Marc Hooghe (2003) has recently published a study using Belgian data showing that the raft of non-findings on the effects of associations may well be due to a failure to account for associational exposure the same way we do for educational exposure: cumulatively. Despite Tocqueville's and Dewey's analogy between associations and schools, we measure years of education even for people who have not been in school for decades, but not years of associational experience for past members. Hooghe finds quite remarkable effects of past involvement in youth associations on adults of all ages. While the NES data employed here does not include this improved measurement method, Hooghe's findings suggest caution in interpreting the measurements we have; democratic socialization may have occurred in the past for present-day survey respondents who report no current memberships in democratic associations. Wollebaek and Selle (2002) argue from their statistical findings with Norwegian data that passive membership is not distinct from active membership in its effect on three measures of social capital (trust, networks and civic engagement), an observation they describe as contrary to Robert Putnam's hypotheses about the importance of face-to-face encounters. However, there is no assurance that today's passive members were not active members in the past, whose present-day participation in social capital was generated primarily at the time of joining and early participation, a possibility also suggested by Stolle (1998, 508). In terms of the weak version of congruence theory, this means that our data should ideally consider not only any exposure to democratic institutions in the present cross-section, but also past

involvement. Unfortunately, we do not have such data, but this limitation should remain firmly in mind.

The most potent causal force of associations may be yet more arcane, residing not only in the individual's past, but in the cultural past. Wollebaek and Selle (2002) argue that associational institutions serve as social infrastructure, a repository of norms and resources supportive of collective action. They suggest a "counterfactual thought experiment":

> What would the level of social capital be like if associations were absent? Regardless of whether those joining associations possess more social capital than nonjoiners to begin with, associations contribute to the sustenance and transformation of values and norms because they are an important part of the political, social and cultural infrastructure of society. The existence of a multitude of visible voluntary associations is in itself evidence of the value and rationality of collaborative efforts, even for individuals who do not actively take part themselves. (2002, 57)

After challenging some of Putnam's less controversial points, Wollebaek and Selle thus deliver an argument for his most controversial claim in *Making Democracy Work* (1993): that social capital can endure as a sort of dormant cultural resource—untilled but fertile soil—over decades or even centuries, as he suggests took place in northern Italy between the era of medieval city states and the 1980s. For example, Putnam remarks that the founding in 1865 of a cooperative in Altare drew on much older rituals (1993, 150). His description of medieval forms of association emphasizes the institutionalization of procedures for taking collective action and resolving disputes (1993, 126) in ways that persist in present-day cultural memory.

This conception of associations as "institutions in which norms and resources are embedded" should become central to a revised understanding of the logic of congruence. The "transmission belt" mechanism almost certainly does not require the comprehensive

congruence that Nancy Rosenblum correctly decries as an enemy of liberal pluralism (1998). But weak congruence may at least provide a boost in system support for democratic government, not only by giving more citizens experience with the tools of democratic decision-making and action-taking, but by replenishing or reinforcing cultural memory that present nonparticipants may draw on in the future. Active participation by all in democratic associations is probably not necessary any more than active participation by all in democratic government. Nevertheless, exposure to the "demonstration effect" of democratic procedures might have measurable impact on attitudes related to those procedures. Ideally, we could observe and measure such exposure across the spectrum, in family, school, business, church and associations. Such data is not likely to emerge from anything but a colossal new longitudinal study of associations and their members, but the data presented below may at least give a glimpse of the effects of associational structure. Within the current study's limitations, those effects appear to be nonexistent or at least undetectable.

Another approach to developing knowledge of associational diversity is participant observation. In the same volume with Stolle and Rochon, Carla Eastis observed the differences between two local music-performance groups (Eastis 2001). Like Rosenblum, she concludes that complexity is the order of the day: "some organizations broaden social networks, participants in others develop strong values that may or may not be supportive of democratic institutions, still other organizations train individuals in civic skills, and, of course, some associations do all or some combination of these." (168) However, the "weak congruence" question addressed here is narrower, not whether autocratic

associations may not serve some public purpose, but whether democratic associations have specific measurable effects on attitudes toward national government.

Nina Eliasoph's *Avoiding Politics* (1998) is an ethnographic *tour de force* about the internal workings of a number of local associations in the Pacific Northwest. Eliasoph observed "political evaporation," in which Americans seem to "strain themselves" to avoid any situation that might imply public responsibility or require public discussion; by an unspoken normative convention, political conversations are held only in "backstage" whispers, and acknowledgment of the public purpose behind what political activism does occur is veiled in favor of a statement of personal interest. Eliasoph notes that activists "who were working within ethnically or racially bounded groups were much more connected to institutional powers: churches, civil rights groups, nationalist ethnic organizations." These activists were much more secure as "representatives of the organization"—as opposed to the "mainstream" volunteers who saw themselves as "representatives of 'the common person'"—in taking confrontational or "complaining" positions that were unacceptable to the "civic manners" of the mainstream (1998, 58-9). Some internal parliamentary institutions are necessary to make political discussion and debate comfortable, or at least "unavoidable;" associations that are loosely structured around informal consensus can easily evolve the kind of norms of silence described by Eliasoph.

My own brief observation of a pair of North Carolina associations suggest that what Eliasoph calls "political condensation" can indeed be induced by internal associational institutions; we might say institutional democracy is a "political rainmaker." The

procedural ritual of doing business through discussion and voting is a socializing force that should inculcate both respect for rules and a sense of personal competence. One participant in the North Carolina PTA, a local school principal, told me of his learning experience about handling conflict: "I used to hate bylaws, but now I see the beauty of bylaws. You want to know something [about how to decide an issue], just open them up and there it is, all settled." His initial perception was that the complex associational bylaws were inefficient and offered open doors for gratuitous dissent, but through experience he came to recognize them as tools for channeling and managing conflict. Far from avoiding politics, he can embrace them in the confidence that the bylaws will structure and limit conflict and legitimize controversial decisions. People with such practical experiences certainly might be more understanding of the public "sausage factory" appearance of Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). But they would first have to make the inference across contexts, a condition that cannot be taken for granted.

Research design

Independent variables

An institutionalist view of government-association congruence theory requires independent variables measuring associational institutional configurations.

Organizational constitutionality: At the associational level, constitutionality is explicit or widely accessible organizational instructions about how decisions are made and by whom. Constitutionality should contribute to stronger indicators of organizational success. As Huntington (1968) described, organizations lacking in institutionalized

structures for conflict resolution and coordination face serious problems in times of crisis. The greater the individual's exposure to associations with explicit rules for group membership and decision-making processes, the greater her internal and external political efficacy and regime support. Formal constitutions produce these effects both by reducing uncertainty where the individual is conceived as a rational actor and by creating routine expectations when the individual is conceived as a psychological object. These effects are expected to hold *independently* of whether the association's practices are in fact democratic. All else equal, a participant in a highly hierarchical but constitutionally-governed organization should have greater efficacy than a participant in a similar organization that lacks any written constitutional structure. Organizational success should be enhanced and regime support should be increased by the security of established rules and procedures. Even where such rules are widely ignored in practice, they offer a focal point for internal debate in crisis and a means for the rank and file to legitimize protest and criticism of the leadership when the rules are violated. Organizations without such rules are more vulnerable to arbitrary manipulation of their internal politics, and arbitrariness is the enemy of efficacy.

Organizational democracy exists in greater degree where more of the following kinds of statements are true:

- competitive elections are held for leadership positions;
- the "franchise" in these elections is generally broader and more competitive;
- agenda-setting is open to a greater number of participants (that is, rules allow a wider franchise of members to propose "new business" in open meetings);

- major policy decisions are made by a group vote of either a representative board or council, or by the members themselves in assembly or convention;
- And so on, as Chapter 4 elaborates.

This opportunity-based rather than action-based approach follows Carlson (1999) in allowing that non-participants may abstain from political participation precisely because the mere opportunity to vote or influence discussion is reassuring enough. A measurement strategy for these variables is presented in Chapter 4 and employed in analysis in Chapters 5 and 6.

Constitutional democracy is the interaction of the previous two factors; democratic associations that do not codify democratic practices are presumptively more, not less vulnerable to Michel's "iron law of oligarchy." Democracy is a complex kind of political system, and participants need the clarity of externally recorded procedures and standards to have confidence in which levers to pull when they perceive the need to act. An informal democracy without any constitutional form is one in which properly democratic procedure is not merely subject to interpretation, it is entirely a matter of interpreting oral and historical traditions of interaction. *A priori,* constitutionality and democracy should be mutually reinforcing; that is, models should reveal a positive interaction effect between measurements of the two concepts.

Dependent variables and specific hypotheses

The central outcomes of interest for congruence theory have traditionally been so-called "political-cultural" attitudes, measured with polling data ever since Almond and

Verba's landmark study (1963); I continue this practice here.[5] They are not the only variables worth consideration, but they are clearly worthy enough. As I argued in Chapter 1, these "cultural attitudes" are not radically distinct conceptually from "institutions," but may be conceived of as measurement indicators of the same complex of institutional "mental models" of politics and cultural "semiotic practices" discussed by institutional economists and political anthropologists alike.

This research is concerned with seven dependent variables, as follows. First, at the association level, ***organizational success*** is the key outcome variable. Chapter 5 presents an index of associational leaders' perceived organizational success built from measures of volunteer commitment, membership turnover, volunteer civicness, mission performance and trends in mission performance. Organizational success is a measure both of practical value to associational leaders and a potential source of congruence; the greater the organizational success, the association's achievement of its goals is greater by definition (charity, mutual benefit, issue advocacy, etc.) and its presumptive ability to "tutor" citizens in the use of its institutional forms is also greater. The hypothesis to be tested is simple: if constitutional democracy is effective at retaining volunteers and mobilizing people for association purposes:

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[5]An alternative stream focuses on government performance indicators, as did Huntington (1968) and Putnam (1993); but one of the chief, oft-confirmed claims of the attitudinal approach is precisely that the attitudes contribute substantively to government performance. For example, Levi and Stoker catalog the extensive literature on trust in government and government trustworthiness, concluding that "Whether citizens judge politicians or government trustworthy influences whether they become politically active, how they vote, whether they favor policy or institutional reforms, whether they comply with political authorities, and whether they trust one another." (Levi and Stoker 2000, 501)

Hypothesis 1: constitutional democratic associations should experience greater perceptions of success.

Second, ***generalized trust*** is the subject of a social-scientific industry. The ability to trust generic others is described as one indicator of the presence of social capital; Brehm and Rahn (Brehm and Rahn 1997) found that interpersonal trust is more a function of confidence in government institutions than the reverse, a finding consistent with Levi's (1996) claim that effective government is a good-fences-make-good-neighbors precondition for personal trust. Huntington (1968) notes that Bertrand de Jouvenel called this the "institutionalization of trust" (1957); a similar conception is critiqued by Adam Seligman as "institutionalized trust" (Seligman 1997). And Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999) find that national elections stimulate generalized trust. By congruence logic, we should expect similar effects from associational governance; institutions that coordinate cooperation and order conflict, whether constitutional, democratic or both, may reassure people about the modal trustworthiness of others. On the other hand, the hypothesis may be rejected if critics like Seligman are right and institutionalization crowds out the fragile, basic trust in others *qua* human beings that is the real foundation of a liberal society.

Hypothesis 2: greater exposure to organizational constitutionality and organizational democracy should increase generalized trust.

Third, ***internal political efficacy*** is an individual's confidence in her own personal political competence. Internal efficacy is a kind of human capital, a subjective version of the civic skills addressed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995); it is portable, in principle, from one context, such as the association meeting, to another, such as voting in a national election or contacting a Congressional representative. Without some amount of internal efficacy, citizens are paralyzed and can or will not act politically, except as pawns of other players. The more confidence they sense, the more they can resist fear of others and respond with restraint to perceived challenges to their interests and wishes. Under congruence, exposure to associational democracy should demystify politics and raise expectations of personal competence in other democratic arenas.

Hypothesis 3: members of constitutional democratic associations should report a greater sense of their own personal internal efficacy.

Fourth, ***external political efficacy*** is an individual's confidence in the responsiveness of leadership of political systems. This confidence is similar to internal efficacy, with the exception that it is focused outward, on the reliability of others in a specific context, in this case officeholders. The central question for congruence theory is how much the context of elected office abstracts itself from associations to governments; Nancy Rosenblum says it can hardly be expected to do so at all. External efficacy as measured here is linked with Easton's concept of "government support" (Easton 1957) and the wide trust in government literature. It reflects assessments of the people in government more so than the institutional regime, although as Miller and Citrin's long-

running debate shows, the two are likely interrelated (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974a). Trust in government is consequential for vote choice (Hetherington 1999) and citizen compliance with government decisions (Levi and Stoker 2000, 492). But confidence in leadership is a controversial outcome; some consider distrust of leadership to be a necessary component of democratic systems (there are several essays to this effect in Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Warren 1999a). Others object that the variable is too unstable over time to reflect anything real; the emotive surge in trust in government following the terrorist destruction of the World Trade Center demonstrates this volatility (Chanley 2002). But variation in external efficacy *across individuals* may be a less ambiguous indicator of perceptions of system health than actual participatory behavior, since abstention can indicate any or all of satisfaction, apathy and alienation (Carlson 1999). In congruence theory, constituents of more democratic organizations in particular should have greater reason to expect official responsiveness from democratic officials because they will have had greater opportunity to witness how democratic institutions structure incentives and habits of responsive behavior by political leadership.

Hypothesis 4: greater exposure to organizational democracy should increase external political efficacy.

Fifth, ***regime support*** for democratic political practices (Carlson 1999; Easton 1957) is the expression of confidence directly in political institutions and practices, both associational and governmental. Where efficacy concerns persons, regime support concerns the political technology itself—does the citizen believe democracy (or hierarchy

or oligarchy) works? The fairness of elections, the legitimacy of appointed positions and the appropriateness of executive powers all fall under this rubric. With low regime support, individuals, both as association members and citizens, have little reason to expect political solutions to problems and can be expected to seek remedies outside the regime, thereby destabilizing it. This is as true of a children's sports league as much as a national government. Psychologists have demonstrated that people are more likely to act to restore an opportunity or "freedom" that has been removed than to create a new freedom (Brehm and Brehm 1981); this asymmetry suggests that the opportunity to participate offered by democratic institutions can produce stable underlying support even when active participation is low. Again, considering the individual as both rational actor and psychological object, electoral and democratic institutions can raise rational expectations of future influence, thus lengthening the actor's time horizon and decreasing their "discount rate," encouraging long-term "investment" in the organization ("loyalty" in Albert O. Hirschman's famous terms, 1970). Psychologically, the individual becomes habituated and comfortable with the practice of consulting others for approval before acting. Both approaches are transmissible in principle from the associational to the national level; successful implementation of elections as a decision-making technology in associations may provide evidence to participants that this mechanism is also desirable and reliable on a national scale.

Hypothesis 5: greater exposure to associational constitutional democracy should increase support for the national constitutional democratic regime.

The external efficacy and regime support items, along with internal efficacy as a sort of "self-support," draw on Easton's categories of "diffuse support" for the national political system. In treating diffuse support as a dependent variable, I am not thereby advancing a utopian vision of democratic citizenship. As many scholars have been at pains to point out (such as Hardin 1999), "trust" in government may indeed be badly misplaced, and even support for the regime might be objectively foolish. We should not expect or wish for experiences of associational democracy to inspire ecstatic transports of political enthusiasm for the democratic state. James Madison's grudging satisfaction with barely controlled factionalism is more to the point. But we have ample evidence that many present-day Americans are not much committed to the damage-control philosophy that underlies liberal democratic institutions, preferring instead a "stealth democracy" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), a government that expresses preexisting consensus in a quiet, sanitary fashion. Their discontent with government may be an artifact of misplaced expectations rather than an informed judgment of the regime's worth. But if congruence theory is correct, citizens with more exposure to constitutional and democratic associational practices, like those with higher levels of education, should simply be more likely to converge on measurably higher mean levels of various measures of diffuse support. Despite their misgivings, people should benefit from the reduction of uncertainty about how well constitutional, democratic processes work to control and legitimize authority, on the proverbial principle of "the devil you know is preferable to the devil you do not." Associational democracy may also build affective or habitual

tolerance for the boredom of following procedure and witnessing the occasional ugliness of democratic political conflict.

Finally, associational congruence is not terribly important politically if it does not contribute to political behaviors like ***voter turnout*** and ***campaigning behavior***. If the logic of congruence holds, members of constitutional democratic associations should perceive the importance of voting and campaigning and do so more often. The social networks fostered by free internal political competition should also facilitate more peer-to-peer mobilization. Finally, as more legitimate political actors in their own right, these congruent associations should be better structured to mobilize members to vote and campaign.

Hypothesis 6: exposure to more constitutional democratic association should (a) increase national voter turnout rates and (b) increase active engagement behavior in the national campaign.

Chapter 4 presents the data set that will be used to test these hypotheses.

CHAPTER 4: New Data on Associational Institutions

1996 American National Election Study

This chapter introduces the data set I have developed, with both heroic assistance and remarkable caution by the National Election Studies (NES), to address the questions raised by the association-to-government "transmission belt" implied by the logic of congruence. The project is derived from the 1996 NES, a very ambitious survey research project. In addition to the usual lengthy battery of questions on political issues, candidates, attitudes and demographics, the investigators included an extended list of questions on associations. As in many other data sets, respondents were asked about categories of associations they might adhere to. The General Social Survey (GSS), used in Brehm and Rahn (1997), has asked respondents about membership in seventeen categories of groups. The 1996 NES expanded and revised the list to twenty-two categories. Some GSS categories merged: the GSS's separate categories for professional and farm societies became a single "work-related" category, sports and hobbies became a single "leisure" category; fraternal, service and campus Greek groups became a single "service or fraternal" category. Several new categories were added, including churches *per se* and religiously affiliated groups (the GSS asked only about "church-affiliated groups) , senior citizens' groups, women's groups, charities (that is, "service to the needy"), cultural services and self-help groups. Types of political groups were expanded from the GSS's vague "political clubs" to include political issue groups, nonpartisan

civic groups, liberal and conservative groups, and political parties. **Table 4.1** on page 75 below provides more detail on these changes.

The NES also contacted more respondents, collecting associational data from 1,534 post-election respondents, while the 1994 GSS (the nearest GSS to employ the association questions) used a split sample of 511 persons, about one-sixth of the total 2,992 interviewed. The NES also prompted responses by naming major groups in the questions for some categories (such as the American Legion, the PTA, the Knights of Columbus, and so on). Finally, where the GSS has usually asked only for a yes-or-no answer to the question "are you a member [of one or more groups]?", the NES asked respondents to mention up to four "involvements" in each category, to *name the groups* and to indicate six additional aspects of participation for each group: membership, dues-paying, donating, attending meetings, joining in other activities, and the frequency of political discussion. Each respondent thus could mention and name up to a theoretical maximum of eighty-eight associations; the observed maximum was thirty-one mentions. The naming of specific groups differentiates the 1996 NES from otherwise similarly detailed studies, such as Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995).

One practical result of the NES's thorough measurement design is a significantly higher estimate than the GSS provides of the percentage of Americans who are presently involved in at least one association. The 1994 GSS produced a raw figure of 71.5% of respondents with membership in at least one of the sixteen categories, while the 1996 NES counts 84.9% with at least one "involvement," 82.1% with one or more *memberships*, 78.2% paying some dues or donations, 70.7% attending meetings or

activities, and 37.2% perceiving politics discussed "often" or "sometimes" in at least one involvement.

Table 4.1 shows that the biggest increases in 1996 NES estimates over the 1994 GSS were a result of explicitly including churches as a category and of distinguishing involvement from membership, especially for adults involved in youth and children's groups. The table compares the percentages of respondents responding "yes" to membership in the GSS category or naming at least one association in the NES category. The NES asked if respondents paid dues or donated (the column labeled "money" in the table) or attended meetings or activities ("activity" in the table). The "discuss" column counts mentions where politics were discussed "sometimes" or "often."

Table 4.1 - 1994 GSS and 1996 NES associational categories

Category (with 1994 GSS for comparison)	1994 GSS (N=511)	*1996 NES (1,534 post-election respondents)*				
				Last 12 months:		
	member	involved	member	money	activity	discuss
1 **Labor unions**	11.8%	14.0%	13.6%	11.0%	6.2%	7.3%
2 **Work-related**: business, professional or farm		17.1%	16.2%	13.1%	11.9%	6.9%
GSS: Professional or academic societies	18.7%					
GSS: Farm organizations	3.7%					
3 **Veterans'** organizations such as the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars (GSS: Veterans' groups)	7.9%	7.9%	6.3%	6.2%	3.3%	2.7%
4 Local **church,** parish or synagogue		58.5%	55.5%	53.7%	43.7%	8.7%
5 Other orgs. **affiliated with your religion** such as the Knights of Columbus or B'nai B'rith or a bible study group		12.8%	11.9%	8.3%	9.7%	2.5%
GSS: Church-affiliated groups	33.4%					
6 Orgs. for the **elderly** or senior citizens?		11.5%	10.6%	8.6%	4.4%	5.1%
7 Orgs. representing your own particular **nationality or ethnic** group such as the Polish-American Congress, the Mexican-American Legal Defense, or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People? (GSS: nationality groups)	3.5%	3.8%	3.5%	2.4%	2.3%	2.0%
8 Orgs mainly interested in issues promoting the rights of **women**–an organization such as the National Organization for Women, Eagle Forum, or the American Association of University Women?		1.5%	1.2%	1.0%	0.8%	0.7%
9 Organizations active on any particular **political issues** such as the environment or abortion (on either side), or gun control (on either side) or consumer rights, or the rights of taxpayers or any other issues?		6.4%	5.8%	5.0%	1.9%	4.6%
10 Nonpartisan **civic** organizations interested in the political life of the community or nation–such as the League of Women's Voters or a better government association?		2.0%	1.7%	1.4%	1.6%	1.2%

(Continued on following page)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Category (with 1994 GSS for comparison)	1994 GSS (N=511)	*1996 NES (1,534 post-election respondents)*				
				Last 12 months:		
	member	involved	member	money	activity	discuss
11 Organizations that support general **liberal or conservative** causes such as Americans for Democratic Action or the Conservative Caucus?		0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
12 Organizations active in supporting candidates for elections such as a **political party** organization?		3.1%	2.7%	1.5%	1.1%	2.4%
GSS: Political clubs	4.7%					
13 Groups in which **children** might participate, such as Girl Scouts, 4-H, youth sports leagues such as soccer or Little League?		16.0%	11.3%	12.5%	13.3%	1.3%
GSS: Youth groups	10.4%					
14 **Literary, art**, discussion or study groups	9.8%	3.5%	3.3%	1.8%	3.1%	1.0%
15 Hobby clubs, sports or country clubs, bowling leagues, or other groups for **leisure time** activities?		18.0%	17.0%	14.1%	14.3%	3.9%
GSS: Sports groups	21.6%					
GSS: Hobby or garden clubs	9.2%					
16 Associations related to where you live--**neighborhood or community** associations, homeowners' or condominium associations, or block clubs?		13.3%	12.7%	9.6%	10.0%	3.3%
17 **Service or fraternal** organizations such as the Lions or Kiwanis or a local women's club or a college fraternity or sorority?		8.1%	7.8%	6.3%	5.7%	1.4%
GSS: Fraternal groups	10.1%					
GSS: Service clubs	10.1%					
GSS: School fraternities or sororities	5.7%					
18 Organizations that provide services in such fields as health or **service to the needy**--for instance, a hospital, a cancer or heart drive, or a group like the Salvation Army that works for the poor?		10.1%	6.6%	6.2%	5.9%	1.7%
19 **Educational** institutions-- local schools, your own school or college, organizations associated with education such as school alumni associations or school service organizations such as the PTA? (GSS: school service groups)	16.1%	18.3%	16.5%	13.1%	12.0%	4.5%
20 Organizations that are active in providing **cultural** services to the public--for example, museums, symphonies, or public radio or television?		6.7%	6.0%	5.7%	3.5%	1.8%
21 Support or **self-help** groups such as AA or Gamblers' Anonymous?		2.8%	2.3%	1.8%	2.0%	0.4%
22 Any **other** organizations (GSS: Any other groups)	10.7%	6.4%	5.7%	5.0%	3.6%	2.5%
Total with at least one	71.5%	84.9%	82.1%	78.2%	70.7%	37.2%

For reasons of confidentiality, the respondents' open-ended names for the groups they mentioned are suppressed in the publicly available data. Through a very careful "Special Access Request" (SPAR) process approved by the National Election Studies Board, I gained restricted access to these names and the full set of per-mention variables (membership, dues-paying, donating, meeting-attending, activity-going and political discussion). Respondent case numbers were scrambled in the data I received, in order to diminish the risk that a respondent's confidentiality could be compromised by matching their organizational affiliations to their demographic profiles. I also received permission to contact the head offices of only the very largest associations mentioned in the data, reducing the risk of contacting a former NES respondent to the vanishing point. The situation is similar to the privacy-versus-science debates common to medical records, commercial data and government security programs. The combination of the public data and the very specific group names could be a powerful tool for identifying respondents and violating their confidentiality, so we must cope with stringent limits on what can be done with the data.

Data structure and associational leadership questionnaire

However, what can be done is substantial. I made dozens of passes through the list of over 4,700 open-text mentions recorded by the NES interviewers; given the size of their task and the time pressure the NES interviewers were under, the data included almost certain misspelling, a significant number of multiple associations mentioned in a single data entry (such as "Little League, Boy Scouts" as a single mention), and duplicate

entries for the same organization by the same respondent. My revised version of the data numbers 4,678 associational mentions made by 1,305 respondents. I then identified 161 organizations that were mentioned by at least two respondents. These large organizations accounted for 2,030 or 43.3% of all the respondent group mentions.[1]

One approach to gathering institutional information would have been to collect documentary materials on each organization and code institutional forms through content analysis. However, the task would probably be too complex and tedious to receive quality work from hired coders I could afford, and my own coding decisions might be too easily colored by my theoretical expectations. Representatives of the organizations would be more defensible judges of their own institutions, and it would also be much easier for an organizational informant to undertake the effort of contextualizing organizationally-specific terms into categories general enough to permit comparison across organizations. Therefore, I designed and tested a questionnaire for organizational leadership in the spring of 2002, then fielded it on the Internet to ease delivery and data entry and to provide convenient, instant access for leaders; the survey instrument is found in Appendix A. I contacted 125 of these large associations by phone and follow-up e-mail between June and December of 2002, usually beginning with their public relations or

[1]A complete list of these organizations here might compromise confidentiality agreements by permitting reverse engineering of which 1996 NES respondents belonged to which associations, as well as revealing the answers of a few association staff respondents who requested confidentiality of responses. Some potential for this kind of inference is unavoidable, but only for the very largest associations. The list is available with permission from the National Election Studies; please contact nes@umich.edu or (734) 764-5494. Suffice it to say that the list is very similar to any other mid-1990's list of the nation's largest membership organizations in the categories described.

communications departments.[2] Where organizations formed part of a loose-knit federation, political party or religious denomination, I treated the entire movement as if it were a single association. I contacted the office closest to a U.S. national level and asked them to represent the entire group to the best of their ability. I requested an authorized informant knowledgeable about associational governance to complete the fifteen-to-thirty minute long Internet questionnaire.

By April 2003, eighty-one informants from sixty-seven associations completed the questionnaire.[3] Several more provided partial responses but did not reach the final page that set permissions to use the data. I made a concerted effort to locate only authoritative, well-informed respondents with long experience in their organizations. Informants included several chief executives, presidents and executive directors; many more vice presidents and assistant directors; a large number of public relations or communications directors; in a few cases, a communications staff member or research librarian responded, and a few more organizations had internal governance specialists who took on the task with relish. I have no reason to suppose that rank or any other characteristic would systematically bias responses, but it is possible.

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[2]The 36 remaining organizations were all small (with two or three respondents). Some twenty of these were discovered in the data too late to be included, due to variable spellings or naming discrepancies (I developed a new search technique that uncovered some new matches); most were smaller labor unions with long, hard-to-type acronyms. A few others were too local and might have led to confidentiality risks; the NES uses cluster samples which increase the chance of very local associations receiving multiple mentions.

[3]Specific associations are not named in connection with their scores in accordance with confidentiality promised to informants; some associations would certainly not have been forthcoming about internal difficulties without this promise.



Source: 1996 American National Election Study and Associational Institutions Supplement (AIS)

Figure 4.1 - Annotated diagram of relational data structure

Figure 4.1 displays the relationships between the four data tables involved. As shown in the figure, I began with the original 1,714 NES respondents, 1,534 of whom answered the post-election survey. Of these, 1,305 mentioned at least one association, up to an actual maximum of thirty. The one and infinity (1 ∞) symbols indicate that the database relationship to the next data table is "one to many"—each respondent could make many associational mentions. The red circle-and-slash at upper left indicates that this first relational data link was scrambled by NES to protect respondent confidentiality. The second data source is the set of 4,678 associational mentions with the scrambled respondent identification keys. Each of these mentions was reviewed and coded with several additional categorical variables based only on the text; for example, a hypothetical case in the hobby and sport category might say "baseball league," clarifying that the association in question is specifically a sport rather than a hobby group; bible studies, homeowners' associations and other categories of interest were similarly identified with new variables. The histogram shows the relative frequency of mentions by NES category; churches were mentioned more than twice as often as the runner-up business and professional associations. The next relationship is marked (∞ 1) or "many to one"; there may be many mentions referring to one particular association in the following table. I identified 161 specific associations—including some loosely-knit movements, federations and denominations—with at least two mentions each. The largest of these had 266 mentions[4]; forty-one associations had just two mentions. The black boxes overlaid on

[4] This large group is the Roman Catholic Church, a fact that cannot be concealed. I recognize that the Catholic Church and other groups are often more than mere "associations." The church is too large and internally diverse to characterize with just one set of measurements, a problem I address briefly in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, I use the generic "association" for brevity and lack of a better term.

the third histogram show the proportion of each bar for which we have data; for example, of the forty-one associations with two mentions, only twelve responded. The next and final relationship is again "one to many" (1 ∞): each large association could have one or more informants responding to the Internet questionnaire. Due to the fairly high requirements for time and expertise to respond to the survey, relatively few organizations did provide multiple informants; in a very few cases, secondary informants invited by the primary informants have been excluded because they were merely curious or were not qualified to respond; this was always clear from their written comments and time stamps showing they progressed too quickly to have read and considered the questions. In the end, just ten associations provided multiple informants, eight with two informants and two with four informants. Several of these were among the largest and most complex associations, however, so the additional information is valuable. In several cases, multiple informants collaborated to complete a single questionnaire.

Because the first relational link in the database is scrambled for confidentiality, a great deal of information represented by the four levels of data has to be flattened to connect it with the original respondents' data. The data was collapsed to the respondent level in stages, then unscrambled by the NES staff, so that I never had access to linked data that might have allowed association names to be attached to specific respondents. The auxiliary file's codebook describes the various methods used to collapse the data; the variables are sums, means or maximums as appropriate. For example, responses on electoral competitiveness from multiple informants were averaged to give a single score for each organization; this score is then linked to each mention of that organization. Then

each respondent received an overall score representing the average electoral competitiveness of all of the set of sixty-seven responding associations he or she actually mentioned.

The leadership questionnaire attempted to capture institutional practices in a general enough fashion to allow a wide range of organizations to answer without too much confusion about terms; to this end, it was moderately successful. A few informants clearly misunderstood the meaning of terms such as "volunteer" or "local branch," despite instructions explaining the intended meaning of the terms. However, informants were given the opportunity to type an open-ended clarification to most questions, and these notes were usually adequate to allow me to recode answers to fit the intended question meaning.[5]

The resulting dataset was released by the NES in August 2003 as part of a new Auxiliary File on Group Memberships (Rinden, Carlson, and National Election Studies 2003). The next two chapters present initial results of investigations of the new data.

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[5]Interested parties can view the Stata "do file" that documents and performs all of the editing on the organizational-level data at: *http://www.duke.edu/~nec/ps/diss/data_and_stats/orgsGetOrgsEdit.do*. If the web site is unavailable, the NES also has archived a copy of the file. Most of the edits are my clarification of informants' open-ended "Other - please explain" answers.

CHAPTER 5: Association-Level Analysis of Institutional Patterns

Associational traits

Data from the sixty-seven associations responding to the leadership questionnaire is remarkable for its variation; if there is any "institutional isomorphism" from a "structurated organizational field" imposing homogeneity on these associations (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), it is relatively weak or lurks "below the radar" of this study's institutional measurement approach. For example, **Table 5.1** shows that almost two-thirds of the organizations, with 1,080 total respondent mentions in the 1996 NES,[1] reported having an official membership system; twenty organizations with 209 respondent mentions did not. Four organizations with multiple informants varied in their responses and scored 0.5 on this variable, accounting for 146 respondent mentions. A very similar breakdown occurs between organizations reporting that members join through a formal process of application, orientation, nomination, election, or initiation of some sort. But these two groups of organizations are not at all identical; the two variables are only moderately correlated ($r = 0.45$).

[1]Note that some respondents may have mentioned more than one organization in this set of forty-one, so the total number of respondents involved is smaller. Precisely how much smaller cannot be determined due to the scrambled link between mentions and respondent records.

Table 5.1 - Sample membership system variables by association

Variable	Large Associations	Mentions	Percent of Mentions
Total associations with data	67	1,464	
Official membership system?			
Yes	41	1,080	73.8%
(Informants differ)	4	146	10.0%
No	20	209	14.3%
Members inducted formally?			
Yes	41	1,060	72.4%
(Informants differ)	3	56	3.8%
No	21	319	21.8%

Some of the most important data for theoretical purposes is on internal elections. Informants were asked whether their group's top leader was elected in any way, and if so by what constituency. They were then asked if their organization held any elections at any level; if so, they were asked to indicate the competitiveness and frequency of the elections and the size of the electorate in the highest-level election. **Table 5.2** shows significant variation in this area as well; twenty-eight organizations with nearly half of the respondent mentions of these associations do not elect their top leadership figure, or the "election" is conducted by a Board or similar small, elite body. But election by representatives and direct membership votes are to be found in plenty.

Table 5.2 - Election variables by association

Variable	Large Associations	Mentions	Percent of Mentions
Total with Data	67	1,464	100.0%
Is top leader elected?			
No	6	60	4.1%
(Informants differ)	1	266	18.2%
By Board of Directors, etc.	21	353	24.1%
By member representatives	22	437	29.8%
(Informants differ)	1	101	6.9%
By membership directly	16	247	16.9%
Are elections competitive?			
Very competitive	10	210	14.3%
(Informants differ)	4	142	9.7%
Somewhat competitive	15	569	38.9%
Occasionally competitive	12	89	6.1%
(Informants differ)	1	3	0.2%
Rarely competitive	15	165	11.3%
Never competitive	4	58	4.0%
[Missing, no elections are held]	6	228	15.6%
How frequent are elections?			
More than one per year	5	401	27.4%
Every one to two years	44	654	44.7%
Every two to four years	6	84	5.7%
(Informants differ)	2	40	2.7%
Every four or more years	4	57	3.9%
[Missing, no elections are held]	6	228	15.6%
How large is top-level electorate?			
Very large (several thousand or more)	18	333	22.7%
(Informants differ)	1	101	6.9%
Moderately large (several hundred or more)	22	349	23.8%
(Informants differ)	2	43	2.9%
Moderately small (20-30 or more)	8	39	2.7%
Very small (up to 20-30 people)	10	371	25.3%
[Missing, no elections are held]	6	228	15.6%

Additional questions addressed formal and informal authority structure, policymaking practices and meetings. Twenty-four organizations with 296 total mentions said the organization's highest formal authority was held by elected representatives of the membership; only fourteen of these, with 205 mentions among them, also said that the highest *informal* authority was also held by those representatives. Another five associations with 127 mentions said elected representatives held informal but not formal authority. All told, informants from thirty-two associations with 38% of the mentions said elected representatives held the highest authority either formally or informally. When asked what procedure was necessary to make major policy changes in the organization, twenty-eight associations with 552 mentions reported that a convention or other assembly of the membership was required to approve changes; another five associations with 170 mentions had at least one of multiple informants who said a membership convention was necessary.

Measurement model of institutional associational traits

Congruence theory has the "observable implication" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) that associational democracy is itself a coherent syndrome or dimension that can be evaluated, as opposed to a set of unrelated characteristics. Practically speaking, our evaluation of associations can be greatly simplified if we can develop latent measures that summarize the exposure of NES respondents to underlying dimensions of associational political institutions. The measurement model below serves this purpose, using confirmatory factor analysis to generate a score for associations on three latent

constructs: organizational democracy, membership constitutionality, and organizational success.

Table 5.3 below shows the results of a confirmatory factor analysis performed on the fifty-nine of the sixty-seven responding associations with data for all the indicators in the model. The model, created by the CALIS procedure in SAS System 8, is not a particularly good fit, with a Goodness of Fit Index of 0.66 and an RMSEA estimate of 0.096.[2] However, this is particularly "chunky" data with a lot of dummy and discrete variables with three to five options, so a good fit would be elusive in any case. Each of the latent variables can also be created by an identical scale with reasonable reliability (Cronbach's alpha ranges from 0.74 to 0.79 as shown in the rightmost column of the table below), and the resulting scores are correlated with the alpha scales with coefficients above 0.95. I have employed the CALIS output because it offers a more informative description of the contributions of the various indicators and because it simultaneously estimates covariation among the latent variables. Given that the purpose was to test theory rather than simply to find patterns in the data, the results provide reasonable confirmation of expectations of covariation in many of the indicators.

This model is not the random result of tinkering and data-mining; it is almost identical to the first, theoretically-driven attempt. A few indicators were dropped due to too little variation; for example, the membership constitutionality construct was

[2]Strictly speaking, these measures are meaningless, since the data is not at all a random sample. Significance tests indicate the probability of drawing a sample with values as extreme as the observation, but here there is no direct probability process. The data is better treated as a population, in which case the coefficients are not estimates in the usual statistical sense. However, using significance tests as a diagnostic for population data remains a common practice, so I report them here. Future work will pursue Bayesian methods of interpreting the reliability of population coefficients (Jackman 2000).

originally hypothesized in Chapter 3 to include a wider range of indicators of constitutionality, such as in center-local relations and in leadership selection procedures. But almost every association indicated documented procedures governed those areas. Likewise, an additional factor for subsidiarity or federalism did not pass muster, again because there was too little variation in the answers; most associations reported moderate to high levels of local autonomy, and budget and finance questions did not produce good data. Future work will have to employ different questions to identify wider variation.

Table rows are sorted to place the highest loading at the top for each factor, and the fourth column of numbers shows a simple rescaling of the factor loadings where the highest loading is the divisor for all of the subsequent loadings, which gives an approximation of what the loadings would be if the fixed loading were reset to the indicator with the highest loading.

Table 5.3 - Confirmatory factor-analytic measurement model with association-level data

Indicator Name	CALIS Loading	SE	t-value	rescaled loading	Alpha
Organizational Democracy Index					0.78
Meetings follow parliamentary procedure	2.01	0.68	2.92	1.00	
Meeting agenda are published and accessible in advance	1.92	0.66	2.89	0.96	
Meetings are conducted according to by-laws	1.53	0.57	2.69	0.76	
Any leadership elections at all	1.40	0.53	2.60	0.70	
Volunteers can place new business on agenda	1.40	0.54	2.60	0.70	
Convention required for major policy changes	1.35	0.52	2.56	0.67	
Electorate size	1.24	0.50	2.46	0.62	
Top leadership is elected	1.23	0.50	2.45	0.61	
Policy-making meetings open to full membership	1.15	0.48	2.37	0.57	
Meetings occur at predictable intervals	1.08	0.47	2.29	0.54	
Degree of electoral competition	1.00	0.45	2.19	0.50	
Formal authority is held by elected representatives	1.00			0.50	
Informal authority is held by elected representatives	0.86	0.43	2.00	0.43	
Election frequency	0.79	0.41	1.88	0.39	
Volunteers participate in local meetings	0.57	0.38	1.46	0.28	
Membership Constitutionality Index					0.79
An official document sets membership standards	1.57	0.41	3.87	1.00	
Members join through a formal process	1.42	0.38	3.73	0.90	
Members have responsibilities to fulfill	1.42	0.38	3.72	0.90	
Association has an official membership system	1.00			0.64	
Members can lose standing if responsibilities are not met	0.98	0.33	3.01	0.62	
Membership standards are strictly enforced	0.84	0.31	2.70	0.54	
Membership is informal in practice	-0.79	0.31	-2.58	-0.50	
Organizational Success Index					0.74
Volunteer commitment	1.00			1.00	
Mission performance	0.79	0.19	4.23	0.79	
Membership turnover	0.73	0.18	3.92	0.73	
Volunteers' civicness	0.71	0.19	3.84	0.71	
Mission performance trend	0.65	0.18	3.53	0.65	

As shown in the table, three latent constructs are created; the resulting variables represent covariation in responses to multiple survey questions. The first, organizational democracy, uses almost every available institutional indicator related to elected authority and participatory policymaking. The highest loadings are for the use of parliamentary procedure in meetings and for meeting agenda widely published in advance; the indicators having to do with meetings are the strongest category indicators, while electoral and membership system variables are significant but less indicative of the factor. Electoral frequency and competition, representative authority and membership meeting participation did not load as strongly as expected. All but two of the indicators have t-values of two or greater, and the Cronbach's alpha for a scale of the same indicators is 0.78. The highest scores on the organizational democracy scale are assigned to convention-governed associations with open, parliamentary-style meetings and elected top leadership from a large electorate; the lowest scores have few or none of these features.

The second construct is a measure of membership constitutionality, reflecting the degree to which members are systematically distinguished from non-members. The rescaled loadings are all at least 0.5, and a simple scale of the same indicators has an alpha of 0.79. The highest scores on membership constitutionality go to associations with official, documented, strictly enforced membership standards with member responsibilities and a formal member induction process.

Finally, the third construct measures organizational success in achieving the primary mission and retaining high-quality, committed volunteers; this construct is indicated by

informants' subjective ratings on five seven-point scales: volunteer commitment, volunteer turnover and general volunteer civicness, mission performance and the recent trend in mission performance. Volunteer commitment is the strongest indicator, while the other four cluster at loadings between 0.65 and 0.79. The organizational success scores are highest for associations whose informants perceived the lowest turnover in volunteer supporters, the highest levels of commitment and general civic behavior, as well as the highest estimate of performance and recent trend in performance on the association's primary mission.

Since the variable scale is arbitrary, each of these latent variables has been rescaled to range between zero and one for convenience in interpretation.

Analysis of latent traits

Associational categories are not very good proxies for institutional forms. As **Figure 5.1** shows, within-category variation is fairly broad in almost every NES category for which we have data on multiple associations, on both the organizational democracy and the membership constitutionality dimensions. The high democracy scores for veterans' groups are a fine illustration of Rosenblum's argument about human capacity to differentiate associational contexts. Participation in the military, by most accounts one of the most hierarchical institutions extant in the U.S., is connected with associational forms that mimic military command structures less than they do the democratic Constitution the military is tasked to defend. A large veterans' organization has the highest organizational democracy score of the responding population of associations.

Figure 5.1 - Within-category institutional variation



Source: NES 1996 Auxiliary File on Group Memberships

One explanation of the high scores for veterans' and other government-oriented organizations is "institutional isomorphism" imposed by government forms on politically active associations. This may occur through legal coercion, imitiation, the dissemination of norms, or any combination (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Skocpol describes this government-to-association process as the driving force behind the nineteenth century boom in association building (Skocpol 2003). Veterans' organizations, government employees' labor unions, political parties and advocacy groups might be expected to adopt democratic forms to legitimize their claims to representation; in some cases the form is partly dictated directly by legislation. This expectation is borne out; 42 organizations that said their volunteer constituents participate in some public-policy advocacy had higher mean organizational democracy scores than the 17 whose volunteers did not engage in association-sponsored advocacy.[3] Leaders were also asked to evaluate the degree to which their organization's decision process was constrained by dependence on or limitation by government. Most (52) said there was no constraint. The fifteen organizations that did sense government constraint were not systematically more or less democratic; the correlation is 0.09, in the opposite of the expected direction.

Organizational democracy and membership constitutionality are orthogonal in this data, correlated at just $r = 0.03$, though the measurement model did not force perpendicularity. **Figure 5.2** displays a scatterplot. This provides support for our assumption in Chapter 3 that constitutional democracy in associations is a two-part phenomenon; there are several associations in each of the four quadrants of the plot.

[3]ANOVA finds a difference in means of 0.12, $F(1, 58) = 4.37, p = 0.04$.

Figure 5.2 - Organizational democracy and membership constitutionality



Source: NES 1996 Auxiliary File on Group Memberships

Modeling perceptions of organizational success

The chief question of interest in this chapter involves the relationship between institutional forms and our measure of organizational success.

Bivariate relationships

Figure 5.3 plots the fifty-nine responding associations with latent scores, predicting their perceptions of success with their scores for organizational democracy and membership constitutionality, respectively. Beginning on the right hand of the figure, there is a small and statistically insignificant positive relationship between the membership constitutionality measure and the organizational success measure. On the left hand side, a more interesting result emerges. Organizational democracy appears at first glance to inhibit success. The regression line has a downward slope with a 95% confidence interval that does not include the line with a slope of zero.[4] But the bivariate relationship is strongly heteroskedastic; that is, the variation in organizational success increases as organizational democracy increases, diagnosed by the triangular shape of the data. This violates the assumptions of regression analysis and raises questions about the linearity of the relationship. Although they are not numerous, the less democratic associations express higher perceptions of success; the highest scorer on the organizational success measure is a religious organization that prides itself on its

[4]As discussed previously, confidence intervals and significance tests are technically meaningless for nonrandom samples like this group of associations, but some scholars continue to use them as a simple convention for judging the strength of relationships. It is only for the latter purpose that I continue to mention them here.

efficiently autocratic organization.[5] Meanwhile, the most democratic associations vary the most, from the least successful straggler, a once-mighty and very old fraternal organization now in the throes of internal strife over modernization efforts, to a very democratic government employees' labor union proud of great success and a veterans' organization doing quite well.

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[5]For the sake of associational informant and 1996 NES respondent confidentiality, I am not identifying specific organizations except where their identity is obvious to informed observers; however, some mention of the associational characteristics seems necessary to establish the credibility of the data.

Figure 5.3 - Organizational success by organizational democracy and membership constitutionality



Source: NES 1996 Auxiliary File on Group Memberships

One possible interpretation of this pattern would be to infer that less democratic organizations are generally successful, while more democratic associations are more likely to struggle. Certainly some longstanding worries about democratic governments might be applied to associational democracies as well; popular influence may hinder effective implementation of necessary but unpopular policies, and policy gridlock or a kind of "political business cycle" (Hibbs 1977) may afflict the organization with inefficient policy instability. The miserable case at the bottom of each chart above is one such example, where democratic institutions have helped a few hardline traditionalists hold the organization's leaders hostage to outdated rituals and rules that alienate contemporary membership candidates.[6]

On the other hand, it is also possible that the lower left quadrant of the graph is empty because autocratic associations that face crisis are more likely to die out. This turns the democratic inefficiency argument on its head, maintaining that the democratic organizations are more crisis-resistant and thus live long enough to tell us they are struggling. Some support for this latter interpretation can be found in **Figure 5.4**, which shows that among these fifty-nine associations, older cases are slightly more likely to be democratic than newer ones. But the slope of the regression line is strongly influenced by the three oldest cases, and there are quite a few old autocrats on the chart. Nor is it apparent, given investigation of organizational histories, that the "iron cage" is turning old organizations into autocracies.

[6]These observations are based on confidential conversations with the association's informant.

Figure 5.4 - Organizational age and democracy



Source: NES 1996 Auxiliary File on Group Memberships

Yet another possible interpretation of the success data is that it reflects survey response bias: many of the organizations that declined to participate in the study are rather obviously autocratic, and their autocratic nature places greater controls on the very informants who might have contributed to the study. My conversations with association staff who declined to participate strongly supported this interpretation; the more tightly controlled the organization by its leadership, the more likely I was to be referred to a legal department or other guardians of internal secrets, and then to be refused. The most successful of these organizations may sense less risk in participation, thus biasing responses from the few low-democracy organizations toward higher success scores. On this interpretation, the empty lower-left quadrant of the first part of **Figure 5.3** is an artifact of the survey research method.

Multivariate models

One expectation expressed in Chapter 3 was that organizational democracy and constitutionality would be mutually reinforcing, that "constitutional democracy" is the most congruent and productive form. **Figure 5.3** above implies otherwise, since democratic associations score lower success on average. But the heteroskedastic triangular shape of the bivariate data leaves room for the possibility of an interaction effect, where the linear relationship between democracy and success varies with the degree of membership constitutionality.

Model 1 in **Table 5.4** tests for this interaction with ordinary least-squares regression, including a control for the organization's relative size using the number of mentions from

the NES data and a dummy variable to reduce the leverage of the extreme low outlier.[7] This model's coefficients suggest there may be an interaction, but the standard errors are too large to inspire any confidence, though standard errors do not reflect sampling variation in this population data and so are technically uninterpretable. Diagnostics also reveal that the interaction does not account for enough of the funnel-shaped variation to eliminate the severe heteroskedasticity problem. The organizational democracy index remains correlated with the model's squared residual errors ($r = 0.35$).

Model 2 offers a solution to the heteroskedasticity problem by modeling the increasing variance directly with a heteroskedastic regression model (Franklin 2002). The variance equation controls for and quantifies the relationship between higher organizational democracy scores and a wider range of success scores. This estimator unveils an interaction effect about fifty percent greater than the OLS coefficients. Associations with maximal democracy but minimum membership constitutionality are estimated to score an average of thirty percent lower on the success index than those with maximum membership constitutionality.[8] However, given the variance equation, that estimate is also subject to wider variation at higher levels of organizational democracy. **Figure 5.5** below illustrates the difference in fitted slopes as constitutionality varies in Model 2.

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[7]Leverage and DFbeta diagnostics in Stata confirm this case has very high leverage on multiple independent variables. Including dummy for the case quantifies the outlier's model results with the case dropped are very similar.

[8]Because the variables are scored between zero and one, this is simply the interaction coefficient in **Figure 5.5**; when organizational democracy is maximal (scored 1), the difference between minimum and maximum membership constitutionality is 0.3, thirty percent of the total range of the success index.

Table 5.4 - Models of organizational success

Model number:	**1**	**2**
Organizational Success (range 0 to 1)	**OLS Regression**	**Heteroskedastic Regression**
Mean equation		
Constant	0.825 **	0.876 **
Organizational Democracy (OD; 0 to 1)	-0.200	-0.280 **
Membership Constitutionality (MC; 0 to 1)	-0.012	-0.068
Interaction OD*MC (0 to 1)	0.177	0.300 *
Logged Mentions (LM; 0.69 to 5.58)	-0.025 †	-0.032 **
Outlier, association #14 (dummy)	-0.757 **	-0.781 **
Variance equation		
Constant		-6.427 **
Organizational Democracy (OD; 0-1)		3.368 *
N	59	59
R-squared (predicted vs. actual)	0.429	0.424
Adjusted R-squared	0.376	
Wald chi-squared(6)		43.26 **

† p <0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Figure 5.5 - Membership constitutionality interaction effect



As noted, the foregoing models may reflect response bias or other defects in the data. It is possible that organizational democracy would exhibit a positive relationship with success if a few struggling autocratic associations had responded to the survey. In any case, there is some consistency with theories of democratic practice evident. The apparent independent effect of democratic institutions on variation in success may indicate the greater difficulty of building a successful, complex democratic polity. Referring to Huntington's criteria for institutionalization (1968), introduced at the beginning of Chapter 2, we might say that the challenge of institutionalizing a flexible, complex democratic polity is great, as the reformers in that least successful outlier organization are finding. Meanwhile, the interaction effect suggests that good fences do make good neighbors (Levi 1999), as strong membership standards and boundaries facilitate successful democratic membership organizations. Constitutional democratic organizations are not more successful than autocratic cases, but strong membership standards may help to filter out, coopt or discipline potential internal dissenters and shirkers who might turn associational democracy into an inefficient albatross. Recalling that some of the indicator components of the latent success factor involve volunteer commitment and turnover, it is also possible that strong membership systems are necessary to give democratic institutions the legitimacy and efficiency they need to produce good results.

The above models also found that larger organizations, as indicated by the coefficients for the logged count of respondent mentions, are significantly less successful on average. This finding likely reflects the manageability problems of large scale as well.

One potential solution to problems of scale is subsidiarity. Further analysis interacting organizational size with local branch autonomy are not robust and so are not shown here in detail. However, the analysis at least suggests that branch autonomy interacts with size in a fashion similar to the interaction between organizational democracy and membership constitutionality. That is, large organizations with high local autonomy may have higher success scores than those with low local autonomy, while smaller organizations' success is not much affected by branch autonomy.

Thus, complex institutional configurations may be the secret to success: if an association is democratic, it should also be constitutionally bounded for membership. If an association is large, it may also need to be more subsidiary. But more autocratic organizations can apparently succeed (or perceive that they succeed) without strong membership boundaries, and smaller associations may be able to manage without the added complexity of local autonomy.

The data is not at all decisive when it comes to evaluating the relationship between democratic forms and organizational success. However, given that it includes many of the largest such associations in the United States, it does at least show that democratic organization and strong membership constitutionality are not necessarily incompatible with organizational success, since some quite self-contentedly successful groups in several functional categories are very democratic in formal structure.

The following chapter addresses the relationship between associational institutions and respondent-level attitudes and behaviors.

CHAPTER 6: Respondent-Level Analysis of Exposure to Associational Institutions

Previous studies have established relationships between associational membership and generalized trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1999) and between democratic associational institutions and efficacy with respect to the association (Knoke 1990), as reviewed in Chapter 3. But the question posed by congruence theory is whether institutional similarities between democratic government and associational governance can produce "democratic character," operationalized here with reference to David Easton's types of diffuse support (Easton 1957). Just as Jack Citrin (1974) famously questioned whether distrust in a specific government's personalities and policies translates well into distrust for the institutions themselves, so Nancy Rosenblum's critique questions whether efficacy produced by a democratically governed association has any necessary implications for one's attitude toward a democratic regime and its present government. This dataset presents a unique opportunity to test for "democratic transmission" in broad terms.

In the 1996 National Election Studies Auxiliary File on Group Memberships (Rinden, Carlson, and National Election Studies 2003), there are 1,305 respondents with some group mentions data, 912 with scores for at least one of the 67 large associations with institutional information, and 897 with scores on the latent constructs for organizational democracy, membership constitutionality and success. The organizational democracy construct—the critical independent variable for congruence theory—is imputed to these 897 respondents as two variables: first, an average of all their mentions

of large associations with democracy scores, and second, the maximum score among all mentioned large associations with scores. The average score implies "strong congruence," meaning that less democratic organizations should have a countervailing negative effect on attitudes and behaviors, while the maximum score implies "weak congruence," where any exposure at all to a more institutionally democratic association is enough to produce the expected effects without respect for any exposure to autocracy.

Univariate distributions of exposure to associational traits

Organizational democracy

Figure 6.1 displays histograms of the average and maximum organizational democracy distributions, with overlays approximating some of the largest associations contributing to the data. The modes for these large groups unavoidably reveal how these giant cases were scored. However, as the variation within each subgroup shows, the variability introduced by multiple memberships is significant, and would undoubtedly be greater yet if we had data on all possible associations.

Figure 6.1 - Histograms of exposure to organizational democracy



As members of the largest group with data, most Catholics with just one membership are found in the tall column just below 0.4 on the scale of zero to one in both graphs, but there are Catholics spread throughout the distribution. Members of educational groups, Southern Baptists, and members of large veterans' organizations are also likely to be influenced by particularly large, relatively democratic cases in the associational set.[1] As the bottom portion of the figure shows, most of the 897 respondents with scores have at least one membership falling in the upper range of the scale, reducing variation on the scale. A glance at the frequencies in the rightmost three columns of the bottom chart shows that over 500 respondents (or about a third of all the post-election NES respondents and well over half of those with data) belonged to at least one organization scoring the 0.7 mode or higher. By comparing the two distributions, we can see that veterans' groups are significantly responsible for the difference between average scores and maximum scores. Veterans are likely to be members of several associations, and thus have average scores across the spectrum; but they also have the highest maximum scores due to the highly democratic structure of the largest veterans' groups. Given the limitations of this data to just 59 of the 67 very large associations responding to this study, many more respondents may have at least one exposure to a smaller or non-

[1]Please note that information on which respondents actually mentioned a Catholic church, for example, or a specific veterans group, is not contained in the public release data. The most we can do with the data is to identify respondents with organizational democracy scores who are *likely* members of the largest associations given the categories of associations they mentioned, the denomination affiliations available in the public data set, and the presence of a score indicating they belonged to at least one scored association. The categories are *not* mutually exclusive; a respondent may be a Catholic veteran, of course. This means the bars in the overlaid histograms need not sum up to the total of the overall distribution. Finally, readers without access to the full-color originals can read the overlays by inferring from the bars' width; the widest bars belong to the largest group in the legend, the next widest bars to the second largest group listed, and so on.

responding association with highly democratic internal institutions, not to mention a workplace, family or other setting with democratic values. The data lends itself to some optimism about the extent of democratic political culture in the United States, but also attenuates our ability to detect weak congruence effects, since there are many unmeasured associations that may fill the role for the relatively few respondents who continue to score low here.

Membership constitutionality

The degree of membership standards and boundaries experienced by respondents is charted in **Figure 6.2**. The overall distribution is jagged but broad. Catholics and Southern Baptists trade places, with the former being a much less officially permeable institution than the latter. Educational and veterans' groups have relatively high modes but have significant internal differentiation.

Figure 6.2 - Histograms of exposure to membership constitutionality



Organizational success

Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of respondents' exposure to what association leadership informants perceived as organizational success. One solitary respondent is an outlier at zero (doubtless a member of the outlying least successful association seen in figures in Chapter 5), with the rest of the respondents grouped between 0.4 and 1. The Roman Catholic Church was assessed as achieving mixed results, which translates here to one of the lower scores, since most associations placed themselves above average. None of the major groups dominates the top scores; smaller groups had the top success scores.

Figure 6.3 - Histograms of exposure to organizational success



Measurement model of outcome variables

The congruence-theory-related question at issue is whether the associational traits of constitutional democracy have any detectable impact on respondents' political-cultural attitudes toward government. Before proceeding, we must evaluate how to measure those attitudes. As with the association-level measures in the previous chapter, we can simplify and reinforce analysis by using factor-analytic methods to combine multiple NES survey items into theoretically-driven measurement scales. By using the covariance structure of a large number of discrete response items, we can construct continuous measures of underlying respondent dispositions that reduce measurement error and better represent theoretical concepts. As introduced in Chapter 3, the key concepts of interest are generalized trust, internal and external political efficacy, regime support, voter turnout and active campaign engagement.

The measurement model builds on previous efforts by Brehm and Rahn (1997) and Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999). I replicate the latter work's constructions for several latent variables, then add several more; the additional latent variables expand the covariance structure, increase the identification of the model and produce more continuous output scores on all latent variables. The borrowed portions are as follows: ***generalized trust*** is indicated by pre-election answers to whether others can be trusted or "you can't be too careful" and whether others are fair or quick to take advantage. Both items are binary. ***Civic engagement*** is an alternate, weighted measure of simple associational involvement constructed from the number of respondents' reported memberships in each of the twenty-two types of voluntary organizations in the public

NES data; factor loadings reflect the relative "civicness" of these various types. The resulting scale correlates strongly with the raw mentions count ($r = 0.70$). ***Behavioral engagement*** in the campaign and election is indicated by reported political actions: wearing campaign buttons, attending political meetings, working for a political party, and giving money to candidates, parties or political groups. ***Psychological engagement*** in the campaign and election reflects four indicators of interest in the campaign and attention to news about the campaign.

In addition to the borrowed measures, the measurement model adds new constructs for internal and external political efficacy, regime support, as well as economic evaluations, religious commitment and moral traditionalism. The major theoretical challenge is measuring efficacy, both internal and external. Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999) did not distinguish separate internal and external dimensions of efficacy, and used a single survey item, "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," and further distinguished this item from a separate item for trust in government. The new model demonstrates that external efficacy and trust in government are a single concept, corresponding to Niemi, Craig and Mattei's (1991) finding that political trust and external efficacy (using similar indicator items) were highly correlated (0.71). The combination is not simply empirical, however; we have theoretical reasons to see them as representations of the same idea, since both concepts represent expectations about the responsiveness and reliability of government officials.

The validity of specific efficacy survey items has been discussed in literature by Acock, Clarke and Stewart (1985), Finkel (Finkel 1985), and Niemi, Craig and Mattei

(1991). Unfortunately, the excellent internal efficacy items from the 1988 NES championed by Niemi *et al.* have not been replicated. Instead, we have followed the earlier writers' advice and shared ambiguous indicators between concepts. For example, the "people like me" item above can be interpreted both as a judgment about the respondent's qualities as a person and about the government's responsiveness. The findings confirm that this indicator loads on both internal and external efficacy, as expected by Acock *et al.* (1985: 1070).

In summary, ***external efficacy*** is indicated by trust in Washington D.C. government and low perceptions of crookedness, waste and service of "big interests," along with two shared, ambiguous items: "People like me don't have any say" and "Public officials don't care much what people like me think." ***Internal efficacy*** is indicated by the latter two items *and* by "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."[2]

Regime support reflects confidence in the abstract rules and systems such as "democracy" and "elections," and is indicated by three items:

1. "On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?"

[2]To confirm that the internal efficacy factor represents the political self-confidence we want to measure, the interviewer's assessment of the respondent's apparent intelligence is also included; rather than a pure measure of intelligence, this is a reasonable behavioral indicator of the respondent's confidence with the survey's political material. Including or excluding this item makes a negligible difference in the other loadings.

2. "Thinking of the last election in the United States, where would you place it on this scale of one to five where 1 means that the last election was conducted fairly and 5 means that the last election was conducted unfairly?"
3. "How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think—a good deal, some, or not much?"

These items are skewed toward satisfaction, as one might expect, but not so dramatically that they aren't useful: more than 19% of the sample were not satisfied with democracy, almost 10% ranked the 1992 election as somewhat or very unfair, and 14.5% answered "not much" to the elections-get-attention item. This measure will do, but the lack of items regarding support for political procedures—as opposed to personalities or "government" — is a major weakness of recent NES studies; earlier years have included more and better measures of regime support (such as those employed by Citrin 1974).[3]

A confirmatory factor analytic model of 1996 NES data was estimated with the SAS CALIS procedure, a variant of LISREL and other structural equations estimators. The model allows covariance among all ten latent variables and among all error terms, so the resulting scores for each respondent reflect not only variation on the indicator items but also covariation with the other latent factors. The other factors are in effect "instrumental variables" that assess the probability that a respondent's specific answers to the direct indicators accurately reflect the underlying latent factor. The result is a continuous

[3]Additional factors for religious commitment, moral traditionalism and economic evaluations are not employed centrally here and so are not described in detail; **Table 6.1** below documents the items included. Their inclusion contributes to the model's fit; correlations between the latent variables are unconstrained, and this allows each latent variable to act as a partial instrument for the others, producing more continuous output scores.

distribution for each latent variable in which almost every observation is unique, improving the efficiency of later models in comparison with single, discrete indicators.

The model has a Goodness of Fit Index of 0.89 and an RMSEA of 0.04, just at the limits of conventional acceptability. The very significant chi-square of 4,995.7 with 1,492 degrees of freedom indicates that there is model error due to systematic influences and not to random sample fluctuations (Hayduk 1987, 160ff). However, this is such a common problem with discrete survey data that few scholars allow it to disqualify a model with an otherwise good fit. The results are robust and do not improve or deteriorate dramatically with small changes. In practical terms, the model is acceptable if not ideal; the loadings are all but one strongly significant (see note in table below), there are no problems with convergence in a large family of similar models, and each latent variable is very comparable to individual indicators and indices built with Cronbach's alpha. Each latent variable has one indicator with the loading constrained to 1.00 to enable estimation and interpretation of the loadings. External and internal efficacy share a pair of indicators; each of these has a single error term but two loadings. **Table 6.1** shows the complete results of the analysis.

Table 6.1 - Confirmatory factor analysis results for outcome variables

Latent Variable / Indicators	*Loading*
Generalized Trust	
Are people fair?	1.00
Can people be trusted?	1.00 (0.07)
External Efficacy	
Government in D.C. do right?	1.00
Government run for big interests?	-1.20 (0.08)
Government run by crooks?	-0.99 (0.07)
Government waste taxes?	-0.89 (0.07)
People like me have a say	0.62 (0.07)
Public officials don't care what people like me think *(disagree)*	0.81 (0.07)
Internal Efficacy	
Politics too complicated? *(disagree)*	1.00
People like me have a say	1.04 (0.07)
Public officials don't care *(disagree)*	0.74 (0.07)
Interviewer Assessment of Intelligence *(scale is inverted)*	1.01 (0.08)
Behavioral Engagement	
Gave money to candidate	1.00
Gave money to party	0.75 (0.06)
Gave money to group	0.43 (0.05)
Displayed a campaign button, sticker or sign?	0.78 (0.06)
Attended political meeting	0.94 (0.06)
Worked for party	0.86 (0.06)
Psychological Engagement	
Attention to Campaign News	1.00
Interest in Campaign	0.85 (0.03)
Campaign TV Consumption	0.79 (0.03)
Attention to Congressional Campaign	0.81 (0.03)

Latent Variable / Indicators	*Loading*
Civic Engagement	
Cultural Organizations	1.00
Nonpartisan Civic Organizations	0.48 (0.08)
Labor Unions	0.26 (0.07)
Professional Associations	0.85 (0.09)
Veterans' Organizations	0.23 (0.07)
Churches and Synagogues	0.60 (0.08)
Other Religious Organizations	0.64 (0.08)
Elderly Groups	0.40 (0.07)
Ethnic Associations	0.44 (0.08)
Women's Groups	0.57 (0.08)
Political Issue Groups	0.79 (0.09)
Ideological Groups	0.02 (0.07)
Political Parties	0.89 (0.09)
Youth and Sports Groups	0.66 (0.08)
Literary and Art Groups	0.47 (0.08)
Hobby and Sports Clubs	0.60 (0.08)
Neighborhood Associations	0.80 (0.09)
Fraternal Organizations	0.53 (0.08)
Charitable Organizations	0.76 (0.08)
Educational Institutions	0.95 (0.09)
Self-help Groups	0.29 (0.07)
Any other groups	0.43 (0.07)

Cell entries are factor loadings and (standard errors). All loadings are significant at $p < .001$, except Ideological Groups, which has only 3 nonzero observations.

Table 6.1 *(continued)*

Latent Variable / Indicators	*Loading*
Regime Support	
Satisfied with democracy in the U.S.?	1.00
Last election fair?	0.73 (0.07)
Elections make government pay attention to people? *(high=not much)*	-1.10 (0.09)
Economic Evaluation (Retrospective)	
National economy improved in the last 12 months? *(pre-election)*	1.00
National economy improved? *(post-election)*	0.82 (0.04)
Government policies make economy better?	0.77 (0.04)
Religious Commitment	
Is religion important?	1.00
Frequency of attendance at services *(1=more than weekly)*	1.07 (0.05)
Frequency of prayer *(1=several times a day)*	1.22 (0.05)
Frequency of Bible reading *(1=several times a day)*	1.05 (0.04)
Believe Bible is God's Word *(literally or interpretively)*	0.72 (0.05)
Moral Traditionalism	
New lifestyles breaking down society	1.00
Moral views should adjust to change *(disagree)*	1.04 (0.07)
Fewer problems if emphasis on traditional family ties	0.94 (0.07)
Should tolerate different moral standards *(disagree)*	0.95 (0.07)

Cell entries are factor loadings from a confirmatory factor analysis. All factor loadings on this page are statistically significant at $p < .001$.

The scores output for each latent variable take into account both loadings on indicators and covariation with other latent variables; as a result, each respondent receives a nearly unique floating-point score for every factor. Each score has been rescaled from zero to one to facilitate interpretation. The overlaid histograms of the generalized trust factor in **Figure 6.4** illustrate the way the CALIS scores qualify the values of particular indicators with covariation from the other latent variables in the model, providing a corrective for measurement error. The overall distribution of the score has a plateau-like shape, with the mode around 0.6 but not much more populated than values from 0.15 to 0.75. A simple scoring of the two trust indicators would result in a three-point integer scale counting the number of trusting answers from zero to two. The overlays show where these three groups fall in the measurement model's score. The groups' ranges and means are in the expected order, but each group has broad internal variation with its own approximately normal distribution curve. Respondents with mixed answers to the two indicators are in the center, while each matching-answer group has its mode at the expected end and a tail extending into the middle of the spectrum. A few respondents with no trusting answers still score nearly 0.5, while there are a few respondents with two trusting answers whose score is actually lower, just above 0.4. These respondents' answers to other indicators—trust in government, economic evaluations, religious beliefs and associational membership types—cast doubt on the probability that their answers to the particular indicators employed here really measure their underlying trust levels well, so they receive scores that reflect this doubt.

Figure 6.4 - Histograms comparing trust indicators with generalized trust scores



Subsampling strategy

The data do not include associational traits for all associations mentioned by respondents, both because of nonresponse by large associations and because of the myriad smaller associations not included in the study. This means that our estimates of the impact of associational institutions may be attenuated by missing data problems. A sophisticated missing-data strategy may be a worthwhile future project. In the meantime, there is a simple way to address the problem: we can filter for survey respondents for whom we do have full data on each association they mentioned. For convenience, I will refer to the 897 respondents with any associational trait scores as Subsample A. A smaller group of 629 respondents, labeled Subsample B, has scores for all of the "large" associations they mentioned, where "large" means the set of 161 with at least two respondent mentions in the confidential NES data described in Chapter 4. Finally, Subsample C includes the 223 respondents from Subsample B who did not mention any smaller associations; thus we have data on all the associations these respondents mentioned.

Each subsample is somewhat atypical, of course. Subsample C necessarily excludes anyone who mentioned any "smaller" organization. B and C overrepresent respondents with relatively few mentions; one-association respondents are almost seventy percent of Subsample B, versus twenty-five percent of the 1,305 total respondents with at least one associational mention. The process of subsampling respondents is not ideal, but it does offer the ability to compare respondents whose associations' traits are more fully documented. As shown in the results tables below, there are further small reductions in

subsample sizes when respondents lacking scores on specific dependent and independent variables are also dropped. It should also be noted that a further implication of the subsamples is that "strong" and "weak" scores for respondents are progressively more identical as the number of mentions decreases. Dropping respondents without data on all associations also means dropping those with the largest differences between strong and weak scores. However, some measurable differences remain even in the smaller groups.

Bivariate results

Table 6.2 displays correlations between the six dependent variables of interest and nine independent variables. The simple count of associational mentions is also broken down into large and small groups, where "large" again means the 161 associations with at least two respondent mentions. The three associational trait indices are further divided into versions for strong (average score) and weak (maximum score) congruence logics. Finally, each relationship shows the three subsamples, plus full-sample figures for the association counts for comparison. The result is a matrix of 180 coefficients. The data is arranged to make it easy to scan for changes in coefficients when moving down columns of subsamples and moving across rows from a strong to a weak measure of the relevant trait.

Table 6.2 - Correlation matrix of associational counts and traits with political attitudes and behaviors

		Association Counts			*Org. Democracy*		*Memb. Const.*		*Org. Success*	
	N	**All**	**Small**	**Large**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**
Generalized Trust										
	1,329	0.342 **	0.328 **	0.235 **						
A	794	0.324 **	0.322 **	0.199 **	0.001	0.056	0.025	0.092 **	0.094 **	0.131 **
B	558	0.276 **	0.252 **	0.153 **	-0.030	0.040	0.089 *	0.148 **	0.073 †	0.124 **
C	203	0.234 **	na	0.234 **	0.017	0.108	0.228 **	0.311 **	0.125 †	0.226 **
Internal Efficacy										
	1,329	0.342 **	0.339 **	0.221 **						
A	794	0.340 **	0.348 **	0.192 **	0.001	0.031	0.018	0.085 *	0.106 **	0.129 **
B	558	0.318 **	0.315 **	0.118 **	-0.052	-0.004	0.068	0.127 **	0.105 *	0.133 **
C	203	0.180 *	na	0.180 *	0.010	0.085	0.109	0.162 *	0.170 *	0.225 **
External Efficacy										
	1,329	0.090 **	0.083 **	0.063 *						
A	794	0.051	0.066 †	0.006	0.013	-0.011	0.024	0.023	-0.013	-0.018
B	558	0.011	0.029	-0.040	0.006	-0.007	0.068	0.054	-0.046	-0.042
C	203	-0.071	na	-0.071	0.092	0.053	0.143 *	0.105	0.019	0.017
Regime Support										
	1,329	0.209 **	0.187 **	0.162 **						
A	794	0.163 **	0.169 **	0.088 *	0.018	0.022	-0.008	0.026	0.054	0.062
B	558	0.143 **	0.151 **	0.031	-0.018	-0.001	0.029	0.052	0.045	0.053
C	203	0.044	na	0.044	0.044	0.057	0.101	0.112	0.127 †	0.153 *
Voter Turnout										
	1,534	0.277 **	0.225 **	0.255 **						
A	897	0.210 **	0.187 **	0.168 **	-0.007	0.046	-0.003	0.044	0.045	0.093 **
B	629	0.222 **	0.194 **	0.150 **	-0.031	0.022	0.011	0.059	0.019	0.071 †
C	223	0.200 **	na	0.200 **	0.047	0.122 †	-0.037	0.041	0.015	0.104
Campaign Behavioral Engagement										
	1,329	0.509 **	0.443 **	0.415 **						
A	794	0.457 **	0.418 **	0.344 **	0.075 *	0.128 **	-0.083 *	0.048	0.073 *	0.147 **
B	558	0.383 **	0.337 **	0.242 **	0.010	0.073 †	-0.007	0.094 *	0.102 *	0.166 **
C	203	0.189 **	na	0.189 **	-0.025	0.009	0.104	0.143 *	0.202 **	0.237 **

Entries are pairwise correlation coefficients, where N is shown at left; † $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

A = Subsample A, all Rs with mentions of any large association with trait data

B = Subsample B, Rs with data on all *large* associations.

C = Subsample C, Rs with data on all associations

The first glance is an instant blow to any variety of congruence theory. Only one coefficient in the table has $r > 0.5$, and that is for the simple associations count with campaign behavior in the full data set. Associational institutions appear to offer little or no purchase on these outcome variables. The commentary that follows is offered in the knowledge that none of the coefficients is substantively impressive; however, there are minor patterns that merit brief remarks.

The simple association mention counts are the most frequently correlated with the dependent variables; association involvement is a correlate of generalized trust, internal efficacy, voter turnout and campaign behavioral engagement. There is a hint of a relationship with regime support, where $r = 0.209$ for the full sample. The correlations for counts diminish in size when moving down through the subsamples, as should be expected, since the count is truncated from its full range of zero to thirty-one to a range of just one to six in Subsample C. Coefficients for large associations are consistently smaller than those for small associations. Taken together, these patterns seem to point toward the old Romantic, contact-driven theory of civic engagement, where associational traits matter less than the simple fact of personal involvement with others.

There is a very faintly encouraging pattern for congruence theory across many of the six associational-trait columns. As the subsamples shrink toward those with more complete trait data, the coefficients often increase, as discussed below. These changes might raise expectations that missing data on small and nonresponding associations are masking a wider congruence effect, but there is also a purely mathematical explanation

for some portion of these increases.[4] There is a very modest overall tendency, with exceptions, for the weak congruence coefficients to be larger than the strong versions of the same relationship, where there is any relationship at all.

Overall, congruence theory does not look promising. Combining these findings with literature reviewed in Chapter 3—Hooghe's finding on the salience of past memberships (2003) and Wollebaek and Selle's findings of effects of passive membership and contextual "cultural memory" (2002)—we have a picture of institutional socialization effects that demand unimaginably complex and thorough measurement strategies. If any form of congruence theory is to survive, it may be the weakest possible version; perhaps all that is needed for measurable democratic socialization effects to be observed and enjoyed is for citizens to have *any* exposure to democratic institutions, with or without direct involvement, at any time in earlier life, in associations, schools, governments, workplaces and households, irrespective of whether their other exposures were democratic or not. Such a theory is so broad as to be almost irrefutable.

Organizational democracy

The organizational democracy index, in both strong and weak forms, is not measurably correlated with any of the outcomes. An apparent link with campaign engagement evaporates in the smaller subsamples, when it should increase where more complete data is available. Correlations with external efficacy and regime support do

[4] N is the effective denominator of the correlation formula (see Lane 2004 for the formula), so dropping cases creates a presumption for higher values of r, even if points are dropped in a completely random fashion.

increase as the sample is restricted to those with more complete data, yielding just a hint that a relationship could turn up in multivariate models and future research. The external efficacy coefficient for the strong version of organizational democracy increases from 0.013 to 0.092, and the voter turnout coefficient of the weak version rises from 0.046 to 0.122; paltry measures, but trending in the direction expected by congruence theory. It is unlikely that any strong relationships will emerge, but we have yet to test for complex multivariate relationships.

Membership constitutionality

Membership constitutionality may have a more interesting story to tell, with increasing coefficients on generalized trust and internal efficacy, particularly for the weak congruence version, suggesting that visible and enforced membership standards are a possible condition for creating a sense of trust. The "good fences make good neighbors" story may carry a little weight. If one accepts that the NES questions about "most people" measure generalized trust rather than specific in-group trust,[5] the relationship implies some synergy between so-called "bonding" and "bridging" forms of social capital (Putnam, Feldstein, and Cohen 2003, 2). That is, the bonding, in-group "sociological Super-Glue" created by membership constitutionality—barriers to group entry and

[5]The assumption is debatable, since trust may be trustee- and domain-specific by definition (Hardin 2002); his classic formulation is "A trusts B to do X," but the standard NES questions substitute the vague "most people" for B and leaves X to the respondent's imagination. However, even if all real trust relationships are concrete and trustee- and/or domain-specific, it remains plausible that respondents can offer their sense of the running average of their relationships over all salient trustees and domains. Although efforts to identify the most influential trustees and domains behind this average may be interesting, the items' very ambiguity is probably an asset in permitting the respondent to infer the scope.

enforced standards for membership maintenance—may contribute to bridging, out-group "sociological WD40" in the form of generalized trust. When my associational membership is clearly bounded, my stance toward the rest of the world may be more secure in the knowledge that I belong and have similarly committed comrades to back me in wider public circles. Membership boundaries also filter out people who do not genuinely support the organization's goals and practices; Brehm and Gates (1994; 1997) demonstrated that people's "preexisting dispositions" are far better predictors of organizational compliance than supervision and sanctions. Organizations with few such filters risk exposure to opportunists and saboteurs, who may certainly undermine generalized trust. As Chapter 5 showed, strong membership boundaries are an apparent requirement for organizational democracy to produce success. Multivariate models of trust found below test the persistence of this tentative relationship in the presence of controls.

Membership constitutionality is also a potential predictor of internal efficacy and campaign behavioral engagement. Verba and Nie (1972) observed that "bounded" communities exhibited higher political participation levels; rule-bounded associations may be similarly encouraging. It was members of clearly defined ethnic organizations who were the rare exceptions to the rule of "political evaporation" observed by Eliasoph (Eliasoph 1998); that phenomenon may scale up to much larger associations. Finally, membership constitutionality may also contribute to external efficacy and regime support, as these coefficients increase in the smaller subsamples.

Organizational success

As the relative wealth of asterisks in **Table 6.2** indicate, nothing succeeds like success. While there are no coefficients where $r > 0.25$ in these columns, organizational success appears to be the most likely candidate for association with efficacious, trustful and participatory outcomes. It may be that before an association can transmit its institutional mental models to its members, it must demonstrate that those models do in fact work well. While success was not a part of the original hypotheses, the correlation patterns suggest we should include it in models, allowing that success may be an intervening variable between constitutional democracy in associations and national political culture.

Multivariate models

The following sections present multivariate models of each of the dependent variables while testing for effects of associational institutions and success. Each model includes an array of standard candidates for confounding factors with associational traits, demographic, economic, political and social.[6] To avoid undisciplined model specification searching that might overemphasize associational trait effects due to sampling variation, the baseline model (Model 1 in each of the six model tables below) was specified and locked in before results were viewed. The control array was specified by creating a

[6]Each dependent variable is modeled with some independent variables that were also entered as indicators for other latent variables in the measurement model; this means that those indicators were minor contributors to the dependent scale itself. This may produce some artifactual covariation, but this is a small price to pay for the improvement in the dependent variable's measurement properties. Since the associational variables are the main interest here, their presence serves to control for each dependent variable's covariation with the other factors in the measurement model.

standard list of candidates from *a priori* expectations and published models (Carlson 1999; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1999; Uslaner 2002). I permitted myself to modify these models only to correct for heteroskedasticity and to save space by dropping a few control variables that were insignificant. Model baselines were set before viewing results of any of the subsample models with associational traits included. The model results for associational variables were thus news to the author as much as to the reader, a fact which should lend them some credibility in the age of easy data-mining. The inclusion here of all seven models for each of six dependent variables is an effort to expose what Robert Keohane has called the "scaffolding" behind the research finding, rather than the product of a long hunt for elusive significant coefficients.

These cross-sectional, single-equation models are not adequate for strong claims about causal direction, so the model descriptions attempt to hew to the language of association and relationship. Correlation is a component of the requirements for diagnosing causation, so it is safe enough to test first for correlation and then discuss causal possibilities only if correlation appears. Appropriate estimators are employed, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for continuous variables as a default, but moving to heteroskedastic regression (Franklin 2002) when diagnostics show patterns in the variance of the OLS model residuals. Probit is utilized to estimate reported voter turnout, and the campaign behavioral engagement scale is logged. All entries are unstandardized coefficients, except the turnout probit model, which reports first differences at the point of means (using Stata's *dprobit* command).

Hypothesis 2, generalized trust

Figure 6.5 redisplays the distribution of the generalized trust factor, with overlays for each subsample. The visual patterns show that subsampling in this case does not severely truncate the range nor alter the distribution, although members of Subsample C do score visibly lower on average. The distribution is flattened, and the mean moves from 0.45 overall up to 0.48 in A, back to 0.46 in B and down to 0.41 in C. The standard deviation is 0.215 overall, 0.21 for A, 0.205 for B and about 0.2 for C.

Hypothesis 2 from Chapter 3 expected that "greater exposure to organizational constitutionality and organizational democracy should increase generalized trust." **Table 6.3** presents seven models of the trust score to test the hypothesis. As in each of the following model sets, Model 1 sets the full-sample baseline, without any associational traits included ($N = 1215$). Thanks in part to the measurement improvements, the model explains almost forty percent of the variance.[7] The control set performs as expected: higher education and larger family income, indicators of a higher quality of life, accompany higher trust levels. Two additional years of education and fifty thousand additional dollars in family income are each associated with an increase in the trust score of about 0.025, or 2.5 percent of the score's full range from zero to one. Blacks are less trusting on average, which is unsurprising given the legacy of distrust left by segregation, discrimination and otherwise hostile race relations.

[7]A probit model of the binary trust item with the same specification finds an almost identical pattern of coefficient direction, relative magnitude and significance, but explains only about twelve percent of the variance (using Stata's "Pseudo R-squared", which divides the full model's log-likelihood into the constant-only model's log-likelihood and subtracts the result from one). With probit, the key coefficients for associational traits are not as significant but exhibit the same pattern of increasing coefficients and declining standard errors when moving through subsamples from Model 1 to Model 7.

Figure 6.5 - Histograms of generalized trust by subsample



Table 6.3 - OLS models of latent generalized trust by subsample

Model number:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Subsample, Rs with data on:		*A: At least one ass'n*		*B: All large ass'ns*		*C: All ass'ns*	
Generalized Trust (range 0 to 1)	**All Rs**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**
Constant	0.414 **	0.341 **	0.341 **	0.366 **	0.353 **	0.228	0.200
Education (highest grade)	0.013 **	0.011 **	0.011 **	0.012 **	0.012 **	0.012 *	0.012 *
Family Income (thousands of dollars)	0.001 *	0.001 *	0.001 *	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Black (dummy)	-0.052 **	-0.076 **	-0.070 **	-0.073 *	-0.071 *	-0.074	-0.070
Retrospective Economic Eval. (5 pt.)	0.030 **	0.034 **	0.034 **	0.038 **	0.038 **	0.049 **	0.046 **
Personal Financial Outlook (5 pt.)	0.024 **	0.018 *	0.019 *	0.019 *	0.018 *	0.006	0.006
Trust Government (4 pt.)	0.075 **	0.076 **	0.076 **	0.087 **	0.087 **	0.075 **	0.081 **
Politics Complicated (5 pt., disagree)	0.047 **	0.044 **	0.044 **	0.039 **	0.039 **	0.034 **	0.031 **
Political Name Recognition (0 to 1)	0.107 **	0.111 **	0.113 **	0.112 **	0.111 **	0.131 *	0.139 **
Crime Victim (dummy)	-0.037 *	-0.045 *	-0.045 *	-0.042	-0.041	-0.065	-0.064
Small Associations (0 to 19)	0.011 **	0.010 **	0.011 **	0.010 *	0.010 *	NA	NA
Large Associations (0 to 11)	0.013 **	0.010	0.002	0.027 **	0.008	0.048	0.008
Organizational Democracy (0 to 1)		0.046	0.051	0.046	0.069 *	0.096	0.123 *
Membership Constitutionality (0 to 1)		0.017	0.029	0.044	0.059	0.148 *	0.189 **
Organizational Success (0 to 1)		0.110	0.097	0.079	0.093	0.081	0.126
N	1215	721	721	500	500	182	182
Adjusted R-squared	0.397	0.378	0.381	0.349	0.355	0.385	0.409

$p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Those who see the national economy improving and their own finances improving are more trusting, riding on a perception of mutually profitable transactional relationships. Those who trust government more often to "do what's right" are also more trusting, as Levi (1996; 1988) has argued should be the case when law and regulation provide security for personal trust. The causal relationship between interpersonal and government trust is probably reciprocal, as found in Rahn, Brehm and Carlson (1999), but the evidence there suggests that a reciprocal specification would not eliminate the association found in this case. Those internally efficacious persons who deny politics is too complicated for them are also more trusting. Trust in government is an indicator of the external efficacy factor, and the "politics are complicated" item is an indicator of the internal efficacy factor. Together, they confirm how confidence in self and state correlates with confidence in the general community of citizens.

Cognoscenti who demonstrated political knowledge by better matching major officials with their job titles were also more trusting. Better information about politics (and as a proxy for news in general) may be an avenue to more realistic assessment of the relative lows and highs of human behavior. It is well known to psychologists that people emphasize preventing losses over achieving gains (Brehm and Brehm 1981); as a result, the recognition that exalted highs are rare may be less important in making generalized trust judgments than information about just how uncommon worst-case scenarios are. Likewise, crime victims have had concrete experiences of just such worst-case scenarios and are less trusting on average with reason.

With **Table 6.3**'s Model 1 as a baseline, we can assess the consistency of the six additional subsample models before looking at the results for associational traits. Of the control variables discussed, none exhibit high instability; signs are the same in all seven models, the magnitude of the coefficients does not shift dramatically, and the variation in trust explained by each model is between thirty-five and forty-one percent. The constant, family income, personal finance and crime victims become less significant, but there are no signs that the subsamples are radical departures with respect to the correlates of generalized trust.

In Model 1, association membership, both large and small, is a significant but moderate correlate of trust; an additional large association has about the same implication for greater generalized trust as a year of education, another small association about fifteen percent less so. Two additional large associations (more than a standard deviation change) imply an increase of just over 3% on the trust scale's range from zero to one—nothing to write home about, but measurable. More than four large associations would be necessary merely to compensate for the average distrust of blacks, three for crime victims. As with government trust, the causal relationship between association and trust is also demonstrably reciprocal,[8] so these coefficients require some reticence in interpretation.

The five bottom lines of the coefficient list show a surprising result, given the relative weakness of the correlation coefficients with generalized trust in **Table 6.2**

[8]As previously noted on page 56, I have attempted to replicate Uslaner's claim, made from the same 1996 NES data, that the causal direction is from trust to involvement (2002), with the contrary result of a fully reciprocal relationship similar to that found by Brehm and Rahn (1997).

above. Associational traits increase from left to right and become significant in the expected direction in Models 5, 6 and 7. It is not surprising that the association count coefficients fluctuate and become insignificant, since the chief definition of the subsamples is a reduction of the number of associations. But organizational democracy and membership constitutionality are both substantive relationships; in Model 7, a shift of just half the range of the organizational democracy variable (0.5) is associated with about the same increase in trust as five additional large involvements were in Model 1. In Model 7, the average difference in trust between a top scorer and a bottom scorer for exposure to organizational democracy is the same as that associated with over ten additional years of education. Membership constitutionality has a fifty percent greater effect. Since Model 7 presumes weak congruence, a single maximally constitutional-democratic association could account for an increase of over 0.3 units on the one-point scale when compared to a person whose only membership is a maximally autocratic and arbitrary-membership group.

However, these findings must be taken with a grain—perhaps a boulder—of salt. Coefficients for the small association counts remain significant and consistent through Model 5; the trait coefficients may just be acting as proxies for simple involvement effects in the smaller subsamples, as variation in the count variables decreases and, for small associations, becomes part of the constant in Models 6 and 7. Given the small size of Subsample C, it is also possible that the apparent relationship is driven by particular organizations rather than a broader institutional effect. The Catholic church is the largest group and the hardest to characterize; oversimplifying people's experience of the Church

with a couple informants' judgments may drive arbitrary conclusions. Dropping Catholics who mentioned a church entirely and running Models 1 through 7 again leaves about 120 observations and erases the organizational democracy relationship, but the coefficient of membership constitutionality remains similar (results not shown). Outlier diagnostics showed organizational success and democracy coefficients are substantively higher and more significant in Models 2 through 5 if the single low-organizational-success high-leverage outlier respondent is dropped, but other results remain consistent.

The bottom line for generalized trust is that we have some tentative evidence that constitutional democracy in associations is a candidate engine for generalized trust, much as Rahn, Brehm and Carlson found to be the case with national elections. Skocpol's historical work on the coalition-building power of the old cross-class membership federations (2003), modeled on variations of the U.S. Constitution, is somewhat supported by the evidence that members of such democratic groups may be expected to trust both each other and outsiders more.

Hypothesis 3, internal efficacy

Internal efficacy is the respondent's sense of personal competence in politics. **Figure 6.6** displays the distribution of the internal efficacy latent variable with overlays for each subsample. The overall distribution approximates normality, with a mode spike slightly right of the scale's midpoint. The subsamples do not truncate the range much, but have progressively fatter tails than the overall sample. The means are 0.48 overall, 0.50 for A, 0.48 for B and 0.43 for C. Standard deviations are between 0.175 and 0.187.

Figure 6.6 - Histograms of internal efficacy by subsample



Table 6.4 - Heteroskedastic regression models of latent internal efficacy by subsample

Model number:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Subsample, Rs with data on:		*A: At least one ass'n*		*B: All large ass'ns*		*C: All ass'ns*	
Internal Efficacy (range 0 to 1)	**All Rs**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**
Mean equation							
Constant	0.002	-0.073	-0.034	-0.046	-0.015	-0.367 **	-0.330 **
Age (years)	-0.001 **	-0.001 *	-0.001 *	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001 *	-0.001 *
Education (highest grade)	0.017 **	0.014 **	0.014 **	0.009 **	0.010 **	0.015 **	0.016 **
Family Income (thousands of dollars)	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001	0.000
Partisan Strength (0 to 3)	0.013 **	0.013 *	0.014 *	0.010	0.010	0.018	0.016
Political Name Recognition (0 to 1)	0.144 **	0.139 **	0.140 **	0.132 **	0.131 **	0.186 **	0.189 **
Campaign Interest (1 to 3)	0.052 **	0.053 **	0.054 **	0.063 **	0.064 **	0.079 **	0.083 **
Trust Others (dummy)	0.062 **	0.057 **	0.057 **	0.049 **	0.049 **	0.026	0.022
Small Associations (0 to 19)	0.010 **	0.011 **	0.012 **	0.014 **	0.014 **	NA	NA
Large Associations (0 to 11)	0.000	-0.002	-0.006	-0.003	-0.014	0.020	-0.018
Organizational Democracy (0 to 1)		0.036	0.019	0.032	0.027	0.109 *	0.111 *
Membership Constitutionality (0 to 1)		0.021	0.025	0.033	0.038	0.089	0.100
Organizational Success (0 to 1)		0.114 *	0.071	0.130 *	0.096	0.307 **	0.281 **
Variance equation							
Constant	-3.272 **	-3.149 **	-3.165 **	-2.998 **	-3.022 **	-2.521 **	-2.494 **
Education (highest grade)	-0.068 **	-0.084 **	-0.082 **	-0.109 **	-0.107 **	-0.127 **	-0.131 **
Campaign Interest (3 pt.)	0.140 *	0.179 *	0.172 *	0.220 *	0.219 *	0.126	0.130
N	1208	719	719	502	502	182	182
R-squared (predicted on actual)	0.354	0.359	0.359	0.355	0.354	0.304	0.295
Wald chi-squared	758.9 **	429.2 **	426.2 **	288.8 **	287.3 **	99.6 **	101.9 **

p <0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Table 6.4 displays the slate of seven models to test Hypothesis 3, "members of constitutional democratic associations should report a greater sense of their own personal internal efficacy." In an OLS version of Model 1, diagnostics for heteroskedasticity were very significant, indicating decreasing residuals for larger fitted values of $X\beta$. Szroeter's test (Szroeter 1978) rejected the null of homoskedasticity in the residuals with respect to education, income, campaign interest ($p < 0.01$) and political name recognition ($p < 0.05$). As in Chapter 5, the estimator employed to address the problem is maximum-likelihood heteroskedastic regression (Franklin 2002). The models substitute a second equation for the variance component of the model, $\sigma^2 = e^{Z\gamma}$, where $Z\gamma$ is a variable-coefficient vector for variance as $X\beta$ is for the mean. In other words, the variance is explicitly modeled rather than handled as random error, and the unstable effects of heteroskedasticity on standard error estimates are reduced by simultaneous estimation of the two equations (although there is little substantive change in the standard error estimates in this case). The exponential distribution means that linear changes in the Z variables of the variance equation are related to percentage changes in the model errors.

Beginning with the variance equation section near the bottom of the table, only education and campaign interest remain in the variance model; income and political name recognition were not consistently significant. The addition of the two variance parameters improves the fit over the same model with a constant-only variance equation.[9] In Model 1, every additional grade of education is accompanied by almost seven percent less model error in estimates of internal efficacy; over just four years of education, the

[9]The log likelihood increases from 1,723.8 to 1,740.7. Two times the difference in log likelihoods between two nested models is distributed as a chi-square; in this case, $\chi^2(2) = 33.749, p << 0.001$.

percentage decrease compounds to 0.93 to the fourth power, or about a twenty-five percent decrease in the error variance for every four years of education. More educated people are evidently better able to judge their own political competence, or at least better able to judge their socially-expected level of competence given their other characteristics. Meanwhile, on a three-level scale from 1 to 3 points, the most interested observers of the campaign have 1.14^2 or about thirty percent more error variance than those with the least interest. Interested respondents may be exposed to more varied and conflicting information about their own place in the political system, leading them to more divergent estimates of their competence.

The array of controls differs somewhat from the generalized trust model, and explains over thirty-five percent of variation in internal efficacy in Model 1. Among demographics, black racial identity was always insignificant and was dropped, but age is retained and education and income remain significant. Surprisingly, older respondents were less confident in their own political competence, perhaps as wisdom and realism come with experience. In Model 1, two additional years of income and fifty thousand dollars of additional income are associated with about the same 0.033 increase in the internal efficacy score, a correlation about a third greater than the same variables' relationship with generalized trust. The economic evaluation variables did not add any explanatory grip and were dropped. Among political characteristics, the strongest partisans of either major party scored an average of about 0.04 greater than centrist independents. Officeholder recognition and campaign interest are associated with more efficacy, for clear enough reasons; but trust in government (a component of external

efficacy) was consistently insignificant and dropped. Finally, those who trust others see measurably more political competence in themselves. These coefficients are again reasonably stable across the subsamples; the most marked change is the sudden halving of in the "trust others" coefficients in Subsample C (Models 6 and 7). C includes no small-association members and, as we saw back in **Figure 6.5**, scores significantly lower trust scores on average.

Turning to the association variables, the patterns are intriguing. Across the subsamples, the count of small associations has as big or bigger a coefficient on internal efficacy as it did on generalized trust, but the large association count is entirely insignificant and sometimes has the wrong sign. There are countless possible rationales for this finding; one important candidate would be the possibility that smaller associations may more frequently engage members in civic skills like speech making and meeting leadership (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). When it comes to association traits, it's not clear that one of the congruence operationalizations outperforms the other, but the strong congruence coefficients in Models 2, 4 and 6 are generally larger than their weak congruence neighbors. Organizational success is the most consistently significant trait from Model 2 to Model 7; this relationship is nearly identical if the single low success outlier observation is dropped. Recall that the effective in-sample range of the organizational success variable is from 0.4 to 1, not 0 to 1. In Model 6, this means the difference between members of the most and least successful associations are expected to have greater internal efficacy comparable to ten additional years of education.

Another apparent congruence relationship emerges in Subsample C Models 6 and 7, where the coefficients for democratic and constitutional associations more than triple and become significant. The weak congruence coefficients in Model 7 are slightly larger, with coefficients of 0.111 and 0.100 for democracy and constitutionality, respectively. The latter coefficient has $p = 0.060$, just shy of the conventional test threshold. Together, they indicate that a member moving from minimal to maximal constitutional-democratic association traits would be expected to have increased internal efficacy greater than the increase related to twelve additional years of education. In Subsample C, the three associational traits taken together account for a substantial portion of the explained variance. However, the presence of the relationship only in the smallest subsample is not confidence-inspiring. Overall, the evidence for congruence is mixed.

Hypothesis 4, external efficacy

External efficacy is the respondent's expectation of responsiveness and trustworthiness from the officials and agents of national government. **Figure 6.7** below displays the distribution of the latent variable score, which is bimodal, with a smaller group clustered around the smaller mode at about 0.7 and most respondents clustered around the larger mode at around 0.25. Some investigation and a reference back to **Table 6.1** reveals that the modes most reflect the indicator with the largest loading, the question whether U.S. government is run "for the benefit of all" or "a few big interests." Under twenty-eight percent of the 1996 respondents agreed that government is run for the benefit of all, and they populate the smaller mode.

Figure 6.7 - Histograms of external efficacy by subsample



Table 6.5 - Heteroskedastic regression models of latent external efficacy by subsample

Model number:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Subsample, Rs with data on:		*A: At least one ass'n*		*B: All large ass'ns*		*C: All ass'ns*	
External Efficacy (range 0 to 1)	**All Rs**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**
Mean equation							
Constant	0.573 **	0.600 **	0.603 **	0.658 **	0.631 **	0.619 **	0.675 **
Retrospective Economic Eval. (5 pt.)	0.019 **	0.027 **	0.027 **	0.038 **	0.038 **	0.056 **	0.054 **
Personal Financial Outlook (5 pt.)	0.026 **	0.019 *	0.019 **	0.016	0.017	0.028 *	0.029 *
Congressional Approval (5 pt.)	0.029 **	0.028 **	0.028 **	0.025 **	0.026 **	0.022 **	0.022 **
Clinton Thermometer (100 pt.)	0.002 **	0.002 **	0.002 **	0.002 **	0.002 **	0.001 **	0.001 **
Elections Get Gov't Attention (3 pt.)	0.052 **	0.050 **	0.050 **	0.048 **	0.048 **	0.037 **	0.037 **
U.S. Position Stronger (3 pt.)	0.022 **	0.015	0.015	0.021	0.022	-0.003	-0.001
Trust Others (dummy)	0.054 **	0.063 **	0.062 **	0.047 **	0.047 **	0.041	0.042
Fewer Probs w/Trad'l Family (5 pt.)	-0.025 **	-0.038 **	-0.038 **	-0.033 **	-0.033 **	-0.043 *	-0.045 *
Small Associations (0 to 19)	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	NA	NA
Large Associations (0 to 11)	0.000	-0.004	-0.001	-0.009	-0.010	-0.022	-0.027
Organizational Democracy (0 to 1)		-0.010	-0.021	0.001	0.007	0.104	0.068
Membership Constitutionality (0 to 1)		0.016	0.025	0.052	0.065	0.131 *	0.099
Organizational Success (0 to 1)		-0.062	-0.062	-0.130	-0.100	-0.142	-0.165
Variance equation							
Constant	-3.139 **	-3.304 **	-3.307 **	-3.2162 **	-3.244 **	-2.5412 **	-2.5316 **
Personal Financial Outlook (5 pt.)	0.154 **	0.104	0.104	0.116	0.114	0.436 **	0.413 **
Clinton Thermometer (100 pt.)	0.005 **	0.006 *	0.006 *	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.006
Elections Get Gov't Attention (3 pt.)	0.118 **	0.114 **	0.114 **	0.116 *	0.112 *	0.086	0.087
U.S. Position Stronger (3 pt.)	0.111	0.138	0.142	0.245 *	0.241 *	0.362 *	0.356 *
N	1232	732	732	508	508	189	189
R-squared (squared correlation of fitted and actual values)	0.355	0.359	0.359	0.346	0.346	0.286	0.295
Wald chi-squared	732.5 **	436.6 **	437.9 **	313.0 **	312.3 **	139.8 **	131.1 **

p <0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

The control set for external efficacy models has to include factors that influence respondents' perceptions of the equitability of national government. Many of these factors are indicators of evaluations of particular personalities; in 1996, President Bill Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich were the most salient referents.

As in previous cases, the subsamples appear to be fairly representative of the range and distribution in the overall sample. The means and standard deviations in each subsample are within 0.015 above the sample mean of 0.40, and the standard deviations are all within 0.01 of the sample's 0.217.

Table 6.5 displays tests of Hypothesis 4, "greater exposure to organizational democracy should increase external political efficacy." As with internal efficacy, diagnostics of an OLS version of Model 1 revealed high levels of heteroskedasticity, so the heteroskedastic regression estimator is again employed here, with four parameters in the variance equation. Respondents whose personal financial outlook was positive had greater error variance, as did those who had more positive feelings about Bill Clinton, believed elections influence government (a constituent indicator of the regime support latent variable), and saw the U.S. position as stronger in the world. I could try to explain each variable in detail, but in each case, a more positive view of the world increases error variance in views of government. Each of these Z variables is also an X associated with an increase in the mean of external efficacy. Given that optimistic assessments of external efficacy are the minority position, these other forms of optimism may both influence optimism toward government but simultaneously create uncertainty about the degree to which such optimism merits transfer. If I think things are bad, it is easy to be

sure the government is not so hot, either; but when things are good, it is not at all clear to what degree the government deserves any credit. The influence of these four factors varies across the seven models; in Subsample C, the Clinton thermometer and the "elections get attention" items lose their statistical significance altogether, while the variance coefficients for personal finance and international stature items increase dramatically.

The correlates of external efficacy are all about evaluations of political actors and government-related environmental conditions. There are no demographic variables entered, since they were consistently insignificant in the multivariate model. Positive evaluations of the economy, personal finance, Congress, the President, elections, international affairs and trust in generic others all go along with higher external efficacy. Supporters of traditional family patterns are relatively disaffected. As in the variance equation, the mean equation also shows the most substantial changes in the smaller subsamples we have seen so far. The coefficient for retrospective, sociotropic economic evaluations nearly triples over the seven models, while the "elections get attention" item decreases by a third, and the disaffection of traditionalists almost doubles between Model 1 and Model 7. These differences raise some questions about the representativeness of the subsamples, but the coefficients are still fairly consistent overall. The variation explained by each model is a consistent thirty-five percent in Models 1 to 5 and around twenty-nine percent in Models 6 and 7.

The estimates of associational counts are not only insignificant, the sign is actually negative in all of the models. The bivariate correlations were weak in **Table 6.2**, and in

this case multivariate controls have washed out rather than strengthened the apparent relationship. Only one trait, membership constitutionality, reaches significance at $p < 0.05$, in Model 6, and the significance is tenuous. The effect in Model 6 is quite substantive; a shift from minimum to maximum on constitutional democracy sums to a move of 0.235 on the external efficacy scale, nearly a fourth of the range and more than twice the shift predicted by a maximal 100-point jump in warmth toward President Clinton or a shift from complete disapproval to complete approval of Congress. However, the pattern from **Table 6.2**, of increasing coefficients on democracy and constitutionality as subsamples shrink to those with the most complete data, persists in the multivariate setting. The evidence is not robust, but it points in the direction expected by congruence theory, with stronger evidence for the "strong" version of the theory.

Hypothesis 5, regime support

Regime support is a measure of attitudes toward democratic practices themselves, indicated by satisfaction with democracy in general and with elections in particular. **Figure 6.8** shows the distribution of regime support scores. There is again very little difference between the subsamples and the overall distribution. As with generalized trust, Subsample C scores a little below the sample mean (at 0.54) and Subsamples A (0.57) and B (0.565) have means above the sample mean of 0.55. Standard deviations are 0.172 for the sample, 0.167 for A and B and 0.181 for C.

Figure 6.8 - Histograms of regime support by subsample



Table 6.6 - OLS regression models of latent regime support by subsample

Model number:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Subsample, Rs with data on:		*A: At least one ass'n*		*B: All large ass'ns*		*C: All ass'ns*	
Regime Support (range 0 to 1)	**All Rs**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**
Constant	0.658 **	0.629 **	0.656 **	0.652 **	0.647 **	0.530 **	0.551 **
Age (years)	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 *	0.001 *
Education (highest grade)	0.006 **	0.006 **	0.006 **	0.007 *	0.007 *	0.010 *	0.010 *
Family Income (thousands of dollars)	0.000 **	0.001 *	0.001 *	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
Retrospective Economic Eval. (5 pt.)	0.048 **	0.052 **	0.052 **	0.050 **	0.050 **	0.050 **	0.050 **
Personal Financial Outlook (5 pt.)	0.013 **	0.010	0.010	0.012	0.012	0.018	0.018
Partisan Strength (0 to 3)	0.020 **	0.019 **	0.019 **	0.020 **	0.020 **	0.025 *	0.025 *
Congressional Approval (5 pt.)	0.013 **	0.009 **	0.009 **	0.007	0.007	0.002	0.002
Clinton Thermometer (100 pt.)	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **	0.001 **
Politics Complicated (5 pt., disagree)	0.036 **	0.035 **	0.035 **	0.035 **	0.035 **	0.035 **	0.035 **
Trust Government (4 pt.)	0.100 **	0.106 **	0.106 **	0.108 **	0.108 **	0.139 **	0.141 **
Trust Others (dummy)	0.035 **	0.025 *	0.025 *	0.016	0.015	-0.005	-0.006
Church Attendance (6 pt.)	0.006 **	0.005 *	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.011	0.010
Small Associations (0 to 19)	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.004	0.004	NA	NA
Large Associations (0 to 11)	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.002	0.006	-0.008
Organizational Democracy (0 to 1)		0.024	0.010	0.010	0.016	0.021	0.020
Membership Constitutionality (0 to 1)		0.003	0.006	0.007	0.015	0.058	0.052
Organizational Success (0 to 1)		0.033	0.003	-0.006	-0.007	0.104	0.105
N	1136	673	673	463	463	171	171
Adjusted R-squared	0.484	0.486	0.485	0.494	0.494	0.551	0.551

p <0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Hypothesis 5 stated, "greater exposure to associational constitutional democracy should increase support for the national constitutional democratic regime." **Table 6.6** shows the seven models of regime support. Diagnostics found complete homoskedasticity in residuals, so the OLS regression results are retained. In the controls, regime support is a correlate of greater age, education and income.[10] These effects are all substantively weak; two additional years of education are correlated with just 0.01 to 0.02 greater regime support, about the same as twelve additional years of age. The substantial R^2 values, which range from forty-eight to fifty-five percent of variation explained, come from the economic, political and social characteristics of respondents. Some of these are more chronic traits, such as partisan strength, personal political comprehension (the "politics complicated" item), trust for others and church attendance, all of which point to higher levels of regime support. But many are transitory and circumstantial, such as the sociotropic and pocketbook economic items (the latter loses significance in the smaller subsamples, even though its coefficient increases), evaluations of Congress and the President, and the trust in government item itself. A shift of four units from perception of national economic doldrums to economic paradise accompanies a move of 0.20 in mean regime support, a fifth of the scale; a shift of just one point on the trust in government scale[11] points to a similar increase, rising to 0.28 in Model 7.

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[10]The income coefficients hover around 0.0005, so some round up to 0.001 in the table and some do not.

[11]The "just about always" and volunteered "never" ends of the trust in government scale are routinely underpopulated, so moving one point from "only some of the time" to "most of the time" is the shift of most interest.

The models lend support to Arthur Miller's side of the famous 1974 Miller-Citrin debate (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974a; Miller 1974b); *pace* Citrin, temporary lapses of confidence and support for government officials can contribute dramatically to evaluations of the democratic rules of the game themselves. But from Citrin's vantage, we may only be proving that regime support is itself as transitory a measure of opinion as the "political trust" items; if evaluations of the regime can be affected by evaluations of the President and Congress, then "this too shall pass," and throwing the rascals out may increase statements of confidence in democracy as well as confidence in government.

Regime support is probably the most important test for congruence theory. The expectation of transmission from associational institutions to government is surely the most easily detected where the parallel government institutions themselves are at issue. But the model set shown in **Table 6.6** finds regime support the least supportive of congruence for all the variables tested. The associational counts and traits are very nearly zero across the board; not a single one is significant, nor has any other model of regime support raised a robust relationship with fewer or different controls. There is a slight jump in the coefficients for membership constitutionality in Models 6 and 7, as well as for organizational success, but even if these indicate that better measurement of more associations would reveal a significant coefficient, it is doubtful it would have much substantive impact. The failure to find congruence relationships with regime support casts doubt on the mechanism driving the very tentative findings in the other areas.

Hypothesis 6a, reported voter turnout

Turning from reported attitudes to reported behaviors, we might expect congruence patterns to emerge in voter turnout (this section) or campaign participation (the next section). Reported turnout is a simple yes or no question unimproved by our measurement model. **Table 6.7** below reports the percent of the sample and subsamples reporting that they voted in the 1996 November election (since this is a binary measure, a histogram is not offered). The differences between samples are quite marked, but resemble previous differences in direction; Subsamples A and B are well above the sample mean, while Subsample C is well below it. Subsample C is defined by a low count of national-scale-only associations, and that alone may account for lower turnout here, as well as the lower generalized trust and internal efficacy noted above.

The probit models in **Table 6.8** test Hypothesis 6a, "exposure to more constitutional democratic association should increase national voter turnout rates." As noted, coefficients are first differences at the point of means generated by Stata's *dprobit* routine. Here the evidence is entirely against the hypothesis. Turnout is a "low-cost, low benefit decision" (Aldrich 1993), which may be evidenced by variation in the coefficients across models. In spite of the ease with which turnout is influenced, there is no measurable leverage from democratic associational institutions to voting participation in government institutions. Association counts are significant and quite substantive, with just three additional large associations linked to an increase of ten percent in the estimate of the probability of voting. But associational traits are not significant, and the sign on organizational democracy is in the wrong direction.

Table 6.7 - Distribution of self-reported voters by subsample

Reported Voter Turnout	***N***	**Percent**
All Rs	1,534	76.6%
Subsample A	897	84.4%
Subsample B	629	81.6%
Subsample C	223	72.7%

Table 6.8 - Probit models of reported voter turnout by subsample

Model number:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Subsample, Rs with data on:		*A: At least one ass'n*		*B: All large ass'ns*		*C: All ass'ns*	
Reported Voter Turnout (range 0 to 1)	**All Rs**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**
Constant	-0.650 **	-0.2575 *	-0.2773 *	-0.340 *	-0.350 *	-0.5969	-0.7378 *
Age (years)	0.002 **	0.002 **	0.002 **	0.003 **	0.003 **	0.006 **	0.006 **
Education (highest grade)	0.019 *	0.009 *	0.009 *	0.013 *	0.013 *	0.016	0.015
Log, Years Resided in City (0 to 4.5)	0.022 *	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.009	-0.009	-0.009
Census Belt (6 pt., rural high)	-0.016 **	-0.014 *	-0.014 *	-0.024 *	-0.024 *	-0.018	-0.018
Married (dummy)	0.077 **	0.027	0.028	0.054 *	0.054 *	0.158 *	0.161 *
Personal Financial Outlook (5 pt.)	0.027 **	0.033 **	0.033 **	0.032 *	0.032 *	0.067	0.064
Partisan Strength (0 to 3)	0.052 **	0.026 **	0.026 **	0.027	0.027	0.067	0.067
Political Name Recognition (0 to 1)	0.197 **	0.153 **	0.153 **	0.168 **	0.168 **	0.135	0.140
Contacted by Party (dummy)	0.094 **	0.048 *	0.048 *	0.065 *	0.066 *	0.138	0.133
Campaign Interest (3 pt.)	0.096 **	0.041 **	0.040 **	0.046 *	0.045 *	0.098 *	0.097
Church Attendance (6 pt.)	0.022 **	0.011 *	0.011 *	0.019 *	0.019 *	0.021	0.023
Small Associations (0 to 19)	0.016 *	0.011	0.011	0.027 *	0.027 *	NA	NA
Large Associations (0 to 11)	0.033 **	0.028 **	0.029 *	0.039	0.048	0.116 *	0.113
Organizational Democracy (0 to 1)		-0.035	-0.029	-0.064	-0.067	-0.081	-0.036
Membership Constitutionality (0 to 1)		0.014	0.013	0.053	0.050	-0.005	0.049
Organizational Success (0 to 1)		-0.040	-0.020	-0.107	-0.101	-0.147	-0.021
N	1495	879	879	613	613	217	217
Pseudo R-squared	0.293	0.256	0.255	0.251	0.251	0.264	0.263
Likelihood ratio chi-squared	471.2 **	189.3 **	189.1 **	145.3 **	145.3 **	66.4 **	66.2 **

Entries are one unit first differences with all else at mean values; $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

The baseline model does not account for the fantastic breadth of explanatory factors available in this data, but the variance explained is substantial, with pseudo R-squared values between twenty-nine and twenty five percent.[12] Probit is an appropriate estimator for a binary outcome variable in this case. There is evidence of heteroskedasticity in the residuals, but heteroskedastic probit models turned up little of substance and did not affect coefficients noticeably. The heteroskedastic probit estimator also does not provide first differences with the ease of the *dprobit* routine, so the latter is retained here for simplicity. Demographic correlates of reported turnout include age, education, marriage and geographic factors such as length of residence and urban-suburban-rural location, with rural voters less likely to vote. Race and income are insignificant and dropped, but only because minority and low-income groups tend to over-report voting (Carlson 1999). In this model, "pocketbook" personal-finance voting trumps sociotropic economic evaluations, so the latter has been dropped. Partisans, politically informed voters, those mobilized by a party and interested persons all vote at higher rates, unsurprisingly. Church attendance and association membership are mobilization tools independent of structural traits, which lends credence to Rosenblum's observation that authoritarian associations can be quite effective as trainers in civic skills and virtues when they seek influence in the democratic national arena. When it comes to voting, it seems any involvement is enough.

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[12]Pseudo R-squared is calculated as one minus the ratio between the log likelihoods for the full model and a constant-only model; it ranges between 0 and 1 for all discrete distributions where the log likelihood is the log of a probability (Sribney 1997).

Hypothesis 6b, campaign behavioral engagement

Behavioral engagement in the campaign is a latent factor indicated by reports participatory behaviors such as wearing a button, displaying a sign, attending rallies and other events, working for a party, and giving money to a candidate, a party or another active group. **Figure 6.9** below shows that the raw variable has a classic logarithmic distribution, consonant with the fact that relatively few Americans engage in these behaviors, and those who do are more likely to be recruited for further engagements. The bottom histogram displays a logged version of the distribution, which much better approximates the normality expected by regression analysis.[13] As before, Subsamples A and B have means above the sample mean and Subsample C is below it. The sample mean is 0.41, compared to 0.44 for A, 0.42 for B and 0.38 for C. Standard deviations are 0.128 overall, 0.124 for A, 0.116 for B and 0.107 for C.

[13]The end distribution is thus the product of several transformations: the original variable was rescaled to range between 0 and 1. To avoid outlying logged values in very negative numbers, 0.05 was added to this range before logging, which yields a variable ranging from about -3 to 0.5. Finally, the variable was rescaled once more to range from 0 to 1. Since the original units were arbitrary, the only substantive change mathematically is the log transformation.

Figure 6.9 - Histograms of campaign behavioral engagement by subsample



Table 6.9 - Heteroskedastic regression models of latent behavioral campaign engagement by subsample

Model number:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Subsample, Rs with data on:		*A: At least one ass'n*		*B: All large ass'ns*		*C: All ass'ns*	
Behavioral Engagement (0 to 1)	**All Rs**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**	**Strong**	**Weak**
Mean equation							
Constant	0.168 **	0.146 **	0.149 **	0.118 **	0.145 **	0.021	0.062
Census Belt (6 pt., rural high)	-0.004 *	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005	-0.005
Married (dummy)	0.013 **	0.011	0.011	0.020 **	0.019 **	0.024 *	0.023 *
Personal Financial Outlook (5 pt.)	0.006 *	0.009 *	0.009 *	0.010 *	0.010 *	0.005	0.005
Partisan Strength (0 to 3)	0.006 *	0.008 *	0.008 *	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003
Political Name Recognition (0 to 1)	0.050 **	0.037 **	0.037 **	0.047 **	0.046 **	0.047 *	0.045 *
Politics Complicated (5 pt., disagree)	0.010 **	0.014 **	0.014 **	0.011 **	0.011 **	0.009	0.009
Contacted by Party (dummy)	0.027 **	0.031 **	0.031 **	0.025 **	0.025 **	0.015	0.015
Campaign Interest (3 pt.)	0.072 **	0.069 **	0.070 **	0.068 **	0.068 **	0.081 **	0.082 **
Elections Get Gov't Attention (3 pt.)	0.006 **	0.005 *	0.006 *	0.006 *	0.006 *	0.004	0.004
Small Associations (0 to 19)	0.017 **	0.016 **	0.016 **	0.016 **	0.016 **	NA	NA
Large Associations (0 to 11)	0.017 **	0.012 **	0.010 **	0.022 **	0.017 **	0.022 **	0.013
Organizational Democracy (0 to 1)		0.018	0.011	0.021	0.009	0.040	0.027
Membership Constitutionality (0 to 1)		-0.011	-0.002	0.005	0.007	0.016	0.014
Organizational Success (0 to 1)		0.052	0.047	0.083 **	0.056	0.138 **	0.101 *
Variance equation							
Constant	-5.704 **	-6.274 **	-6.292 **	-6.5134 **	-6.500 **	-6.835 **	-6.8011 **
Family Income (thousands of dollars)	0.006 **	0.007 **	0.007 **	0.008 **	0.008 **	-0.002	-0.003
Partisan Strength (0 to 3)	0.110 *	0.248 **	0.258 **	0.233 **	0.234 **	0.365 *	0.352 *
Politics Complicated (5 pt., disagree)	0.076 *	0.141 **	0.146 **	0.149 **	0.154 **	0.238 *	0.249 **
Church Attendance (6 pt.)	0.072 **	0.081 **	0.078 **	0.144 **	0.139 **	0.175 **	0.174 *
N	1212	723	723	502	502	183	183
R-squared (predicted vs. actual)	0.484	0.491	0.489	0.479	0.481	0.411	0.406
Wald chi-squared	1,438.2 **	773.2 **	772.2 **	506.9 **	499.9 **	192.7 **	187.6 **

$p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table 6.9 shows the seven model structure to test Hypothesis 6b, "exposure to more constitutional democratic association should increase active engagement behavior in the national campaign." The logged dependent variable means that each unit increase in the independent variables is associated with a percentage increase in the campaign engagement equal to the coefficient value from a given starting point. For example, in Model 1 the marriage dummy variable predicts a very small 1.3% increase in the original, unlogged campaign engagement variable. These changes are nonlinear in the original variable, depending on the starting point. Consider two otherwise identical persons differing only in marriage. Where the single person is found at 0.1 on the original scale, the identical married person would be expected at an average of about 0.1013 on the scale, a 1.3% increase. The same pair where the single person was scored at 0.9 would put an average otherwise married person at 0.912, also a 1.3% increase, but almost ten times as much movement on the linear scale.

This model is also complicated by severe heteroskedasticity in the OLS version of the baseline model, provoking another use of the heteroskedastic regression estimator. Model 1 is a dramatic improvement in fit over the same model with a constant-only variance equation, yielding a Wald chi-square for the four added parameters of 345.1, where $p << 0.001$. Higher error variance goes with higher incomes, partisanship, personal competence (the "politics complicated" item) and church attendance.[14] Each of

[14]Coefficient interpretation in the variance equation is doubly complicated. A linear change in each Z variable from the variance equation is associated with a percentage change in the variance of the logged variable, which in turn involves a percentage change in the original linear scale of campaign engagement. In Model 1, a one-point shift in church attendance—for example, from weekly attendance to more than weekly—predicts a 7.2 percent increase in variance in the logged variable. If, given particular values of $Z\gamma$, this 7.2 percent worked out to an increase of 0.1 in the logged variable's variance, that in turn would imply

these is a sort of necessary-but-not-sufficient factor in mobilization; wealth, partisanship, self-confidence and church networks all create demands for mobilization but do not necessarily create compliance with the demands. Low scorers on these four factors are virtually certain to stay out of the campaign game, giving them very low error variance, but high scorers are not homogenous in their response to demand stimuli.

The control variables are unremarkable, except for dropping age, education and income from the mean equation as they were routinely insignificant in the presence of the other controls. Rural respondents are less likely to be engaged in campaigning behaviors, while married people are slightly more so. Healthy perceptions of personal finances, partisanship, political name recognition and a view of politics as not too complicated for oneself all coincide with campaign participation, along with party contact, campaign interest and confidence that elections get government attention.

Small and large association counts have very similar, significant effects in promoting behavioral engagement. Given their potential range, both kinds of involvements are substantively important coefficients in the model. An additional three associations of either size in Model 1 are correlates of about a five percent increase in campaign behavior. The data again seems to favor the social networks view over the congruence theory approach to associations. Democratic and constitutional associational traits are again missing in action. But organizational success makes a strong showing, being significant at least at the $p < 0.10$ level in all six models and reaching $p < 0.01$ in Models 4 and 6. The strong congruence coefficients are more potent, suggesting that

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an increase of 10% in the variance of the unlogged variable.

belonging to an unsuccessful organization can counteract the salutary effects of simultaneous involvement with a successful one. In mobilizing campaigns, it appears that the structure of the organization is not as important as its ability to deliver on its mission and maintain its membership; constitutional democracy may contribute only insofar as it delivers success.

Summary of model results

Some glimmers of supporting evidence aside, congruence theory comes up decidedly short in this investigation. Four of the six variables, including the most conceptually important, regime support, manifested no relationships with associational democracy, constitutionality or success. **Table 6.10** summarizes the coefficients from previous tables; cell entries are subsample letters in which a coefficient was significant, followed by "strong" or "weak" if only one version was significant. So "A strong" means not a larger coefficient, but rather that the strong congruence coefficient was significant while the weak congruence coefficient was not.

Table 6.10 - Summary of model results for associational counts and traits

	Counts		*Traits*		
Dependent variable	**Small ass'ns**	**Large ass'ns**	**Org. democ.**	**Mem. const.**	**Org. success**
Generalized trust	All	All			
	A	A strong	A weak		A
	B	B strong	B weak	B weak	
			C	C	
Internal efficacy	All				
	A				A strong
	B				B
			C	C	C
External efficacy					
				B weak	B strong
			C strong	C strong	
Regime support					
Reported voter turnout	All	All			
	A	A			
	B	B			
		C			
Campaign behavior	All	All			
	A	A			A
	B	B			B
		C strong			C

Cell entries are subsamples and strong or weak congruence models of the row variable in which the column variable was statistically significant

Generalized trust and both internal and external efficacy registered some significant effects of constitutional democratic associations, providing tentative support for congruence theory with respect to those outcomes. However, the necessity to drill down to the small Subsample C to detect many of these relationships raises doubts about the representativeness of the findings. Although the evidence is fairly good that the subsample is not dramatically different from the wider public, we might expect to see more substantial congruence effects in Subsample B. It seems unlikely that the inclusion of respondents with a few additional small associations—themselves accounted for in the small association count parameter—would dilute congruence relationships so much. While the substantive change from least to most constitutional-democratic association is large in these cases, few real persons could experience such a change, and it is even more unlikely that any association could reform itself quite so extensively.

No detectable congruence effects were found in each of regime support, voter turnout and campaign behavior. Regime support in particular should be the hallmark of the congruence argument, so the null finding is doubly troublesome. The appropriate inference would seem to be that whatever congruence effects exist are marginal and do not merit a heady sales pitch of social transformation. The marginal effects hold some social scientific explanatory interest, but are not a firm foundation for the normative and legal agenda addressed by Rosenblum (1994; 1998).

To those who doubt that associations matter at all, the models should demonstrate that association counts are consistently significant correlates of four of the six dependent variables. Association itself, whatever its structural character, is a correlate of trust,

internal efficacy, voter turnout and campaign behavior. Large associations are almost twice as strong correlates of turnout, while smaller associations alone correlate with internal efficacy. The two exceptions, external efficacy and regime support, are strongly correlated with each other and so are similar in their estimates of association involvement. Given the importance of partisan and evaluative variables in explaining these outcomes, to detect any effects associations probably need to be characterized in terms of their political affiliations and propensity to take partisan or even pro- or anti-regime positions.

Insofar as causation is concerned, it would be commonplace to argue that associational involvements (and their traits) are spurious causes, symptomatic of a third factor that causes trust, efficacy and political participation as well as the joiner impulse. Uslaner believes he has found this factor in a basic disposition to optimism (Uslaner 2002). But the relationship persists in well-specified multivariate models that include many other likely instruments for such optimism. With the weak evidence for congruence logic and institutional pedagogy found here, social capital theories seem to remain the most persuasive account of what the unique contribution of associational involvement might be. Optimism may motivate joining, but it cannot confer the network of supportive colleagues that an association does, even if its structure is not particularly democratic.

Threats to validity

To be fair to congruence theory, these tests are a "least likely" research design looking for measurable impact with relatively crude measurements. It is certain that

in-depth case studies of specific organizations would reveal plentiful examples of congruence effects. This investigation should be enough to put to rest a vision of easy and dramatic social change through associational democracies, but little more than that.

There are a variety of measurement and data limitation issues to consider. First, the total amount of potential error in the models is distressing and should advise caution. For the sake of demonstrating the challenges such a project faces, here is a list, which is probably not comprehensive:

- sampling error in selecting the potential National Election Study respondents;
- nonresponse bias (the 1,714 pre-election respondents in 1996 compose just 71% of the selected sample);
- "mortality" from the pre- to post-election interviews (about 10% attrition);
- panel effects that might distort responses from the 1,197 post-election respondents who were long-term participants in the 1992-1997 NES panel study;
- measurement error in the attitudinal and behavioral dependent variables not addressed by the factor model;
- respondent errors in recalling their associations;
- item nonresponse bias, especially at the end of the list of twenty-two categories;
- interviewer errors in transcribing association names;
- the complete omission of small associations from the associational trait data;
- omissions in my detection of and contact with large associations in the 4,700 association mentions (I found 125 out of 161 before beginning the process);

- nonresponse by large associations (the sixty-seven responding are just 41% of the 161 found);
- informant error in characterizing their associations;
- associational changes between the 1996 NES and the 2002 association survey (the questionnaire and informant selection process attempted to limit this source of error, but it is not well quantified);
- errors in my coding of informants' open-ended "Other, please explain" answers;
- measurement errors not eliminated by the association-level factor model;
- aggregation errors in collapsing the data to the respondent level;
- model misspecification errors in attempting to detect congruence effects.

Second, my choice of questions for the institutional questionnaire may not adequately capture relevant aspects of authority structure. In particular, more detailed data on decentralization and local autonomy would probably be helpful; Allison Rinden's parallel contribution to the 1996 NES Auxiliary File on Group Membership may prove useful in this respect (Rinden, Carlson, and National Election Studies 2003). Better questions might yield better results; however, the difficulty of reaching leadership informants and securing responses suggests that studies of this sort will be infrequent at best, *unless some institutional entity can legitimize ongoing research in the eyes of associational leaders* and manage the volume.

Third, the data used here does not allow very much differentiation of the respondents' relative levels of participation in the various associations mentioned. We cannot determine whether respondents are even aware of the authority structures of the

associations they mentioned. Some data similar in detail to Verba, Schlozman and Brady's treatment of civic skills (1995) would be helpful. However, if Wollebaek and Selle (2003) are correct that active participation is not necessary to associational effects, this may not be an issue. It is at least reasonable to claim that associational institutions may affect members even when they are not conscious of the effect, since that is clearly the case for governments. However, unconscious effects from involvement are probably not adequate to provoke unconscious transmission of mental models from associations to government contexts, as I discuss further in the next chapter.

Fourth, the leadership questionnaires may reflect a very different perception of reality than that experienced by respondents; the Weberian "iron cage of [bureaucratic] isomorphism" (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) may exist without being captured here. Future research that questions a large sample directly about their experiences of democratic authority structures, as did Knoke's studies (Knoke 1990; Knoke and Wood 1981), might succeed in identifying congruence effects. Multiple elite informants from more associations might have improved measurement as well. However, the logistical overhead for such a study would be very significant, perhaps even more expensive and time-intensive than the 1996 NES on a national scale. While it might be possible to economize by comparing only members of a fixed set of associational cases, it would still be necessary to question members about most or all of their associations to ensure that the selected cases are actually responsible for observed effects.

Fifth, most respondents belong to many associations large and small for which we still have no authority structure data. If the "weak" version of congruence theory is

accurate, any one of these unmeasured associations, in addition to family, workplace and school experiences, might be adequate to provide a detectable "boost" in democratic character. In that case, many respondents with lower measured values of the maximum exposure to organizational democracy variable would have higher scores if all their associations were correctly measured. However, the data set does include all but two of the twenty largest associations considered, and accounts for over 30% (1,455 out of 4,678) of respondents' associational mentions and almost 75% of the 2,030 mentions of large associations with at least two mentions, so coverage would have had to be extensive indeed to add enough of the many smaller organizations to improve measurement significantly.

Finally, the 1996 NES items are not the ideal dependent variables from a congruence theory point of view; some much more pointed questions about attitudes toward the constitutional order, legislative debate, political tolerance, efficacy, electoral procedures and "stealth democracy" items (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002) would be more persuasive. However, the multiple-indicator latent variables do an adequate job of measuring the key concepts of internal and external efficacy and regime support, and they simply do not appear to respond much to the associational authority structure variables.

The concluding chapter that follows offers an evaluation of the usefulness of these results and a possible alternate frame for a challenge to congruence theory.

CHAPTER 7: Associations and Democratic Society

Pride and disappointment

"Our organization is very proud of its democratic tradition and the fact that officers are directly elected by the members." These are the comments of the representative of a labor union with nearly maximal democracy and success scores, in words that echo those of the Little League web site quoted in Chapter 1. Democracy is a source of pride and "enthusiasm" for the leadership of associations. But what else is it good for? This study has addressed two possibilities. First, associational democracy might correlate with better goal achievement and civic impact by associations, through higher volunteer internal and civic commitment (Knoke 1990; Knoke and Wood 1981) and improved decision-making efficiency (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). In Chapter 5, a measurement model of responses from fifty-nine large associations demonstrated that institutionalized organizational democracy can defensibly be considered a coherent syndrome; direct or representative membership control, leadership elections, open meetings and parliamentary procedure are fairly reliable indicators of a basic organizational disposition to democracy. But the analysis found that more democratic organizations actually reported lower success measures, on average, except when strong constitutional membership standards were in place. Although the observed relationship may be a symptom of nonresponse bias, since few autocratic associations replied to the questionnaire and none admitted even to mediocrity, there is no direct evidence that associational democracy is a success booster. Since the success factor is indicated partly

by the associational informants' judgments of the general civicness of associational volunteers, it is reasonable to infer that institutionally democratic associations do not dramatically promote civic behavior at the associational level, challenging the "logic of congruence" at that level of analysis.

Second, congruence theory describes associational democracies as "schools" teaching individuals the traits of democratic citizens, including (but certainly not limited to) their senses of personal political competence, the responsiveness of government, the legitimacy of democratic elections and practices, and their rates of participation in democratic behaviors (Rosenblum 1998). Chapter 6 established that those relationships are nonexistent or tenuous at best. For 1996 National Election Studies respondents with memberships in these fifty-nine associations, generalized trust in others and internal efficacy showed slight evidence of responsiveness to organizational democracy and membership constitutionality, but only when the models were restricted to those few respondents about whose associations we had complete data. These tests included a "weak" version of the logic of congruence, where any exposure to associational democracy is enough to influence governmental attitudes and behaviors, even if other associations are autocracies. But weak congruence generally performed no better than the strong logic as a measurement strategy.

In short, associational democracy does not live up to its advance billing. In support of Nancy Rosenblum's qualitative empirical work, there is little available evidence that associational "education" in democracy is dependent on the institutional political arrangements of associations. The tests conducted here are blunt, it is true; congruence

effects might conceivably emerge if models could control for finer detail in myriad ways, such as the NES respondents' depth of involvement and their evaluations of associational institutions as well as government. But congruence theory itself does not include such careful modalities, and any such effects would almost certainly be trivial on the national stage, unworthy of the heady sales pitch of social transformation.

Cognitive psychology and abstract inference

Empirical findings are rarely the end of a diehard theory, however, and surely will not be in this case. Congruence may be a diehard because it is a false hope—or it may endure because its logic is irrepressible. Whatever one's epistemology of research, there are certain logical deductions that no amount of data can negate. If we observe couples entering a hospital emergency room and emerging days later with an infant third party in their arms, we do not therefore conclude that one plus one equals three. The mathematical logic is too coherent to be invalidated. Rather, we investigate further to discover what we did not observe that may explain the discrepancy in our observations. The same holds for this research; we have strong reasons to deduce that some association-government logic of congruence is reasonable and even likely, and are left with the task of explaining why we do not find it in the data we have at hand. This is not to say congruence theory is unfalsifiable; on the contrary, the theory as it is usually casually believed is probably false, given our observations. But like astronomy before Kepler introduced elliptical orbits, a theory may be false or wanting because it lacks a

simple modification or a set of important qualifications. Perfect circular orbits were a mistake, but orbits in general were not.

It seems inevitable that at least some people experience what the logic of congruence predicts, carrying experiences of democratic institutions into other walks of life, including the national polity. We have empirical hints that transmission occurs, including learning of civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and efficacy derived from association (Eliasoph 1998; Knoke 1990). Nancy Rosenblum's sweeping dismissal of workplace democracy literature (1994) must be qualified by case studies of specific companies whose employees have consciously and thoroughly exported their corporate culture to their political lives (e.g., Friedman 2003). Jury members who have deliberated to a conclusion are considerably more likely to vote in subsequent elections than those who are excused or do not return a verdict, even when prior voting rates are accounted for (Gastil, Deess, and Weiser). Why wouldn't we see a broad but similar importation of democratic effects from associational institutions to government?

As I argued in Chapter 2, Rosenblum's case for "discrimination between associations" as a fundamental aspect of human culture is insightful, but implies the existence of its opposite. If this "discipline of culture," which we might label "cognitive compartmentalization," is a distinctive human "refined capacity to resist spillover" (Rosenblum 1998, 48), we might reason that unconscious abstraction across contexts is the lower-order, passive rule to which discrimination is the advanced, active exception.

But psychological studies turn this ordering on its head, describing the capacity to abstract as the advanced human cultural distinctive. A recent psychological study of analogical inference (Hummel and Holyoak 2003, 220) begins with these remarks:

> A fundamental aspect of human intelligence is the ability to form and manipulate relational representations. Examples of relational thinking include the ability to appreciate analogies between seemingly different objects or events (Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), the ability to apply abstract rules in novel situations (e.g., Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992), the ability to understand and learn language (e.g., Kim, Pinker, Prince, & Prasada, 1991), and even the ability to appreciate perceptual similarities (e.g., Goldstone, Medin, & Gentner, 1991; Hummel, 2000; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996; Palmer, 1978). Relational inferences and generalizations are so commonplace that it is easy to assume that the psychological mechanisms underlying them are relatively simple. But this would be a mistake. The capacity to form and manipulate explicit relational representations appears to be a late evolutionary development (Robin & Holyoak, 1995), closely tied to the substantial increase in the size and complexity of the frontal cortex in the brains of higher primates, and most dramatically in humans (Stuss & Benson, 1986).[1]

Whether or not it is a "late evolutionary development," abstraction across contexts—including the development and application of political "schemas" (Conover and Feldman 1984) or the importation of "mental models" of politics from one setting to another (Denzau and North 1994)—is clearly an advanced aspect of human cognition. While there are certainly cognitive challenges related to distinguishing contexts, abstraction appears to be the higher-order function. As such, it is a relatively demanding cognitive task and thus highly conditional on activation cues and the complexity of the information to be abstracted. For example, a recent study of social cognition notes that "automatic evaluations" of persons given affective schemas for groups depend on relatively simple observable cues (such as skin color, unfortunately); more complex personal traits such as political affiliation or religion are relatively hard to detect and thus are rarely invoked

[1]Given their low disciplinary relevance, secondary references in this quote are not included in this document's reference list. Please see the original article.

automatically in evaluating newly encountered persons (Castelli et al. 2004, 374). Abstraction between far more complex, corporate conceptual objects than persons, such as associations and government structures, is probably far too demanding a cognitive task for automatic, subconscious or otherwise unprompted inferences. Further, the government is not a "newly encountered object" for most people, and generally has its own schemas or mental models firmly in place. In Bayesian terms, such governmental evaluations are relatively strong priors, not likely to be subject to much revision unless associational institutions are perceived both as part of the political domain and as substantively important and coherent data. As Denzau and North observe, environmental "feedback" for revising mental models "needs to be in a form that makes its relevance to the mental models transparent" (1994, 8). What would it take to make associational models transparently relevant to evaluations of governmental democracy?

Posing this question implies that much congruence theory is grossly under-specified, as is our test of it in Chapter 6. It assumes that exposure to associational institutions produces "congruent" beliefs and attitudes about national government. If abstraction is cognitively simple and "natural," this specification might be reasonable. That is, the relationship between various manifestations of "democracy" would be self-evident, and the tendency of humans as natural "cognitive misers" would be to impose a single democratic schema on all political phenomena. Choosing leaders and making policy in associations and governments would be as interchangeable as driving different models of cars. But if abstraction is cognitively more demanding than discrimination, this

characterization omits steps in a much longer chain of causal relationships for a congruence effect to be observed.

First, democratic associational institutions must be perceived. Since we do not have data on the degree to which the NES respondents actually perceived their associational institutions, we do not know whether they have even entered the alleged associational "schoolroom."

Second, those perceptions must be abstracted to what we might call a higher-order schema or mental model. Elections, for example, must be understood not just as something we do in our association, but as a more general phenomenon. If associational elections are perceived, for any reason, to be atypical, pro-forma, sham or *sui generis*, this abstraction may not occur. The abstraction also might not occur simply because the respondent has no reason to make the perceptual link, including a lack of prompting from others to do so. Association members must perceive elections, parliamentary procedure, and so on, as political activities. The common conceptual framework, critiqued in Chapter 1, that draws a line between "political" and "social" realms in which internal organizational decisions are apolitical by definition, may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. As long as associations are considered apolitical by default, associational democracy may be omitted from a more general schema for democracy.

Third, the higher-order mental model of democracy must also be an umbrella for the lower-order model describing national government. If national elections are perceived to be *sui generis* or sham, then their abstract relationship to the higher-order abstraction is in jeopardy. From this perspective, the regime support variable evaluated in Chapter 6,

which includes a judgment of the fairness of elections, is not an outcome of congruence, but rather a catalyst that should increase the probability of an inference from associational electoral institutions to government electoral institutions.

The missing link is entrepreneurial leaders or institutional aspects that activated the cognitive salience of institutional similarities between associations and governments. In retrospect, our questionnaire for associational informants should have inquired about active pursuit of congruence effects by associational leaders. "Does your association draw parallels between membership and citizenship? Is participation in the associational polity explicitly and consciously linked to participation in the national polity?" Of course, the most likely answer would be "Huh?"

Given that the National Election Studies design did not explicitly prompt respondents to make connections between associational membership and evaluations of government, let alone specify an institutional-structure frame for the comparisons, it is not surprising that little evidence of the relationship exists. But the lack of a direct prompt is exactly what Rosenblum has in mind in critiquing congruence theory. Members of autocratic associations are rarely prompted to apply their local models of politics directly to the governmental context. Even when associations do specifically prompt members to apply associational values to government, it is rarer still for the prompt to be specific to the political procedures at issue in congruence theory. Empirical support for this generalization can be found in association web sites and print publications, most of which give governance a very low profile. When governance is cited, it may be with pride and expectation of internal effects, as in the previously cited Little League case

(2002), but almost never with reference to citizenship broadly, let alone to specific governmental forms.

In the U.S., mental-model transfers are much more likely in the high-cognition context of associational formation, and in the opposite direction, from government to association. The establishment of the American government predated the wave of association building. Skocpol's historical work on the "civic transformation" of American associations "from membership to management" (2003) can be read as an account of the decreasing salience of government-to-association Constitutional analogies and the increasing salience of business-to-association boardroom analogies as mental models for social organization. But while membership organizations themselves may be less frequently founded today, Chapter 5's data on associational democracy scores by year of founding suggests that the governmental analogy is still salient; newer organizations are only slightly less likely to be democratic than their older counterparts, and some new organizations are still highly democratic in structure. Given the within-category diversity of associations, it is clear that functionalist, isomorphic explanations of associational design choices are not enough to crowd out room for voluntarist and cognitive explanations that emphasize "organizational repertoires" (Clemens 1993) or "mental maps" of the organizational design terrain (Richards 2001).

The requirement of cognitive effort and external prompting means that measurable congruence effects of democratic associations on citizens' support for governmental democratic practice may be available in principle, but not by the "osmosis" or "subliminal" routes liberal congruence activists fear. Associations would have to become

activist, conscious, purposeful agents of civic education in order to have the effects desired by congruence theorists. I am not suggesting that this expectation is very realistic; on the contrary, democratic civic education is a public good whose provision is of little interest to all but a very few associations—some of which are themselves quite autocratic, with little evidence of cognitive dissonance, as Rosenblum points out. But this Olsonian collective action calculus (Olson 1965) works to the advantage of democracy when it comes to the "permanent liberal cycle of anxiety" (Rosenblum 1998, 10-16). Though liberal freedom of association is likely to permit the growth of undemocratic associations, these groups are unlikely to be interested in making the investment to promote their governance structures as alternative mental models for citizenship. Even if they do, they face a massive uphill battle to be both relevant and salient enough to shift governmental priors. Either way, they will hardly make a dent in the durability of the Constitutional political culture of the nation. Human nature thus gives us liberals both reasons to be anxious and reasons to quell our anxiety.

How can we treat "political autism"?

There would be some degree of pathology in failure to perceive Warren's "pervasive politics" and draw connections between the rights and duties of the organizational member and the rights and duties of the citizen. While I am neither Cassandra nor Jeremiah nor Chicken Little, there are reasons to believe that our civil society and government are growing apart, not least that Americans tend to say it is so (for example, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001). I'm inclined to think Americans are generally

exaggerating reality and are characteristically human in perceiving losses more than gains. But the perception itself is potentially self-fulfilling. Surely associations can improve our political society at the margins by helping people better perceive the relationships between associational life and government.

With apologies to those who suffer from or know the suffering caused by autism: "political autism" may provide a memorable shorthand for the failure to make desirable political generalizations across contexts. Autism is a neural pathology that disrupts the individual's capacity to make abstractions, producing dysfunctionally literal or exact representations of the world. For example, autistic repeat visitors to the same college quadrangle were unable to recognize and navigate the space when shadows had shifted (Osborne 2003). In effect, their mental maps are all so detailed as to be utterly incommensurate with each other. The level of detail autistic persons can retain reveals the extent to which our cognitive miserliness and "bounded rationality" may be more an exigency of working intelligence than it is a symptom of our physical limitations.

How can associations help participants connect their mental maps of association to wider political life in ways that serve a healthy democratic polity? Going back to the favorite metaphor of congruence, the school must have an active curriculum of civic education. Dewey was simply wrong that every context is a school—someone has to take it upon themselves actually to teach. Autism can be treated by very active stimulation, causing new pathways of inference and abstraction to form. One way to teach can also serve the interests of associations: emphasize that democracy is self-government, and reinforce the association's internal institutions for its own autonomy. Associational self-

governance should be conceived as a constituent function of governing the nation, not a competing function. Associational membership is a component—even if it is not an institutional analog—of citizenship. When the Tenth Amendment reserves powers to the people, that includes their associations; in the U.S., the governance of an association is a Constitutional role grounded in natural rights. An association that yields the terrain of politics to governments, whether in concept or in fact, does not in fact leave politics behind, but it does forego an opportunity to motivate its members and reinforce its own identity and stature as a corporate citizen.

As Chapter 5's results showed, organizational success seems to be partly a function of the extent to which the associational polity is bounded, either in terms of autocratic leadership or in constitutional membership under democracy. In other words, associations can connect themselves with the national polity partly by defining themselves clearly within it and apart from other entities and roles. It is those with strong institutional affiliations and group identities who are equipped to act as political actors on a larger stage (Eliasoph 1998).

My recommendation is consistent with Rosenblum's basic prescription:

> If I am right [and she is], the key to reciprocity between civil society and liberal citizenship is exploiting *incongruence* by making the *experience of pluralism* available to men and women personally and individually. (1998, 70, emphasis original)

Pluralism is itself contingent on the government's respect for associations' right to differentiate themselves, in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, political beliefs and almost every other imaginable aspect of humanity. The necessary side effect of the activist congruence agenda is to blur the lines and decrease distinctions among groups by

breaking down "discriminatory" membership standards and homogenizing political authority structures. Our political autism, our struggle to infer connections between civil society and government, would best be treated by *stronger* distinctions between associations and their environments. Associations can do more than defend themselves in court to assert their distinctiveness. Constitutional membership and democratic practice may not be a direct route to greater success or more citizenship, but it is certainly a means to emphasize the value of the member's associational identity. As in physical autism, shadows cast on the terrain can confuse the mental model of democracy; the political equivalent of artificial, bright light from all directions may dispel shadows and help reveal the basic resemblance between our mental models of politics, partly by clarifying the boundaries between our associations.

Research directions

Future investigations may benefit from two primary discoveries in this study. First, it is at least reasonable and feasible to measure organizations' political institutions as latent factors indicated by specific covarying institutional practices. Generalization across widely divergent classes of organizations has its risks as well as its benefits, but it is clear that there are certain political commonalities to all such associations. Second, the linkages between these syndromes and members' wider "political culture" are not simple or direct; more complex models of institutional influence will have to be developed. As suggested, these should be especially fruitful if they focus on the cognitive processes by which political mental models are and are not transferred between contexts.

Future research should test the proposition that associations can activate the transmission of their internal political system's mental model of politics to members' perceptions of the governmental political sphere. A useful "quasi-experiment" (Achen 1986; Cook and Campbell 1979) would compare several organizations over time, where at least one organization would be engaged in active efforts to promote its organizational practices as a model of democratic decision, while other "control groups" remained passive. The best design would require multilevel data, permitting simultaneous modeling of associational-level and individual member-level variables, and perhaps geographical or community-level variables as well. Continuing the focus on cognitive processes suggested above, measurement should focus on components of information transmission, reception and acceptance (Zaller 1992), modeling mental models (Richards 2001; Richards, McKay, and Richards 2002), and Bayesian updating of mental models given new information. That is, democratic institutions at the association level might be seen as catalysts for the volume of information flow and the transmission of the shared mental model, while individual participation levels and predispositions would condition the reception and acceptance of those shared models.

A multi-level design would permit assessment of how institutional designs combine with member traits to facilitate "learning organizations" and "learning communities" that abstract and apply shared mental models across contexts, producing dividends from coordination. This approach could be especially useful for explaining how well members of different organizations work together to accomplish shared goals by establishing new organizations, such as multiple churches seeking establish a cooperative charitable

organization, or labor unions creating a shared political action committee. Richards (2001) provides a useful method for operationalizing shared mental models and identifying "focal points" (Schelling 1963), which she refines as "knowledge-induced equilibria." This method seems ripe for application to the field of organizational design. It might be combined with a rigorous use of the grammar of institutions (Crawford and Ostrom 1995) as a way to analyze the nodes in mental models of organizational design. Thus, where congruence theory has held simply that having a vaguely defined model of associational democracy in your head is adequate to promote citizenship, the new method would collect and compare specific institutional-syntax statements about associations and government from subjects. Richards' method would have subjects sort these statements into groups, use the grouping data to estimate shared mental models, then locate any "knowledge-induced equilibria." We might thus be able to test directly for whether the presence of such equilibria has salutary effects on subjects' coordination and cooperation in new organizational formation and in other political settings, including government.

APPENDIX A: Associational Leadership Internet Questionnaire

A copy of the web forms used in the internet questionnaire is found on the following twenty-four pages. The printed page breaks here are arbitrary; the original survey consisted of the login page, "about this survey" page, nine question pages and the sign-out page at the end. The survey was programmed with Macromedia Dreamweaver Ultradev, Microsoft Access and some manual coding in Active Server Pages (ASP) code and hosted by the Duke Political Science Department's Windows NT server. Many thanks to Neil Prentice for his patience, flexibility and friendly cooperation.



Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

Thank you for contributing to our research on voluntary associations in the United States.

- The survey takes most people about **15-30 minutes**, depending on the amount of typed notes you decide to add; no one should ever need more than 40 minutes.
- There are **nine pages**, each with three to eight questions; two pages may be skipped, depending on your answers.
- **Sections** cover your organization's volunteers, scope and structure, methods of leadership selection, policy making meetings, history, and wrap-up.
- All answers will be kept **strictly confidential** unless you specifically and explicitly permit release of certain statements. Your **answers will be unattributed** in research results and will not mention your name, your organization or any identifiable information without your direct permission.
- All answers are entirely **voluntary**; you may stop and refuse to continue the survey at any time. We will also honor any request to destroy your answers at any time.
- The survey should work with most browsers, but is tested for use with **Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.x** , **Netscape 6.x**, and later versions of either browser.
- Click here for **more information** about this project.

Please log in:

Survey ID

Access Key

Log In

There are 3 current users.

Updated on June 10, 2002

Log In

Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

ABOUT THIS SURVEY
Our Purpose | Your Confidentiality | Your Control | Who We Are | Log In

Our Purpose: Valuable Information for Voluntary Organizations
We know that the organization of governments can be crucial to the welfare of nations; but what about the government of organizations? A wave of recent scholarship has credited voluntary organizations with a major role in the support of stable governments and strong economies. Given this important role, voluntary organizations face two crucial questions:

1. Which organizational political practices and structures are most effective in helping a volunteer-based organization survive and achieve its goals?
2. Which practices and structures may have positive—or negative—effects on the society at large through their effects on the volunteers?

For example, are both organizations and society at large better served when volunteers are involved in electing leaders or making policy decisions? Or do these practices waste time and effort that should be spent elsewhere, instead producing frustrated members and exhausted leaders? The answers are potentially complex, and the jury is still out.

Our chief concern is discovering **practical and specific answers that can be used to advise voluntary organizations**, especially when they are considering reforms in response to challenges to their survival.

This **expert-informant survey of several dozen of the largest U.S. voluntary organizations** is a key component of a project that seeks to collect information about organizations and analyze it in context with other data about members of such organizations. The resulting analysis will be made available to all survey participants who request it; interested organizations will have the opportunity to **influence the direction of the analysis** to help answer specific questions of importance to them. Our hope is that the short-term project will result in a longer-term, case-study collaboration with a few interested organizations.

Your Confidentiality is Guaranteed
None of the questions in this survey is likely to seem intrusive to you. However, all of Duke University's research involving human beings, including survey research, operates under strict supervision by the federal government. Our **promise to keep survey results confidential** simply must be kept if we are not to risk vital federal funding for the university and dire consequences for personal careers. We have taken every technical step to secure the online database from intrusion. Your answers will never be attributed to you or your organization or identifiable in public in any way *unless you give direct permission for us to refer to your organization in the circulated results.*

Your Convenience and Control
This online survey system is intended to give you maximum convenience. The survey is detailed and may take from 10 to 30 minutes (usually 15-20) depending on your answers and level of interest. You can leave the survey and log back in to complete it at a later time. The final page allows the primary authorized contact from each organization to specify whether you and your organization have any further contact with this research project.

Who We Are
Neil Carlson (e-mail) is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Duke University. This research is a central component of his dissertation on civil society and organizational political institutions.

Academic Advisors:

- Chair: ***Michael Munger***, Chairman, Duke University Department of Political Science
- ***John Brehm***, Chairman, University of Chicago Department of Political Science
- ***Herbert Kitschelt***, Duke University Department of Political Science
- ***Sandra McBride***, Duke University Institute of Statistics and Decision Sciences
- ***John Transue***, Duke University Department of Political Science

Click here to log in and take the survey.

Updated June 10, 2002

Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

PLEASE CONFIRM YOUR IDENTIFICATION
The information below was entered based on a call to you or a representative of your organization. Please **make any necessary corrections or additions**. All information will remain strictly confidential. You will not be contacted further without your direct, express permission.

Organization Name

Title (Mr., Mrs., Ms., Dr., Rev., etc.)

First Name(s) with initials as desired

Last Name with suffix as desired

Your **position** in the organization

With which of these **levels** of the organization is your position most closely associated?

- ○ **International**
- ○ U.S. **national**
- ○ U.S. **regional**
- ○ U.S. **local**

Your employment **status**

○ Employee ○ Volunteer

About how many **years** have you been involved with this organization?

years (please enter a whole number from 0 to 99)

About what **year** was the U.S. national organization **founded**?

(please enter a year as a whole number up to 2002)

Reset form | Next Page >>

Your comments on this page (optional): you may use this space throughout the survey to provide any additional information you consider relevant.



Page Updated July 17, 2002

Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

ABOUT VOLUNTEERS OR SUPPORTERS (8 questions)

- On this page, we are concerned with volunteers, by which we mean **all of the people who voluntarily support your organization**, as donors, participants in activities, and so on.
- As you answer questions throughout the survey, please think about **your experience of the last five to ten years** in your organization.
- Please choose the **best answer possible** from the choices provided. If none of the answers seems appropriate, please explain in the Other space provided or in the Comment box at the bottom of each page.
- This is the **longest page** of the survey.

2.1 **Thinking of the last five to ten years**, please check each of the following ten statements that generally **describes your organization**. Check all that apply. Each statement stands alone. If none apply, please check "None of the above" at the end.

- ☐ We have an **official membership system** for volunteers (that is, we distinguish "members" or "partners" or "associates", etc., from non-members).
- ☐ Anyone on our **mailing list** is considered a "member" or some similar category equivalent to a "member" (such as "associate", etc.)
- ☐ Anyone who **donates or pays dues** is considered a "member" or the equivalent

- ☐ Volunteers join the organization through a **formal process**, such as a written application, orientation, nomination, election, initiation, etc.
- ☐ An **official document** such as a charter, constitution, or handbook describes standards, privileges and duties for volunteers.
- ☐ Volunteer membership has **multiple levels** or types with differing privileges and duties

- ☐ **All "members" have responsibilities** they are expected to fulfill
- ☐ Volunteers that neglect their responsibilities can **lose their membership standing**
- ☐ Volunteer membership is **informal in practice**; volunteers come and go with little notice
- ☐ Volunteer membership standards are **strictly enforced**

- ☐ **None of the above** or **Other** (please explain below, or just type "none" to confirm "None of the above" is correct)

2.2 Thinking again of the last five to ten years, which group has done most of the **recruitment of new volunteer supporters** in your organization? (Please choose just one)

- ○ Paid **staff** members

○ Existing **volunteers**

○ This statement is **not applicable**; new volunteers are not actively recruited.

○ **Other**, please explain:

2.3 In what areas of your organization's work have **volunteers participated directly**? (Check all that apply)

☐ **Charitable or service work** on behalf of **non-members**

☐ **Service to fellow members** of the organization

☐ **Public-policy advocacy**

☐ **Other** or **None of the above** - please explain:

2.4 Which group would you say has been **primarily responsible for assigning tasks** to volunteers?

○ **Paid staff** supervise volunteers and assign them tasks

○ **Volunteer leadership** supervise other volunteers and assign them tasks

○ Volunteers are largely **self-guided** and choose their own tasks

○ **Other**, please explain:

2.5 Compared to an average volunteer organization (in your judgment), how much **involvement** would you say **your organization demands from a typical volunteer**? Would you say the demand is well below average, average, well above average, or somewhere in between?

○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Well below average	-	-	**Average**	-	-	**Well above average**

2.6 On the scale below, how would you rate your organization's **typical annual volunteer turnover** over the last five to ten years? Has it been too high, acceptable, very low, or somewhere in between?

○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Too high	-	-	**Acceptable**	-	-	**Very low**

2.7 On the scale below, how would you rate **the commitment level of your organization's typical volunteer supporter** over the last five to ten years? Would you say it is too low, acceptable, very high, or somewhere in between?

○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Too low	-	-	**Acceptable**	-	-	**Very high**

2.8 How would you describe **the overall level of active civic involvement** (not just in your organization, but in all of life) by **your typical volunteer, compared to the typical member of a typical association**? Would you say your average volunteer tends to be involved at a level well below average, average, well above average, or somewhere in between?

○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Well below average	-	-	**Average**	-	-	**Well above average**

Previous Page | Reset | Next Page

Your comments on this page (optional): if you have time, a brief description of your organization's membership system would be very helpful to our research.

Updated May 6, 2002



Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

ORGANIZATIONAL SCOPE AND STRUCTURE (6 questions)

3.1 How would you describe **your organization's scope**?

- ○ **International**; the U.S. is just one of many countries involved.
- ○ **International, but primarily U.S.-based**; our presence in other countries is limited.
- ○ **U.S. only, nationwide**; we have members and/or offices in most states.
- ○ **U.S. only, regional**; we focus our work in a part of the country.

3.2 Where would you say your organization, as a whole, gets the **largest share of its operating budget**?

- ○ **Dues or donations** from members or supporters
- ○ **Fees for products or services** charged to those who use them
- ○ **Grants** from foundations or government agencies
- ○ **Endowment earnings** or other investment proceeds
- ○ **Other**; please explain:

3.3 How much would you say your organization is **dependent on or limited by relationships with other organizations** when making decisions about what to do? (In answering, please consider your relationships with other voluntary organizations, business corporations, and foundations, but **do not include government agencies**, which are covered by question 3.4.)

- ○ we are **very dependent** on other organizations and rarely can decide freely.
- ○ we are **moderately dependent** on other organizations and sometimes cannot decide freely
- ○ we are **moderately independent** of other organizations, relatively self-sufficient and free to decide
- ○ we are **very independent** of other organizations, self-sufficient and free to decide.

3.4 How much would you say your organization is **dependent on or limited by relationships with government agencies** in making decisions about what to do?

- ○ we are **very dependent** on government agencies and rarely can decide freely.
- ○ we are **moderately dependent** on government agencies and sometimes cannot decide freely
- ○ we are **moderately independent** of government agencies, self-sufficient and free to decide
- ○ we are **very independent** of government agencies, self-sufficient and free to decide

3.5 Which **tax-exempt status**, if any, does your organization operate under? (If you are interested, see this IRS publication).

- ○ **501(c)(3)**, Charitable Organizations
- ○ **501(c)(4)**, Social Welfare Organizations
- ○ **501(c)(5)**, Labor and Agricultural Organizations
- ○ **501(c)(6)**, Business Leagues
- ○ **501(c)(7)**, Social Clubs
- ○ **501(c)(10)**, Fraternal Societies
- ○ **501(c)(19)** or **501(c)(23)**, Veterans' Organizations
- ○ **527**, Political Organizations
- ○ **Not applicable**; we are not tax-exempt
- ○ **Not sure** or **other** 501(c) or another tax-exempt status; please explain:

3.6 In addition to your U.S. national office, which of the following **types of branches** does your organization have (check all that apply):

- ☐ **Regional** offices or chapters, serving one or more states, a county, or another mid-level area within a state
- ☐ **Local** offices or chapters serving specific cities, towns, counties or other relatively local levels
- ☐ **None of the above**; the national office stands alone. (You will skip page 4, which deals with local and regional levels).

Previous Page | Reset | Next Page

Your comments on this page (optional): if you have time, a brief description of your organization's scope and structural relationships with other organizations would be helpful.

Updated May 6, 2002



Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

LOCAL AND REGIONAL BRANCHES (6 questions)

4.1 Has your organization had an **official document**, such as a charter or constitution, that describes how the various geographic levels of the organization (local, regional, national, etc.) are expected to relate to one another?

- ○ **Yes**, we have had such a document
- ○ **Partly**: we have had **no document**, but there is a strong **informal set of rules**
- ○ **No**, there is no document and no well-known set of rules
- ○ **Other** (please explain):

4.2 Over the last five to ten years, how **relevant** would you say formal or **"official" rules** are to the way local, regional and national offices actually related to each other **in practice**?

- ○ **Very relevant**; the official rules describe well the way we work
- ○ **Sometimes relevant**; the official rules are not entirely accurate
- ○ **Irrelevant**; the official rules are inapplicable or outdated
- ○ **Other** (please explain):

4.3 How much **autonomy** have local or regional units of the organization generally had?

- ○ Local or regional units are **carefully controlled** to implement national goals.
- ○ Local or regional units have some **limited freedom** to set directions apart from national leadership.
- ○ Local or regional units have **wide latitude** to pursue goals independent of the national organization

4.4 Where would you say **local** offices or chapters got the **largest share** of their operating budgets?

- ○ **Direct dues or donations** from members or supporters
- ○ **Fees for products or services** charged to those who use them
- ○ **Direct grants** to local offices or chapters from foundations or government agencies
- ○ **Fund transfers** from national or regional levels of the organization
- ○ **Other**; please explain (255 characters maximum):

4.5 Where would you say **regional** offices or chapters got the **largest share** of their

operating budgets?

- ○ **Direct dues or donations** from members or supporters
- ○ **Fees for products or services** charged to those who use them
- ○ **Direct grants** to regional offices or chapters from foundations or government agencies
- ○ **Fund transfers** from the **national** organization
- ○ **Fund transfers** from **local** offices or chapters
- ○ **Other**; please explain:

4.6 In your experience of the last five to ten years, **which group has been more influential** over organizational activity, national leadership or local/regional leadership?

- ○ **National leadership** is more influential than local or regional
- ○ **Local or regional leadership** is more influential than national

Previous Page | Reset | Next Page

Your comments on this page (optional): if you have time, a brief description of your local and regional organizational structure would be very helpful.

Page Updated May 6, 2002



Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

LEADERSHIP SELECTION (7 questions)
Please answer the following questions, choosing the best answer possible from the choices provided; if none of the answers seems appropriate, please explain in the Comment box at the bottom of the page.

5.1 Over the last five to ten years, what person or group has had the **highest authority** in your organization? Please answer the question both with respect to **formal or official** authority (in the left column) and **informal or unofficial** authority (in the right column).

Formal or official authority	Informal or unofficial authority	
○	○	The **founder** or founders
○	○	A person or persons **chosen by the founder** or the previous top leader
○	○	The **Board of Directors or Trustees** or a similar body
○	○	**Executive staff** member(s)
○	○	**Elected** representatives of the volunteer membership
○	○	**Other**, please explain and include both formal and informal if they differ:

5.2 What do your organizational rules say about top leadership's **time of service**?

- ○ Top leaders serve **fixed terms in office.**
- ○ Top leaders **do not serve fixed terms**, but they are **evaluated regularly** and may be discharged by the evaluating group.
- ○ Top leaders are **not subject to any formal limits** on their time in office.
- ○ **Other**, please explain:

5.3 Has the top organizational leader been **a volunteer or a paid staff** member?

- ○ **Volunteer** (including those with a small stipend or expense reimbursement)
- ○ **Paid staff**

5.4 Has the chief leader of your organization been **elected**?

- ○ No--the chief leader is **not elected**.
- ○ The chief leader is **elected by the Board** of Directors or Trustees, Executive Board or a similar small group.
- ○ The chief leader is **elected by representatives of local or regional branches.**
- ○ The chief leader is **elected by the volunteer membership**.

○ **Other**, please explain:

5.5 Do you have an **official document** (such as a charter, constitution or by-laws) that **describes leadership selection procedures**?

- ○ **Yes**, we have an **official document**
- ○ **Partly**: We have no official document, but the **informal rules** are well-established
- ○ **No**, we have no document and no strong informal rules
- ○ **Other**, please explain:

5.6 How would you say existing leadership selection procedures have been **implemented** in your organization?

- ○ **Very consistently**; the procedures are almost always followed
- ○ **Somewhat consistently**; procedures are sometimes shelved to save time and trouble
- ○ **Inconsistently**; procedures are followed occasionally
- ○ **Very rarely**; procedures are not followed

5.7 Has your organization held **elections of any kind** for any leadership positions at any level? (If "No", you will skip page 6, which deals with elections)

- ○ **Yes**, we have held leadership elections.
- ○ **No**, we have not had leadership elections (you will skip page 6)

Previous Page | Reset | Next Page

Your comments on this page (optional): if you have time, a brief description of your organization's leadership arrangements would also be valuable.

Page Updated May 6, 2002



Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

ELECTIONS (3 questions)

6.1 Thinking as usual of your experience in the last five to ten years, **how competitive have elections been** in your organization, generally speaking?

- ○ **Very competitive** (multiple candidates and/or narrow margins of victory)
- ○ **Somewhat competitive** (usually at least two candidates for a position, with some close races)
- ○ **Occasionally competitive** (sometimes two candidates, but usually just one for each position)
- ○ **Rarely competitive** (almost always one candidate for each position, who is usually easily elected)
- ○ **Never competitive** (all elections are up-or-down votes on a single candidate)
- ○ **Other**, please explain:

6.2 **How frequently have elections been held** in your organization?

- ○ **More than one election per year**
- ○ At least one election **every one to two years**
- ○ At least one election **every two to four years**
- ○ At least one election **every four or more years**
- ○ **Other**, please explain:

6.3 **How large is the group that usually votes** in your highest-level election?

- ○ **Very small** (up to 20 or 30 people)
- ○ **Moderately small** (more than 20 or 30 people up to several hundred)
- ○ **Moderately large** (more than several hundred people up to several thousand)
- ○ **Very large** (several thousand or more)
- ○ **Other**, please explain:

Previous Page | Reset | Next Page

Your comments on this page (optional): if you have time, a brief description of your organization's elections would be very valuable.



Page Updated May 6, 2002

Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

MEETINGS AND DECISION-MAKING (2 questions)

7.1 How have **major policy changes** (for example, mission statements or key public issue positions) been made in your organization?

- ○ **Executive leadership** has had the flexibility to make major changes **at any time**
- ○ **No meeting** has been necessary, but some form of consultation with Directors, Trustees or the membership by phone, mail or Internet has almost always taken place
- ○ **A board meeting** or other relatively infrequent event has been required
- ○ **A large membership conference** or other high-profile public event has been required
- ○ **Other**, please explain:

7.2 Which of the following **describe your organization's meetings** over the last five to ten years (please check all that apply):

- ☐ Attendance at policy-making meetings has been **open to the full membership**
- ☐ **Volunteers have been able to influence organizational decisions indirectly** through letters, phone calls and financial contributions
- ☐ Volunteer members have decided some policy questions directly by **voting**
- ☐ Policy-making meetings have taken place at **regular, predictable intervals**
- ☐ The organization has held an **annual national membership convention**
- ☐ Volunteers have often attended **local face-to-face meetings** with other volunteers
- ☐ Policy-making has occurred in **local and regional** as well as national meetings
- ☐ Meeting **agenda have been published** and accessible to members in advance of meetings
- ☐ Any volunteer member has been able to place a **"new business" item** on the meeting agenda
- ☐ There have been **written by-laws or rules** describing how meetings are to be conducted
- ☐ Policy-making meetings have followed **parliamentary procedure** (with a chairperson, time limits for speakers, etc.)
- ☐ The **official rules** for conducting meetings have been **inconvenient or inefficient** and often ignored

None of the above / Other (please explain, or just type "none" to confirm

☐ "None of the above" is correct.)

Previous Page | Reset | Next Page

Your comments on this page (optional): if you have time, point out any questions above that bother or confuse you, or offer a brief description of your organization's meetings.

Page Updated May 6, 2002



Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

HISTORY AND ACHIEVEMENT (4 questions)

IMPORTANT NOTE: many survey-takers have found the factual questions on this page difficult to answer without referring to colleagues or reference materials. Accurate answers are certainly welcome if you are willing and have the time to come back to the survey when you have complete information. But **it is more important to us that you finish the survey** than that your answers here be infallible. If you are at all impatient with the survey at this point, please feel free to make an educated guess or simply to enter zeros below. **Thank you!**

8.1 a In the last five to ten years, **how much change would you say has taken place** in the answers to the previous pages? Have membership standards, local branch structure, leadership selection procedures, elections or decision-making meetings changed very much?

- ○ **Very little change** has taken place; the organization is basically the same.
- ○ **Moderate change** has taken place; a few organizational structures and procedures have been changed. (Please **mark any years when changes took place** and describe briefly below.)
- ○ **Dramatic change** has occurred; the organization has been transformed. (Please **mark any years when changes took place** and describe briefly below.)

b Please **describe briefly** what changes you were thinking of if you answered "moderate" or "dramatic change" above:

c Please **check any year(s) in which the changes you described took place**, as you recall:

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

8.2 What was the **approximate number** of your organization's **volunteers, members or supporters** and **total budget** (in millions of dollars) for each year below? If you are not sure, just make the **best quick estimate** you can. Again, all such information will be kept ***strictly confidential*** unless you specifically approve release, and a very approximate answer is preferable to an unfinished survey. Thank You!

	1991	1996	2001
Total volunteers (actual numbers)			
Total budget for all U.S. entities in thousands of dollars (round as necessary; for			

Please use whole numbers; commas will be

example, about $1 million would be entered as "1000" here)

removed

8.3 On the scale below, **how would you rate the performance of your organization in fulfilling its primary mission** over the last five to ten years?

○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Very poor	-	-	**Fair**	-	-	**Very good**

8.4 On the scale below, how would you **describe the trend** in the previous answer? Over those five to ten years, has your organization **improved** in its fulfillment of its mission, **declined**, stayed about **the same**, or somewhere in between?

○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Declined greatly	-	-	**Stayed about the same**	-	-	**Improved greatly**

Previous Page | Reset | Next Page

Your comments on this page (optional): any details you have time to offer on the history of changes in your organization and its mission fulfillment are welcome.

Page Updated June 24, 2002

Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

FINAL WRAP-UP

9.1 You have full control over any **future contact** with this project. It would be very helpful to us, and perhaps to you, if we are able to investigate interesting aspects of your organization further. Please **check any of the following to which you agree**:

☐ Please **send me the research results** as soon as they are available

*The following two options are visible only to you as your organization's **primary authorized contact**.*

☐ **I agree that our organization may be mentioned by name in public research results**, provided the organization has the opportunity to review the materials before any circulation and/or publication.

- If you **do not** check this box, all references to your group will be kept **completely unattributed** in the circulated or published results; identifiable characteristics of your organization will be intentionally obscured.
- If you **do** check here, we commit to give you **at least fifteen business days for your review** of a complete copy of every resulting manuscript, with all references to your group clearly tagged; you may then require that any or all mentions of your organization and answers be made anonymous to your satisfaction.

☐ Our organization may be willing to participate in this research further as an in-depth **case study**. (If you are interested, follow-up could include a web-based survey of your membership that would include questions of interest to the organization as well as to this project).

☐ I, personally, am willing to be **contacted further** for a follow-up **interview**.

Preferred e-mail address for contact**:** (optional)

If you are willing to be contacted by phone, please add (or confirm) your phone number and indicate the best time to call:

Phone: (optional) **Best time to call:** (optional)

9.2 Thank you for your patience; this is the **very last item**. This survey has a **invitation feature**, which allows you to decide whether you wish to **invite others to take the survey**. Your answers are valuable and undoubtedly very accurate; but our research conclusions will have greater credibility if we have several questionnaires from each organization. Please help us by inviting additional persons at your organization . Those with **5-10 years experience** in the organization will be the most valuable. Each person you name below will automatically receive an e-mail invitation to take the survey.

*The following wave-limit option is available only to you as the **primary authorized contact**:*

As the primary contact, you may specify **how many waves of invitations are permitted** within your organization; the system will strictly enforce your preferences. We would be pleased to provide you with a summary of the results for your organization, if you wish (use the comment space below to make your request).

Number of invitation waves permitted:	**Max. Replies**
○ **No invitations**, please (no one else will be invited to take this survey)	**1**
○ **One wave**; invite only those persons I name below	**6**
○ **Two waves**; each person named below may invite up to five more	**31**
○ **Three waves**; the second wave may invite up to five more each	**156**

ISSUE INVITATIONS TO UP TO FIVE PEOPLE IN YOUR ORGANIZATION:

1. E-mail address:

First, Last Name:

Position:

Optional **message** from you to the invitee:

2. E-mail address:

First, Last Name:

Position:

Optional **message** from you to the invitee:

3. E-mail address:

First, Last Name:

Position:

Optional **message** from you to the invitee:

4. E-mail address:

First, Last Name:

Position:

Optional **message** from

you to the invitee:

5. E-mail address:

First, Last Name:

Position:

Optional **message** from you to the invitee:

Previous Page | Reset | FINISH SURVEY

Final comments (optional): if there is anything else you would like to communicate, please do so here. Thank you!

Updated June 25, 2002



Duke University Voluntary Organizations Survey

Thank you!

Your survey has been **successfully finished**.

If you have any questions, please contact this survey's coordinator, Neil Carlson

Sponsored by the Department of Political Science at Duke University

APPENDIX B: Codebook for NES 1996 Auxiliary File on Group Memberships

The following eight pages reprint the codebook provided to the National Election Studies to document this project's share of the data now found in the 1996 Auxiliary File on Group Memberships.

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
RespID	R's scrambled NES96 post-election caseID	Provided by NES with SPAR data
Mentions	R's total number of group mentions	Integer from 1 to 30 (respondents with 0 mentions are not included in this data)
OrgLarge	R's number of group mentions of large orgs mentioned at least twice; denominator for calculating each R's percent of large orgs with missing institutional data.	Integer from 0 to 11
OrgFinished	R's number of large orgs supplying institutional data	Integer from 0 to 6
OrgMentionAvg	Average total mentions by all R's of large orgs mentioned by this R	Decimal from 2 to 266
OrgMentionSD	Standard deviation of OrgMentionAvg	Decimal from 0 to 186.676

Part 1. Specific Organizations with >=20 mentions

(hidden for confidentiality, not released by NES)

Part 2. Group mention categories		***NES1996 Group No.***	
GrpLabor	Labor Unions	1	Number of times R mentioned Labor Unions
GrpProf	Professional Groups	2	Number of times R mentioned Professional Groups
GrpVet	Veterans' Groups	3	Number of times R mentioned Veterans' Groups
GrpChurch	Churches	4	Number of times R mentioned Churches
GrpRelig	Other Religious Groups	5	Number of times R mentioned Other Religious Groups
GrpElderly	Elderly/Senior Groups	6	Number of times R mentioned Elderly/Senior Groups
GrpEthnic	Ethnic Groups	7	Number of times R mentioned Ethnic Groups
GrpWom	Women's Groups	8	Number of times R mentioned Women's Groups
GrpPolIssue	Political Issue Groups	9	Number of times R mentioned Political Issue Groups
GrpCivic	Civic Groups	10	Number of times R mentioned Civic Groups
GrpIdeo	Ideological Groups	11	Number of times R mentioned Ideological Groups
GrpParty	Political Parties	12	Number of times R mentioned Political

Field Name	Description/Purpose		Coding Notes
			Parties
GrpYouth	Youth and Children's Groups	13	Number of times R mentioned Youth and Children's Groups
GrpLit	Literary/Art Groups	14	Number of times R mentioned Literary/Art Groups
GrpSport	Hobby/Sport Groups	15	Number of times R mentioned Hobby/Sport Groups
GrpNbor	Neighborhood Groups	16	Number of times R mentioned Neighborhood Groups
GrpFrat	Fraternal/Service Groups	17	Number of times R mentioned Fraternal/Service Groups
GrpChar	Charity Groups	18	Number of times R mentioned Charity Groups
GrpEduc	Educational Groups	19	Number of times R mentioned Educational Groups
GrpCult	Cultural Groups	20	Number of times R mentioned Cultural Groups
GrpSelf	Self-Help Groups	21	Number of times R mentioned Self-Help Groups
GrpOther	Other Groups	22	Number of times R mentioned Other Groups
Part 3. Group Mention Details			
Member	Sum of mentions R says is a member		Sum of "Yes" responses to "Are you a member of this group?" (NES 96 confidential Q702, Q710, Q718, etc.)
Money	Sum of mentions R says gave money		Sum of "Yes" responses to "In the past 12 months have you paid dues or given any money to this group?" (NES 96 confidential Q703, Q711, Q719, etc.)
DuesPayer	Sum of mentions R says paid dues		Sum of "Dues" or "Both" responses to "Which is that? (Dues, contributions, or both?)" (NES 96 confidential Q704, Q712, Q720, etc.)
Donor	Sum of mentions R says made donation		Sum of "Donations" or "Both" responses to "Which is that? (Dues, contributions, or both?)" (NES 96 confidential Q704, Q712, Q720, etc.)
Activity	Sum of mentions R says joined activity		Sum of "Yes" responses to "In the last 12 months have you taken part in any activities sponsored by this group or attended a meeting of this group?" (NES 96 confidential Q705, Q713, Q721, etc.)

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
Meeter	Sum of mentions R says went to meetings	Sum of "Meeting" or "Both" responses to "Which is that? (Attended a meeting, taken part in an activity or what)?" (NES 96 confidential Q706, Q714, Q722, etc.)
Player	Sum of mentions R says went to other activities	Sum of "Activity" or "Both" responses to "Which is that? (Attended a meeting, taken part in an activity or what)?" (NES 96 confidential Q706, Q714, Q722, etc.)
DiscPol	Sum of political discussion freq score	Sum of all responses to "How often does this group discuss politics -- often, sometimes, rarely, or never?" (NES 96 confidential Q707, Q715, Q723, etc.), where the scale is reversed and based at 0 (0 = Never, 1 = Rarely, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = Often); divide by "Mentions" variable to get R's average score.
DiscPolSD	Std. dev. of political discussion score	Standard deviation of R's DiscPol variable above for reference.
Part 4. New Group Mention Variables		
FTFfreq	Sum of impressionistic rating of probable frequency of face-to-face meetings	Investigator Carlson subjectively rated each mention from 1 to 5 on the probability of face-to-face interaction, where groups rated 1 are presumptively mail-order or otherwise have little or no personal interaction, groups rated 5 probably hold frequent small meetings as a matter of course. Divide by total number of mentions (variable "Mentions") to get R's average
Religious	Sum of all apparently religious orgs	Includes all mentions of churches and "other religious groups" as well as any mention in other group categories with an overt religious affiliation.
Bible	Sum of all "Bible Studies"	Sum of all mentions with the words "Bible study" or similar effect
CatholicLay	Sum of all catholic lay orgs	Sum of all mentions of any Catholic lay organization
GenderF	Sum of all gender-specific female	Sum of all mentions of any organization naming women or explicitly for women (e.g. veterans' groups "Auxiliaries", etc.)
GenderM	Sum of all gender-specific male	Sum of all mentions of any organization whose name indicates it is clearly for

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
		men only (not necessarily reflective of discriminatory admission policies where the name does not make this apparent)
Board	Sum of all "Board Member"	Sum of all mentions with any reference to a role on a Board
Emergency	Sum of all vol. emergency services	Sum of all mentions with any reference to volunteer fire, police or medical (public goods provision)
NeighborhoodGen	Sum of all nbrhood orgs	Sum of all mentions of neighborhood or community
NeighborhoodWatch	Sum of all nbrhood watch orgs	Sum of all neighborhood or community watch mentions
Homeowners	Sum of all homeowners' orgs	Sum of all homeowners or community association mentions
Environmentalist	Sum of all environmentalist orgs	Sum of all environmental or conservation mentions
Greek	Sum of all Greek (fraternity/sorority) orgs	Sum of all organizations with Greek letters in the name (except obvious churches, etc.)
Sports	Sum of all sports orgs	Sum of all mentions of any adult sporting group
YouthSport	Sum of all youth sports orgs	Sum of all mentions of any youth sporting group
Soccer	Sum of all soccer orgs	Sum of all soccer mentions
Bowling	Sum of all bowling orgs	Sum of all bowling mentions
Golf	Sum of all golf orgs	Sum of all golf mentions
PublicMedia	Sum of all public media (NPR, PBS, etc.)	Sum of all references to NPR, public radio, PBS, public TV
Part 5. Organizational Institutional Exposures (for question text, see referenced question numbers in accompanying file duke_survey.pdf)		***Sum of all large orgs mentioned by R that responded as indicated [bracketed text marks exceptions to this counting approach]. Divide all sums by the "OrgsFinished" variable above to get average scores.***
MemOfficial	Number of official membership orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to Duke University/Carlson survey question 2.1.1
MemFormal	Number of formal induction procedures	"Yes" (checked box) to survey question 2.1.4
MemDoc	Sum of membership document orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to survey question 2.1.5
MemLevels	Sum of membership levels orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to survey question

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
		2.1.6
MemResp	Sum of membership responsibility orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to survey question 2.1.7
MemLose	Sum of membership-conditional orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to survey question 2.1.8
MemInform	Number of memberships informal-in-practice	"Yes" (checked box) to survey question 2.1.9
MemEnforc	Sum of orgs strictly enforcing membership standards	"Yes" (checked box) to survey question 2.1.10
MemRecStaff	Sum of orgs reporting staff recruit new volunteers	"Paid staff" to survey question 2.2
MemRecVol	Sum of orgs reporting volunteers recruit new volunteers	"Existing volunteers" to survey question 2.2
MemPartChar	Sum of orgs reporting volunteers do charitable work	"Charitable or service work on behalf of non-members" to question 2.3
MemPartFellow	Sum of orgs reporting volunteers do service to fellow members	"Service to fellow members of the organization" to question 2.3
MemPartPolicy	Sum of orgs reporting volunteers do public policy advocacy	"Public policy advocacy" to question 2.3
MemTaskVol	Number of orgs reporting volunteers are supervised by volunteers	"Volunteer leadership" to question 2.4
MemTaskSelf	Number of orgs reporting volunteers are self-guided	"Self-guided" to question 2.4
MemInvolve	Sum of membership involvement scores	[Sum of scaled answers reported in question 2.5 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates a demand for member involvement "well below average" and 7 indicates "well above average"]
MemTurnover	Sum of membership turnover scores	[Sum of scaled answers reported in question 2.6 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates membership turnover "Too high" and 7 indicates "very low" turnover.]
MemCommit	Sum of membership commitment scores	[Sum of scaled answers reported in question 2.7 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates membership commitment "too low" and 7 indicates "very high"]
MemCivic	Sum of membership civicness scores	[Sum of scaled answers reported in question 2.5 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates perceived overall civic involvement "well below average" and 7 indicates "well above average".]

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
BranchLoc	Sum of local branch orgs	"Local offices or chapters" in question 3.6
BranchAuto	Sum of local branch autonomy scores	[Sum of scaled answers to question 4.3 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates "carefully controlled" branches and 3 indicates "wide latitude" for local branches.]
BranchInfluence	Sum of local branch influence scores	"Local or regional leadership" in question 4.6
AuthFormElec	Number of formal electoral authority	"Elected representatives" in "formal" column of question 5.1
AuthInfElec	Number with informal electoral authority	"Elected representatives" in "informal" column of question 5.1
LeadTerms	Sum of leadership term limits scores	[Sum of reversed scaled answers to question 5.2 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 0 indicates "no formal limits" and 2 indicates "fixed terms of office" for organizational leaders.]
LeadVol	Number with volunteer top leadership	"Volunteer" in question 5.3
LeadElecTop	Sum of score for election of top leadership	[Sum of scaled answers to question 5.4 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates "the top leader is not elected" and 4 indicates "elected by the volunteer membership".]
ElecComp	Sum of electoral competitiveness scores	[Sum of reversed scaled answers to question 6.1 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 0 indicates elections are "never competitive" and 4 indicates "very competitive" elections.]
ElecFreq	Sum of electoral frequency scores	[Sum of reversed scaled answers to question 6.2 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 0 indicates elections are held every four years or more and 3 indicates annual or more frequent elections.]
ElecSize	Sum of electorate size scores	[Sum of scaled answers to question 6.3 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates electorates are "very small" and 4 indicates "very large" electorates.]
PolicyAny	Sum of autocratic policy orgs	"Executives make major changes at any time" to question 7.1
PolicyConv	Sum of convention-governed orgs	"Large membership conference" to question 7.1
MtgOpen	Sum of open meeting orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.1

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
PolicyInfl	Sum of member policy influence scores	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.2
PolicyVote	Sum of member referenda scores	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.3
MtgReg	Sum of orgs with regularly scheduled meetings	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.4
MtgConv	Sum of annual convention scores	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.5
MtgFace	Sum of face-to-face meeting scores	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.6
PolicyLocal	Sum of local policymaking scores	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.7
MtgAgenda	Sum of business meeting agenda scores	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.8
MtgNewBus	Sum of orgs allowing new business on agenda by members	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.9
MtgDoc	Sum of meeting document orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.10
MtgParl	Sum of parliamentary procedure orgs	"Yes" (checked box) to question 7.1.11
MissionPerf	Sum of mission performance scores	[Sum of scaled answers reported in question 8.3 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates mission performance is "very poor" and 7 indicates "very good"]
MissionTrend	Sum of mission performance trend scores	[Sum of scaled answers reported in question 8.4 by large orgs mentioned by R, where 1 indicates mission performance has "declined greatly" and 7 indicates "improved greatly".]
Calculated variables from the above:		
AuthSame	Sum of orgs with same formal/informal structure	If formal and informal columns of 5.1 match, 1, else 0
ElecScore	Sum of overall electivity scores	ElecScore is ElecComp*ElecFreq*ElecSize, ranging from 0 to 36 (3*3*4); variable is sum of all scores from large orgs mentioned by R and responding to the survey.
ElecScoreSD	Standard deviation of electivity scores	Standard deviation of ElecScore above, calculated by Microsoft Access

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
OrgPartic	Mean organizational democracy or "participatory" score	Latent variable measuring organizational participatory practices generated by SAS PROC CALIS measurement model from the following variables listed above: AuthFormElec AuthInfElec LeadElecTop LeadElecAny ElecComp ElecFreq ElecSize PolicyConv MtgOpen PolicyVote MtgFace MtgNewBus MtgReg MtgAgenda MtgDoc MtgParl
OrgParticMax	Max organizational democracy or participatory score	Maximum value of OrgPartic above for any org mentioned by R
OrgParticSD	Std. dev. of organizational democracy score	Standard deviation of OrgPartic above, calculated by Microsoft Access
OrgConst	Mean membership constitutionality score	Latent variable measuring membership constitutionality generated by SAS PROC CALIS measurement model from the following variables listed above: MemOfficial MemResp MemLose MemFormal MemDoc MemInform MemEnforc
OrgConstMax	Max membership constitutionality score	Maximum value of OrgConst above for any org mentioned by R
OrgConstSD	Std. dev. of constitutionality score	Standard deviation of OrgConst above, calculated by Microsoft Access
OrgSuccess	Mean organizational success score	Latent variable measuring membership constitutionality generated by SAS PROC CALIS measurement model from the following variables listed above: MemCommit MemTurnover MemCivic MissionPerf MissionTrend

Field Name	Description/Purpose	Coding Notes
OrgSuccessMax	Max organizational success score	Maximum value of OrgSuccess above for any org mentioned by R
OrgSuccessSD	Std. dev of organizational success score	Standard deviation of OrgSuccess above, calculated by Microsoft Access

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Biography

Neil Carlson was born March 13, 1969 in Arcadia, California. He graduated *summa cum laude* from Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois in May 1990, with a bachelor of arts degree in two disciplines, Political Science and Biblical Studies, and a certificate from the Human Needs and Global Resources (HNGR) program for his 1989 internship in Lima, Peru. From 1990 to 1996, he was a full-time administrator for Young Life in Southern California, a non-profit Christian youth organization. He is the co-author with Wendy Rahn and John Brehm of "National Elections as Institutions for Generating Social Capital," published by Brookings in 1999 as Chapter 4 of *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina. As a Ph.D. student in Political Science at Duke University, he has received a departmental fellowship, a James B. Duke Fellowship from Fall 1996 to Spring 2000, a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship from Summer 1997 to Spring 2000, a teaching fellowship from the Duke University Gerst Program in Political, Economic and Humanistic Studies from Fall 2001 to Spring 2002, and a position as a Pre-Doctoral Research Associate at the Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio, from Fall 2003 to Summer 2004. As of this writing, he will be Assistant Director of the Center for Social Research at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, beginning in August 2004.